[2017] FWCFB 1664
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.604 - Appeal of decisions

Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association
v
Beechworth Bakery Employee Co Pty Ltd t/a Beechworth Bakery
(C2016/7653)

VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOSTENCNIK
COMMISSIONER BISSETT



SYDNEY, 6 APRIL 2017

Appeal against decision [[2016] FWCA 8862] of Deputy President Sams at Melbourne on 9 December 2016 in matter number AG2016/3647.

Introduction and background

[1] The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (SDA) has filed a notice of appeal under s.604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) in which it seeks permission to appeal and appeals against a decision 1 (Decision) issued by Deputy President Sams on 9 December 2016 approving the Beechworth Bakery Employee Co Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2016 (Agreement). The Agreement was approved after the Deputy President accepted certain undertakings proffered by Beechworth Bakery Employee Co Pty Ltd, the applicant for the approval of the Agreement and the respondent to this appeal.

[2] Although four grounds of appeal are identified in the SDA’s notice of appeal, it seems clear to us that the SDA challenges the Decision to approve the Agreement on two broad bases. The first relates to the application by the Deputy President of the better off overall test. The second relates to the undertaking accepted by the Deputy President and, in particular that part of the undertaking designed to “make good” any short fall in wages payable to an employee under the Agreement when compared to the relevant modern award.

[3] When the Agreement was approved by a vote of employees conducted between 18 and 21 June 2016, it was said to cover 232 employees employed at six locations, primarily in Victoria but also in New South Wales, who were engaged in front of house service (hospitality) activities, production of bakery products (baking), transport (logistics) and clerical activities. The Agreement does not cover managerial employees.

[4] An application pursuant to s.185 of the FW Act filed by the respondent on 27 June 2016 sought the Commission’s approval of the Agreement. The SDA was a bargaining representative for the Agreement. On 3 August 2016, the SDA filed a statutory declaration made by its National Secretary in which inter alia, the SDA gave notice pursuant to s.183 of the FW Act that it wants to be covered by the Agreement but indicated that it opposed the approval of the Agreement because the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test.

[5] The application for approval of the Agreement was allocated to the Deputy President, who initially listed the application for hearing by telephone on 11 August 2016 and, subsequently, relisted it on 15 August 2016. The application was adjourned by consent to 15 September 2016 to allow discussions between the SDA and the respondent about the issues in contention. It is apparent that a consensus was not reached and as the SDA pressed its objection, the application was listed for hearing on 24 October 2016, with directions for the filing of materials issued by the Deputy President on 7 September 2016.

The Decision

[6] After determining the relevant reference instrument 2 for the purposes of the better off overall test, the Deputy President considered whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test as follows:

[7] The Deputy President next turned to consider undertakings proffered by the respondent as follows:

[8] It is apparent from the passages above that the Deputy President approved the Agreement with undertakings and that as a consequence he was satisfied the Agreement passed the better off overall test.

Consideration

[9] Section 186(1) of the FW Act establishes a “basic rule” that where an application for approval of an enterprise agreement is made under s.185 (which prescribes the time in which such an application must be made and its content), the Commission must approve the agreement if the requirements in ss.186 and 187 are met. Sections 186 and 187 set out a range of approval requirements. Section 186(2) sets out approval requirements in relation to the safety net, and relevantly provides as follows:

[10] Section 193 prescribes that which is necessary for an enterprise agreement to pass the better off overall test. It relevantly provides:

[11] It may be seen from the above that an enterprise agreement will pass the better off overall test if the Commission is satisfied, as at the test time, that each award covered employee, and each prospective award covered employee, for the agreement would be better off overall if the agreement applied to the employee than if the relevant modern award applied to the employee.

[12] The application of the better off overall test is not to be applied as a line by line analysis. Rather it is a global test requiring consideration of advantages and disadvantages to award covered employees and prospective award covered employees of an agreement’s application compared to the application of a relevant modern award. The application of the better off overall test therefore requires the identification of terms of an agreement which are more beneficial to the relevant employees when compared to the relevant modern award, the terms of an agreement which are less beneficial or detrimental when compared to the relevant modern award and then an overall assessment of whether each relevant employee would be better off under the agreement. 4

[13] Turning then to the first basis of appeal, the gravamen of the SDA’s contention was that the Deputy President did not correctly apply the better off overall test. This was because:

[14] The SDA submitted that whilst implausible or fanciful rosters perhaps need not be considered, the mere fact that an employer has never utilised a roster and, at the time of approval, does not intend to, cannot mean that the possibility of such a roster being introduced over the life of an agreement can be dismissed out of hand.

[15] The SDA submitted that the task of assessing whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test is not only to consider how the Agreement would operate under existing conditions, but also how it might operate in the future if employees are required to work in different ways. The SDA contended that the Deputy President did not do this because he accepted the employer's current intention not to change. Such intentions might themselves change, so too might the management of a business, or the conditions under which it has to operate. An agreement is a form of legislative instrument which will continue to apply regardless of those changes. It must also pass the better off overall test in those possible circumstances.

[16] The respondent accepted that the proper application of the better off overall test requires the identification of terms which are more beneficial for an employee, terms which are less beneficial for an employee, and an overall assessment of whether an employee would be better off under the agreement. However, it submitted that the Deputy President gave detailed consideration of the matters raised by the SDA as can be seen from the lengthy recitation of the matters raised by the SDA in its written submissions and at the hearing in paragraphs [29] to [54] of the Decision.

[17] The respondent submitted that the Deputy President did not distinguish Hart on the basis that the undertakings were not given. It submitted that the methodology in Hart was followed and this is evident in [66] to [68] of the Decision.

[18] Further, the respondent submitted that the Deputy President did not purport to discharge his task by finding the scenarios advanced were implausible and fanciful. Rather the Deputy President at [66] to [69] of the Decision identified the benefit in the Agreement, namely the increased hourly rate; and identified a detriment, namely that given the rostering and employment arrangements of the business, there was only one identifiable real circumstance of one employee that could only work Sundays for personal reasons. The Deputy President then made an overall assessment at [68] of the Decision at which the Deputy President observed that he cannot ignore the fact that the higher rates under the Agreement apply for all purposes.

[19] Finally, the respondent submitted that the SDA’s attack on the failure by the Deputy President to consider the future operation of the Agreement has no substance. The Deputy President considered the scenarios advanced by the SDA and concluded that these were implausible and fanciful.

[20] Ultimately, we have found it unnecessary to decide this issue primarily because absent the undertaking proffered by the respondent, there is no finding in the Decision that the Agreement passed the better off overall test. The finding that the Agreement passed the better off overall test was wholly contingent on the undertaking.

[21] It is convenient therefore that we turn our attention to the undertaking. It is not necessarily the case that, where an agreement does not satisfy all of the approval requirements in ss.186 and 187, the application for approval of the agreement must be dismissed. Section 190 allows for an agreement to be approved with undertakings. It provides:

[22] Section 191(1) identifies the legal effect of an undertaking given in relation to a single-employer enterprise agreement as follows:

[23] As is apparent from the above, the power to approve an agreement with undertakings is enlivened only if the Commission has a concern that the agreement does not meet the requirements set out in ss.186 and 187. Before an agreement is approved the Commission must, inter alia, be satisfied that it passes the better off overall test. 6 A concern held by a Member of the Commission dealing with an application to approve an agreement about whether the agreement passes the better off overall test may thus properly empower the Member to consider an undertaking proffered. If the undertaking meets the concern and, after consulting with any known bargaining representatives, the Member may approve the agreement with the undertaking upon being satisfied that the undertaking does not cause financial detriment to any employee covered by the agreement nor result in substantial changes to the agreement.

[24] The undertaking given by the respondent and accepted by the Deputy President is in the following terms:

[25] The SDA criticised the Deputy President’s approval of the Agreement with the undertaking proffered by the respondent in two respects. First, the SDA submitted that the Deputy President did not make any findings as to the ways in which the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test. Consequently, he did not make a finding required by s.190(1)(b) which would have allowed the issue of what undertakings were necessary to be tested. Instead, the Deputy President considered undertakings which had been volunteered by the employer.

[26] Secondly, the SDA submitted that although the first five paragraphs of the undertakings appear to be directed at existing issues, the sixth undertaking contained inherently the type of problem identified in Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association v ALDI Foods Pty Ltd. 7

[27] We consider that the SDA’s criticism in this second regard has substance.

[28] The respondent submitted that the Deputy President identified in the Decision his concern as to whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test by observing that:

[29] We do not accept this submission. A fair reading of the Decision discloses that the only concern expressed in the Decision as to whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test was that identified at [67] where the Deputy President observed:

[30] But that is not the end of the matter. Raising or identifying a concern that an agreement does not meet the requirements set out in ss.186 and 187 of the FW Act need not only be raised in the decision dealing with an application to approve an agreement. Such a concern may be expressed by a Member dealing with an application during the conduct of a hearing or through an exchange of correspondence while an application for approval of an enterprise agreement is being considered. Indeed, this will usually be the case. To raise a concern only in the final decision determining an application would deprive an applicant of the opportunity to proffer an undertaking, thereby leading to the real possibility of error.

[31] The issue of an undertaking was first raised by the Deputy President during the course of the hearing of the application on 24 October 2016 as disclosed in the following exchange recorded in the transcript of the proceeding:

[32] Later in the proceeding, the respondent made the following submission concerning an undertaking:

[33] Still later the following exchange occurred between the SDA and the Deputy President:

[34] At the conclusion of the proceeding the follow exchange took place:

[35] It seems to us clear enough from a review of the transcript that during the course of the hearing on 24 October 2016, through a combination of questions raised by the SDA and concessions made by the respondent, that the Deputy President had concerns about whether the Agreement passed the better off overall test. It was not necessary for the Deputy President to have formed a concluded view that was the case. Contrary to the submission advanced by the SDA in this appeal, we do not consider that it was necessary for the Deputy President to have made “findings” as to the manner in which the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test. It was sufficient for the purposes of enlivening the jurisdiction concerning the provision of undertakings for the Deputy President to have identified his concern with enough particularity so that the respondent could seek to address that concern by proffering an undertaking. We consider that the Deputy President’s concern was clearly enough articulated during the course of the hearing to enable the respondent to respond to that concern by providing an undertaking.

[36] There is nothing in the material in the appeal book which would suggest that the respondent was not clear about the Deputy President’s concern, nor is there anything in the material in the appeal book which suggests that the SDA was not clear about the concern.

[37] The initial undertaking provided by the respondent on 7 November 2016 following the hearing was in the following terms:

 

      Permanent

      Casual

  Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 1 Rate 2

Level 1

      $20.50

      $29.60

      $25.50

      $32.00

Level 2

      $21.00

      $29.75

      $26.00

      $32.50

 

      Permanent

      Casual

  Rate 1 Rate 2 Rate 1 Rate 2

Team Supervisor

      $22.00

      $31.90

      $28.60

      $32.60

[38] On 24 November 2016 the Deputy President’s Chambers corresponded with the parties as follows:

[39] On 30 November 2016 a modified undertaking was provided by the respondent which contained a new paragraph 6 in the following terms:

[40] As is evident from [72] of the Decision, the Deputy President’s Chambers then corresponded with the parties on 1 December 2016 alerting them to the decision in ALDI and its possible impact upon the undertakings given by the respondent and inviting revised undertakings and/or submissions.

[41] In response, the undertaking reproduced earlier at [24] was proffered by the respondent and, as is evident from [76] of the Decision, the Deputy President accepted the undertaking as meeting his concern that the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test.

[42] However, we do not consider that the part of the undertaking contained in paragraph 6 was capable of satisfying any concern that the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test. First, and most obviously, paragraph 6 of the undertaking does not create an enforceable right to any payment, which if made, would mean that a relevant employee would be better off overall under the Agreement than under the applicable modern award. Rather, the undertaking operates only to allow an employee who “considers that . . . they are not better off overall under this agreement than the applicable award” to request a comparison, and thereafter if the comparison identifies a shortfall, the shortfall together with an additional 1.5% payment by reference to the shortfall amount would be paid in the next pay period after the review is completed.

[43] Such obligation to “make good” any shortfall arises only if an employee makes a request for a review. If no such request is made, whether through ignorance or design, or perhaps because an affected employee simply lacks the time, information or ability to form a view, then no obligation to conduct a review, much less “make good” any shortfall, arises. Any concern that an employee or prospective employee would not be better off overall if the Agreement applied to the employee than if the relevant modern award applied to that employee cannot be met by such an undertaking.

[44] In considering whether an undertaking should be accepted as satisfying a concern that an agreement may not pass the better off overall test, it is necessary to analyse the undertaking so as to ensure that it is expressed in a way which will allow it to be enforced as a term of the agreement. An undertaking that in its expression is uncertain, ambiguous, aspirational or perhaps conditional, with the result that it will not create an enforceable entitlement as a term of the agreement, will not likely meet the concern that an agreement does not pass the better off overall test. 14

[45] The second obvious flaw in the undertaking is that since an employee’s consideration that he or she is not better off overall under the agreement compared to the applicable award arises by reference to a four month period, this necessarily means that any review as might be conducted would only occur three times a year in respect of each employee. The inevitable consequence is a delay in payment to an employee. Moreover, the potential length of the delay is unknown as disputes may arise about the quantum of payment due under the undertaking as is apparent from the dispute resolution mechanism established by the undertaking. In these circumstances it is by no means apparent that a 1.5% increase in payment might compensate an employee for that which could be a substantial difference in entitlements over a potentially lengthy and indeterminate period.

[46] In these circumstances it seems to us that the undertaking proffered in paragraph 6 was not an undertaking capable of addressing the Deputy President’s concern that the Agreement did not pass the better off overall test. The acceptance of that undertaking and consequently reliance on it to approve the Agreement was therefore erroneous.

Conclusion

[47] For the reasons given we consider that the Decision was attended by appealable error. We are persuaded that permission to appeal should be granted because the appeal raises important issues about the approval of an enterprise agreement with undertakings as contemplated by s.190 of the FW Act. Furthermore, the error we have identified is jurisdictional in nature as it goes to the power of the Commission to approve the Agreement. We are also persuaded that the appeal should be upheld and the Decision to approve the Agreement should be quashed. As the Deputy President did not conclude that the Agreement passed the better off overall test independently of the undertaking, nor did he make any finding that under s.189 that the Agreement should be approved even though it did not pass the better off overall test, there was no proper basis to approve the Agreement. We consider the appropriate course is to remit the application for the approval of the Agreement to the Deputy President to deal with in light of our decision.

[48] We make a final observation. As we note at [4] of this decision, the SDA gave notice pursuant to s.183 of the FW Act that it wants to be covered by the Agreement. There is no note in the Decision as required by s.201(2). If the Agreement is ultimately approved, attention will need to be given to this issue.

Orders

We order that:

scription: Seal of the Fair Work Commission with the member's signature.

VICE PRESIDENT

Appearances:

Mr W Friend QC for the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association.

Mr A Duc of Counsel for Beechworth Bakery Employee Co Pty Ltd.

Hearing details:

2017.

Melbourne:

23 February.

 1   [2016] FWCA 8862

 2   Neither party to the appeal took issue with the Deputy President’s conclusion in this regard.

 3   Ibid at [70]-[76]

 4   See Re: Armacell Australia Enterprise Agreement 2010 [2010] FWAFB 9985, 202 IR 88; National Tertiary Education Industry Union v University of New South Wales [2011] FWAFB 5163; 210 IR 244; Hart v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FWCFB 2887 at [6]; and Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v ALDI Foods Pty Ltd (2016) FCAFC 161 at [163]

 5   [2016] FWCFB 2887 at [46] – [47]

 6   See s.186 (2)(d)

 7   [2016] FCAFC 161

 8   [2016] FWCA 8862 at [67]

 9   Transcript 24 October 2016 PN297-PN305

 10   Transcript 24 October 2016 PN370 and PN381

 11   Transcript 24 October 2016 PN545-PN561

 12   Transcript 24 October 2016 PN571-PN577, PN580

 13   Ibid

 14   CEPU and AMWU v Main People Pty Ltd [2015] FWCFB 4467 at [38].

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