1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions
Ms Deborah Hallam
v
Sodexo Remote Sites Australia Pty Ltd
(C2017/4642)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOSTENCNIK
DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN
COMMISSIONER MCKINNON
MELBOURNE, 15 MARCH 2018
Appeal against decision [2017] FWC 4105 of Commissioner Spencer in Brisbane on 4 August
2017 in matter number U2017/3968.
[1] Deborah Hallam was employed by Sodexo Remote Sites Australia Pty Ltd (Sodexo).
Her position was made redundant and she was dismissed on 24 March 2017. At the time of
dismissal, she was employed as a full time fly in, fly out “Relief Project Manager” in one of
the company’s ‘relief pool’, which backfilled positions at various worksites during periods of
employee absence. She had not been rostered to work since September 2016.
[2] On 4 August 2017, Commissioner Spencer dismissed an application by Ms Hallam for
a remedy in relation to unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) (the
Decision).
[3] On 19 December 2017, we granted Ms Hallam permission to appeal the Decision after
identifying an arguable error in relation to the Commissioner’s application of section
389(1)(b) of the FW Act. No other arguable case of appealable error was identified in the
Decision. We concluded:
[38] The Commissioner considered the consultation processes undertaken by
Sodexo. However, it is at least arguable that she did not make a finding about whether
there was an obligation to consult under the relevant award or agreement. A failure to
make such a finding would have the result that the Commissioner could not have been
satisfied that the criterion in subsection 389(1)(b) had been met. Accordingly, we
consider that an arguable case of appealable error is established. [Endnote omitted]
[4] On 14 and 15 February 2018 the parties consented to the appeal being determined on
the papers. This decision deals with the appeal.
[2018] FWCFB 1496
DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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Relevant law
[5] Under section 385 of the FW Act, a person has not been unfairly dismissed if their
dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. The expression ‘genuine redundancy’ is defined
in section 389 as follows:
“389 Meaning of genuine redundancy
(1) A person’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy if:
(a) the person’s employer no longer required the person’s job to be
performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the
employer’s enterprise; and
(b) the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or
enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the
redundancy.
(2) A person’s dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy if it would have
been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be redeployed within:
(a) the employer’s enterprise; or
(b) the enterprise of an associated entity of the employer.”
[6] A dismissal is not a ‘genuine redundancy’ if the employer has not complied with any
obligation in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to Ms Hallam’s
employment and required it to consult about the redundancy.1 In order for such a finding to be
made, it is first necessary to determine whether there was a relevant modern award or
enterprise agreement consultation obligation.
The Decision
[7] The question of whether a modern award or enterprise agreement applied to Ms
Hallam was in issue in the proceedings.
[8] The Commissioner considered the requirements of section 389(1)(b) from paragraphs
[71] to [75] of the Decision.2 Relevantly, she observed that:
s.389(1)(b) - the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or
enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the
redundancy
[71] In relation to considering the consultation obligations under the Agreement,
whilst cl.11 does not name Relief Project Manager as a relevant position, the list of
positions is not exhaustive. Further, the duties performed by the Applicant, had
similarities to some of the duties of various positions explicitly identified.
1 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.389(1)(a)
2 Hallam v Sodexo Remote Sites Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 4105 Decision at [71] - [75]
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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[72] Clause 11 of the Agreement states:
“11. CLASSIFICATIONS
Employees will be employed at the following levels as determined by the Company:
Level Hospitality and Facility
Management Stream
Facility Maintenance Stream
Typical positions & duties of position.
1 Typically. includes positions
requiring at least an AQF Certificate
IV or equivalent skill gained through
experience, such as:
● Catering Manager
● Head Chef
● Executive Chef
Facility Maintainer 1: Typically includes
positions requiring at least an AQF
Certificate IV or equivalent skill gained
through experience, such as:
● Highly skilled building and related
maintenance tradespersons with post trade
qualifications, demonstrable capacity to
repair and maintain complex equipment or
systems; or cross trade qualifications
(includes Plumber, Gas Fitter, Electrician,
Refrigeration Mechanic/Air Conditional
Mechanic, Carpenter).
2 Typically includes positions requiring
at least an AQF Certificate III or
equivalent skill gained through
experience, such as:
● Qualified Chef
● Breakfast Chef
● Second Chef
● Administration Manager
● Accommodation Manager
● Bar Manager/ Tavern Manager
● Security Supervisor
● Parks and Gardens Manager
● Airport Manager
● Village Services Manager
● Cleaning Manager
● Reporting Officer
● Warehouse Manager
● Horticulturalist
● Airport Refuelling Officer
● Airport Reporting Officer
Facility Maintainer 2: Typically includes
positions requiring at least an AQF
Certificate III or equivalent skill gained
through experience, such as:
● Base qualified building and related
maintenance tradespersons (includes but
not limited to Water Treatment Plant
Operator, Sewage Treatment Plant
Operator)
…”
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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[73] On the basis that the Applicant’s employment was covered by the Agreement, and
the consultation obligations in the Agreement, were required to be observed by the
Respondent, the case of Ulan Coal Mine Limited v Howarth & Ors is relevant to the
required consultation:
“[31] We do not consider, in the particular circumstances of the present matter
and having regard to the obligation under sub-clause 23.1 of the Agreement,
that a further round of discussions was required to be held by the Company
with the employees to be dismissed, either separately or as a group. This does
not mean that such separate discussions might not be worthwhile and
appropriate e.g. as part of the consideration of measures to mitigate the adverse
affects of terminations or to ensure that opportunities for other employment
and assistance are properly examined. However they are not part of the
discussions envisaged and required under sub-clause 23.1 of the Agreement
and that is the test in these particular circumstances. In different circumstances
this will of course vary according to the terms of particular awards and
agreements.”
[74] It is noted, however that the Applicant did not seek to rely on a failure to consult
as to the operational decision, as grounds to dismiss the jurisdictional objection. The
Applicant’s submissions relating to consultation and mitigation, were made in
reference to the “reasonableness” element of s.389(2), in relation to redeployment.
The Applicant’s representative noted the time lag between when the decision was
made to approve the strategy to remove the relief pools, and when the employees were
told, and how it impacted on the redeployment process. The Applicant argued that if
the employees had been notified or consulted at an earlier stage, jobs that were
available at an earlier time (than when they were notified) could have been isolated for
the redeployment exercise.
[75] Consideration has been given to the processes engaged in by the Respondent, to
consult with the Applicant, regarding the redundancy decision.
[Footnotes omitted]
[9] At paragraphs [109] – [112] of the Decision3, the Commissioner set out her findings:
[109] Having regard to the matters outlined above, and in particular the requirements
of s.389(2) of the Act, the Respondent has satisfied that the termination of the
Applicant’s employment was a case of genuine redundancy.
[110] Having stated this, the Respondent is a significant employer and it would have
been reasonable for the Respondent to notify the Applicant of the redundancy, at an
earlier date, and commence exploring redeployment opportunities at that time. It
would also have been reasonable to properly consult with the Applicant, regarding the
requirements of specific positions identified as possible avenues for redeployment, and
provide all relevant information with the group of positions at the earliest stage. Whilst
these are noted as deficiencies, the evidence does not confirm that there would have
3 Hallam v Sodexo Remote Sites Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FWC 4105 Decision at [109] - [112]
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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been a different redeployment outcome, in the circumstances where the Respondent
was changing its operations.
[111] However, the Applicant was also requested to express interest in positions. The
Respondent argued that the Applicant had been confrontational during the
redeployment process, and was not reasonably proactive or responsive during the
redeployment period. It may have been appropriate to adapt the procedures to account
for the periods where there were lapses in communication between the parties.
Expanding the period or commencing redeployment consultation earlier, and
providing a full list of potential alternative jobs with sufficient information for the
Applicant to express relevant interest, may have accommodated this.
[112] However, this does not overcome the case that there was not a suitable position,
within the Respondent’s or its associated entities’ enterprises, that the Applicant could
have been reasonably redeployed to. Accordingly, despite the identified procedural
deficiencies, they are not considered to be fatal to the Respondent’s procedure, and the
jurisdictional objection must be upheld. Consultation was engaged in, and a reasonable
redeployment exercise occurred. An alternative position was not available on the
evidence, and therefore, it was not reasonable in the circumstances to redeploy the
Applicant.
[113] Having taken into account all of the facts and circumstances, against the
legislative tests, the dismissal is considered to be a case of genuine redundancy, in
accordance with s.387 of the Act. The substantive application made pursuant to s.394
of the Act is therefore, dismissed.
[Footnotes omitted]
[10] The Commissioner clearly considered the question of consultation under the
Agreement. She took into account the Agreement’s classification structure and made a
number of observations suggesting at least a preliminary view that the Agreement might
apply to Ms Hallam. However, there is no reference to any actual obligation to consult about
redundancy either under a modern award or the Agreement in the Decision, and in particular
whether such consultation obligations applied or had been met.
[11] We consider it likely that the approach adopted in the Decision was informed by the
way the matter was conducted, as the obligation to consult was not central to the issues in
dispute. Nevertheless, the finding at [112] of the Decision that “consultation was engaged in”
was not a finding that consultation obligations under the relevant modern award or enterprise
agreement had been met.
[12] In our view, a fair reading of the Decision leads to the conclusion that no finding was
made on whether the criterion in subsection 389(1)(b) of the FW Act had been met. There is
no express finding, and we do not consider that one can be inferred. The Commissioner could
not therefore have been satisfied that the dismissal was a genuine redundancy. Her conclusion
at [113] of the Decision to that effect was a jurisdictional error.
[13] We uphold the appeal on the basis of the error identified and quash the Decision.
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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[14] In her written submissions, the appellant contended that, should the Full Bench quash
the Decision, the appropriate course would be for us to refer the matter to a member of the
Commission to be decided afresh.4 Ms Hallam submitted that she wished to have the
opportunity to convince the Commission that, taking into account new evidence, it would
have been reasonable for the company to redeploy her. However, as we noted when rejecting
the appellant’s application to the Full Bench for leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal,
there is no explanation as to why the evidence in question could not have been identified
earlier through the usual processes and put before the Commissioner at first instance. In our
opinion, the appropriate course is for us now to proceed to re-determine the jurisdictional
objection.
Was the dismissal a ‘genuine redundancy’?
[15] The facts in this matter which are either agreed or do not appear to be contested are
summarised below.
1. Ms Hallam was employed by Sodexo on or about 5 November 2006 in the role of
‘domestic’.5
2. From on or about 1 March 2014, Ms Hallam was employed in the role of “Relief
Project Manager” working in one of four ‘relief pools’ operated by Sodexo.6
3. On 12 May 2016, a significant client of Sodexo asked it not to return Ms Hallam to
work sites operated by the client.7
4. Ms Hallam remained employed and paid as a permanent member of the ‘relief pool’,
but from 20 September 2016 she did not perform any work for Sodexo.
5. In late 2016 / early 2017, Sodexo embarked on a process of terminating the four ‘relief
pools’ after a business decision to outsource the function to third party labour agencies
as required.8
6. On 24 February 2017, Ms Hallam was sent a letter advising of her redundancy and
that she should “consider other suitable redeployment opportunities within the
business”. The letter enclosed a “full list of current vacancies within our business
nationally” and invited her to “notify” Sodexo of any position on the list she was
interested in, by reference to work location and her knowledge, skills, experience,
qualifications and licenses.9 Ms Hallam did not receive the letter until 2 March 2017.10
7. Between 2 March 2017 and 24 March 2017, Ms Hallam and Sodexo exchanged
correspondence about the redundancy, potential alternative roles for Ms Hallam and
the redeployment process. Potential redeployment opportunities for Ms Hallam were
4 Appellants' submissions paragraph 12 and following
5 AB317
6 AB308
7 AB387
8 Exhibit 4
9 AB342
10 AB418-9
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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identified by Sodexo during that period but none were the subject of an expression of
interest from Ms Hallam.11
8. On 24 March 2017, Ms Hallam’s employment was terminated on the grounds of
redundancy.12
[16] Under section 385 of the FW Act, a person has been unfairly dismissed if the
Commission is satisfied of certain matters, including that the dismissal was not a case of
genuine redundancy.
[17] Section 389 of the FW Act defines ‘genuine redundancy’ as set out earlier.
[18] Sodexo objected to Ms Hallam’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy on the
basis that her dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. Ms Hallam disagreed, primarily on
the basis that it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for her to be redeployed.
[19] It is thus necessary to determine whether the dismissal was a case of genuine
redundancy for the purposes of section 389 of the FW Act.
[20] In this regard, we are satisfied that Ms Hallam’s job was no longer required to be
performed by anyone because of changes in Sodexo’s operational requirements. We accept
Sodexo’s evidence that a business decision was made, and subsequently implemented, to
terminate the four relief pools in favour of reliance on third party labour agencies as
required.13 This evidence was not challenged in any meaningful way. In our view, the change
was a change in Sodexo’s operational requirements which ultimately meant that none of the
jobs held by employees in the relief pools, including that of Relief Project Manager, were
required by Sodexo to be performed by anyone.
[21] For the reasons set out in our earlier decision14, we are also satisfied that it would not
have been reasonable in all the circumstances for Ms Hallam to be redeployed in either
Sodexo’s enterprise or that of its associated entities, IFM Services Pty Ltd or Sodexo
Australia Pty Ltd. The evidence simply did not reach the requisite threshold.
[22] That leaves the question of whether Sodexo complied with any obligation in a modern
award or enterprise agreement that applied to Ms Hallam’s employment to consult about the
redundancy. To answer that question, it is necessary to determine whether any such obligation
arose.
[23] According to Sodexo, the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 201015 (the Award)
applies to Sodexo’s business. For present purposes, we accept Sodexo’s implicit concession
that it is an employer in the hospitality industry to which the Award applies. However, neither
party submitted that the Award covered Ms Hallam’s employment and we are satisfied that it
did not.
11 Exhibit 1; AB295-397
12 AB397
13 Exhibit 4
14 [2017] FWCFB 6847
15 MA000009
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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[24] A modern award covers an employee if the award is expressed to cover the
employee.16 In this case, the Award is an industry award that covers:
“…employers throughout Australia in the hospitality industry and their employees in
the classifications within Schedule D—Classification Definitions to the exclusion of
any other modern award.”
[25] The “principal purpose test” is also relevant to whether an employee is covered by a
modern award or enterprise agreement.17 The test was summarised in Carpenter v Corona
Manufacturing18 as follows:
“In our view, in determining whether or not a particular award applies to identified
employment, more is required than a mere quantitative assessment of the time spent in
carrying out various duties. An examination must be made of the nature of the work
and the circumstances in which the employee is employed to do the work with a view
to ascertaining the principal purpose for which the employee is employed. In this case,
such an examination demonstrates that the principal purpose for which the appellant
was employed was that of a manager. As such, he was not "employed in the process,
trade, business or occupation of ... soliciting orders, obtaining sales leads or
appointments or otherwise promoting sales for articles, wares, merchandise or
materials" and was not, therefore, covered by the Award.”
[26] At the time of dismissal, Ms Hallam was employed as “Relief Project Manager”. This
role required her “to manage and have full accountability for managing the work site”.19 She
described this as:
“The daily running of the site in its entirety. The whole village. Kitchen, dining room,
cleaning, administration, accommodation, payroll. Whether or not it had a cabin. Some
do not. Maintenance, grounds, utilities. It can be buses. The whole shebang.”20
[27] Relevantly, an earlier job description for the role of “Project Manager” describes the
purpose of the role as “to ensure the effective management of all aspects of the service
agreement and agreed Key Performance Indicators with client in order to ensure the optimum
performance of the site. To ensure that the highest achievable quality is maintained and meets
the scope of work within budget.” Indicative duties for the role include a range of managerial
functions, including implementing and applying quality assurance procedures, ensuring
compliance with relevant laws and contracts, managing workplace performance and
overseeing disciplinary action, managing ‘core business’ on site including in health and
safety, catering and accommodation packages, cleaning standards, care and security of
company property and monies as well as delivery of training.21
16 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.48.
17 See, for example, Graham v Globus Medical Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FWCFB 5495; McMenemy v Thomas Duryea
Consulting Pty Ltd [2012] FWAFB 7184; Layton v North Goonyella Coal Mines Pty Ltd [2007] AIRCFB 713; The
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Teys Australia Beenleigh Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 5643
18 122 IR 387 (AIRC, 17 December 2002) at [9].
19 AB53
20 AB79
21 AB263
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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[28] Schedule D to the Award sets out the range of classifications covered by its terms.
They include food and beverage attendant, kitchen attendant and cook, guest service and front
office employee, administrative and security staff, leisure attendant, storeperson and gardener.
Some of the classifications progress to a supervisory level within the relevant stream.
[29] As far as “managerial staff” are concerned, the Award contains the classification of
“Hotel Manager”. For the purpose of the classification, “hotel” is broadly defined to cover a
range of retail licensed establishments. It is not clear on the evidence whether the projects
Ms Hallam managed involved retail licensed establishments. That aside, a Hotel Manager
under the Award is an employee (however designated) who:
under the direction of senior management is required to manage and co-ordinate the
activities of a relevant area or areas of the hotel; and
directs staff to ensure they carry out their duties in the relevant area or areas of the
hotel; and
implements policies, procedures and operating systems for the hotel.
[30] Indicative positions within the scope of the “Hotel Manager” classification include
“Duty manager”, “Assistant food and beverage manager” and other equivalent positions.
[31] Senior management employees with responsibility for a significant area of operations
of one or more “hotels” are excluded from the definition of Hotel Manager. Indicative roles
include Venue manager, General/hotel manager and Regional manager.
[32] In our view, the type of manager covered by the Award is one with responsibility for a
particular shift or function within a hotel as defined. It does not extend to managers who have
general responsibility for a venue, site or region.
[33] This is in contrast to Ms Hallam’s role, which at the time of dismissal, was to manage
and have general responsibility for work sites as required. Her role was not limited to the
management of discrete shifts or functions at those sites. Her level of responsibility and the
range of duties which she was contracted to perform were akin to the type of roles expressly
excluded from the Hotel Manager classification. In our view, no other Award classification
was sufficiently broad to align with the principal purpose of Ms Hallam’s role. Accordingly,
we find that Ms Hallam was not covered by the Award.
[34] We now turn to consider the Agreement. Under section 53 of the Act, an enterprise
agreement covers an employee if the agreement is expressed to cover the employee.
[35] Sodexo’s national onshore business is covered by the Sodexo Remote Sites Onshore
Enterprise Agreement 201322 (the Agreement). Ms Hallam argued that her role was classified
as Level 2 in the Hospitality and Facility Management Stream of the Agreement because she
regularly performed the duties of positions identified by way of example in that classification.
Sodexo disagreed and relied on the principal purpose test to submit that Ms Hallam’s role was
not covered by either the Award or the Agreement.
[36] Clause 3 of the Agreement provides as follows:
22 AE405048
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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“This Agreement shall cover and apply to Sodexo Remote Sites Australia Pty Ltd (“the
Company”) in respect of all employees (excluding employees on supported wage
systems or those covered by a site specific enterprise agreement), employed
throughout Australia engaged in the classifications contained in this Agreement to
provide catering, cleaning, facilities management and related services to the onshore
resources sector and construction industry which includes but is not limited to
operations such as construction, mining, milling, smelting, refining and processing of
minerals and hydrocarbons (“Employees”).”
[37] The classifications in the Agreement are set out in clause 11. They are divided into
two classification streams: “Hospitality and Facility Management Stream” and “Facility
Maintenance Stream”. There was no suggestion that Ms Hallam was covered by the Facility
Maintenance Stream and having reviewed the typical positions and duties of positions falling
within that stream, it does not appear relevant to her role.
[38] The Hospitality and Facility Management Stream in the Agreement is divided into
Levels 1 to 4. Level 1 is described as typically including “positions requiring at least an AQF
Certificate IV or equivalent skill gained through experience, such as: Catering Manager, Head
Chef or Executive Chef.” There was no suggestion that Ms Hallam fell within this Level. She
had worked in and around Sodexo client sites for more than 10 years and had completed Year
12, a Certificate III in Business Administration in 2004 and a Diploma of Management.23 She
was not a qualified Chef and the only direct evidence about the Catering Manager role
indicated a requirement for a Bachelor degree or equivalent. We are satisfied that Ms Hallam
was not a Level 1 employee in the Hospitality and Facility Management Stream of the Award.
[39] Level 3 of the Hospitality and Facility Management Stream covers lower level
classifications including Service Attendant, Accommodation Clerk and Receptionist. Level 4
covers Hospitality Apprentices and Trainees. Neither party submitted that either the Level 3
or Level 4 classification applied to Ms Hallam. We are satisfied on the evidence that her role
was more senior than any of the roles within the scope of Level 3 or 4.
[40] That leaves Level 2 in the Hospitality and Facility Management Stream, which is
described as typically including “positions requiring at least an AQF Certificate III or
equivalent skill gained through experience. Indicative positions include Qualified Chef,
Administration Manager, Accommodation Manager, Bar Manager/ Tavern Manager, Security
Supervisor, Parks and Gardens Manager, Airport Manager, Village Services Manager,
Cleaning Manager, Reporting Officer, Warehouse Manager and Horticulturalist. Ms Hallam
identified the roles of Administration Manager, Accommodation Manager, and Village
Services Manager as indicating that the Agreement might apply or ought to be applied to her
employment, as she performed some of the functions inherent in those roles.
[41] Sodexo submitted job descriptions for the classifications of Administration Manager
and Site/Accommodation Manager in support of its submission that neither was applicable to
Ms Hallam. The job description for Administration Manager states that the role reports to the
Project Manager. The purpose of the role is to act as the site’s “front office representative”,
responsible for office duties as required by the individual site, including managing the site
23 AB60
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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administration team.24 In other words, it manages the administration function on a particular
site.
[42] Similarly, the job description for Site/Accommodation Manager makes clear that the
role reports to the Project Manager. Its purpose is described as “provision of supervision to
domestic staff ensuring a high standard of cleaning is maintained. Front office representative.
Also responsible for the allocation of accommodation”.25 That is, it manages the
accommodation on the particular site.
[43] Sodexo tendered a “Project Management Structure” which shows the role of Project
Manager overseeing six discrete service areas (Accommodation Services, Catering Services,
Cleaning and Janitorial Services, Maintenance Services, Retail and Recreation Services and
Security Services).26 This is consistent with Ms Hallam’s own evidence that in her role, she
was “to manage and have full accountability for managing the work site”.27
[44] No relevant evidence was led as to the role of Village Services Manager and there is
no suggestion that such evidence was not available or could not have been adduced at first
instance.
[45] In the same way as the Award classification of Hotel Manager is confined to
employees who manage discrete shifts or functions, the “managers” covered by the
Agreement appear to us to be those with responsibility for particular functions within a site.
Examples include responsibility for site administration, accommodation, the bar, site security
or cleaning. It does not extend to employees with overall site or project management
responsibility. That the Agreement applied to employees with a lower level of responsibility
than Ms Hallam is supported by Ms Hallam’s own evidence that she managed employees who
were covered by the Agreement.28 We also note her evidence that rates of pay for
management were not included in the Schedule of Rates in the Agreement, and that while
some managers were covered by the Agreement, others were not.29
[46] We find that Ms Hallam’s role was not covered by the Agreement.
[47] It follows that there was no relevant obligation on Sodexo in a modern award or
enterprise agreement that applied to Ms Hallam’s employment to consult with her about the
redundancy.
[48] In the result, Ms Hallam’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. Her
application must be dismissed.
24 AB268
25 AB271
26 AB267
27 AB53
28 AB54-5
29 AB454-5
[2018] FWCFB 1496
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DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Final written submissions:
Appellant’s Outline of Submissions dated 19 January 2018.
Respondent’s Outline of Submissions dated 5 February 2018.
Appellant’s Outline of Submissions in Reply dated 13 February 2018.
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