[2017] FWC 3557
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

Belinda Lee
v
Mission Australia
(C2017/3524)

Social, community, home care and disability services

COMMISSIONER JOHNS

SYDNEY, 4 JULY 2017

Alleged dispute about matters arising under the enterprise agreement - failure to consult – proposed redundancy - interim order sought.

[1] Belinda Lee (applicant) has made an application for the Fair Work Commission (Commission) to deal with a dispute in relation to consultation under the Mission Australia Services Delivery Enterprise Agreement 2016-2017 (Agreement). 1 The respondent is Mission Australia (respondent).

[2] The application was made at 5.02 pm on Wednesday, 28 June 2017 pursuant to s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). In her application Ms Lee was represented by the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (NSW and ACT Services Branch) (ASU), namely one of its Industrial Officers, Robert Coluccio. Mission Australia was represented by one of its Employee Relations Advisors, Allison Moore.

[3] The dispute relates to whether or not Mission Australia has complied with its obligations under the Agreement, namely clause 87.  In particular, clause 87.1(c) which states:

[4] Ms Lee says Mission Australia has failed to comply with its obligations. Mission Australia says that it has complied with its obligations under the Agreement with the consequence that it proposed to terminate Ms Lee’s employment by reason of redundancy at 5.00 pm on Friday, 30 June 2017.

[5] The matter was allocated to chambers at 1.45 pm on Thursday, 29 June 2017, however, the file was not received until the morning of Friday, 30 June 2017. At that time the urgent nature of the application became apparent and the matter was listed for conciliation at 3.30 pm that day.

[6] At 2.21 pm, on 30 June 2017 the Commission invited Mission Australia to delay the termination until the matter could be listed for a further conciliation.  At 3.19 pm, on 30 June 2017 Mission Australia rejected that invitation.  When conciliation commenced at 3.30 pm on 30 June 2017 Mission Australia was again invited to delay its decision to terminate Ms Lee’s employment.  Again, Mission Australia rejected the invitation.

[7] The matter was then further listed for an urgent hearing for the making of an interim order at 3.45 pm on Friday, 30 June 2017.

[8] At the completion of that urgent hearing I advised the parties that the application for an interim order was granted and that I intended to issue the interim order sought. The interim order was issued at 4.25 pm on Friday, 30 June 2017.  2 In granting the application for an interim order I provided brief reasons as to why I had reached that decision and advised that detailed reasons would be provided in due course. These are the full reasons for my decision.

Background

[9] The respondent is a provider of family, community, employment and housing services.

[10] The applicant is employed by the respondent as a Program Manager.

[11] The applicant is currently on a period of parental leave which commenced on 1 April 2017. She is due to return to work on or about 1 April 2018.

[12] On 1 June 2017 the respondent emailed a letter to the applicant advising that her position had been made redundant and that her employment would end on 30 June 2017. The respondent wrote,

[13] On 13 June 2017 the applicant emailed the respondent requesting the redeployment period be delayed until her return to work from parental leave. The applicant wrote,

[14] On 22 June 2017 respondent wrote to the applicant denying her request. The respondent wrote,

[15] On 23 June 2017 the ASU wrote to the respondent on behalf of the applicant requesting the postponement of the redeployment period. The ASU wrote,

[16] On 27 June 2017 Mission Australia sent a letter to the ASU denying its request made on behalf of the applicant. Mission Australia wrote,

Matters to be decided

[17] In deciding whether or not to issue interim orders I was required to be satisfied that first, there is power to make the order sought, second, there is a serious question to be answered and third, the balance of convenience supports making the order as sought. I considered each of these issues in turn.

Jurisdiction

[18] Section 589 of the FW Act gives power to the Commission to ‘make an interim decision in relation to a matter before it’. Such a decision can be made on the Commission’s own initiative or on application. Section 598(4) of the FW Act provides that a decision of the Commission may be made by order.

[19] The matter before me arises pursuant to the dispute settling procedure of the Agreement. That is contained in Part 10 and, in particular, paragraph 139 of the Agreement. The Agreement makes it clear that, in settling disputes pursuant to the Agreement, the Commission may arbitrate the matter in dispute.

[20] I was therefore satisfied that this dispute is over a matter arising under the Agreement, and that the requirements of the dispute settlement procedure of the Agreement are such that there is jurisdiction for the Commission to arbitrate the matter in dispute.

[21] Ms Moore made the appropriate concession that the Commission had the power to make the order sought. 3

 The Agreement

[22] Clauses 87 and 88 of the Agreement provide,

Serious question to be tried

[23] In short, it was put on behalf of Ms Lee that the postponement of her redeployment until her return from parental leave would provide a measure to avoid or minimise the risk of termination by allowing her to participate in the redeployment process in the workplace at or about the time that she was returning from parental leave (i.e. in April 2018).

[24] Ms Lee submitted that there is a serious question to be tried. Mr Coluccio made the following submissions on her behalf,

[25] Ms Lee says therefore, the respondent has not met its obligations under the Agreement.

[26] The respondent submitted that there was no serious question to be tried in respect of the Agreement.

[27] On its behalf Ms Moore submitted that,

[28] In essence the respondent submits that Ms Lee has not identified any flaws in the consultation process. It submits that it has consulted and that, ultimately, it is now entitled to terminate Ms Lee’s employment by reason of redundancy. Further the respondent says there is no obligation to delay a consideration of redeployment until when Ms Lee returns from parental leave.

[29] The respondent says that there is no question to be answered, it has met its obligations and the consultation requirements have been properly undertaken.

Consideration

[30] The matters raised by Ms Lee go to the:

[31] Consultation has a purpose and it cannot be conducted for mere show. If the consultation does not provide Ms Lee with an opportunity to influence the decision it is of no value and the requirement to consult and the consultation is hollow.

[32] By the same token at some point management must be able to make a final decision to terminate employment by reason of redundancy having taken into account the views of Ms Lee through consultation.

[33] In Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v QR Limited 7 (QR), Logan J, after considering a number of decisions from the AIRC on the requirement to ‘consult’, observed at [44], that those decisions:

“…serve to confirm an impression as to the content of an obligation to “consult” evident from the dictionary meaning of the word. A key element of that content is that the party to be consulted be given notice of the subject upon which that party’s views are being sought before any final decision is made or course of action embarked upon. Another is that while the word always carries with it a consequential requirement for the affording of a meaningful opportunity to that party to present those views. What will constitute such an opportunity will vary according the nature and circumstances of the case. In other words, what will amount to “consultation” has about it an inherent flexibility. Finally, a right to be consulted, though a valuable right, is not a right of veto.”

[34] I was therefore satisfied that there were questions to be answered, that is, has Mission Australia,

Status quo

[35] Ms Lee puts an alternative to the Commission, should the above matters go against her. She says that the dispute settling provisions of the Agreement, on its own, requires that the status quo should be maintained to allow further consultation and/or arbitration of the matter in dispute. The interim order should therefore be granted to allow that to occur.

[36] Clause 139.6(a) of the Agreement provides that,

[37] The respondent submits that at the time Ms Lee made her application for the Commission to deal with the dispute the respondent had already notified her of the decision to terminate her employment.

[38] The respondent therefore says that the continuation of work as normal, as contemplated by the dispute settlement procedure, does not preclude the effecting of that termination of employment as this is the ‘normal work’ that was being undertaken at the time the application was made.

[39] In the circumstances, having found that there are questions to be answered in respect of compliance with the Agreement, I do not consider it necessary to consider the alternative matter.

Balance of convenience

[40] The third matter to determine is where the balance of convenience lies.

[41] During the urgent hearing I expressed the following preliminary view,

[42] Ms Moore then made the appropriate concession that the balance of convenience favoured Ms Lee. 8

Consideration

[43] I gave careful consideration to the question of where the balance of convenience lies. I was satisfied, in this case, that, I should grant the application for an interim order. In this case the termination of Ms Lee’s employment could only be undone after significant litigation. There would be some complexity attached to unscrambling the egg.

[44] The ‘urgency’ of the application made by Ms Lee was made out. The termination of her employment was to occur a little over an hour after the hearing commenced.

[45] These circumstances weighed the balance of convenience in favour of the applicant.

[46] I carefully considered all of the material before me including the submissions of Ms Lee and Mission Australia. In this case and in these particular circumstances I found the balance of convenience favoured granting the application.

Conclusion

[47] The application for interim orders was granted in the following terms,

[48] The matter was then listed for further conciliation at 9.30 am on Wednesday, 5 July 2017.


COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr R Coluccio, for the applicant.

Ms A Moore, for the respondent.

Hearing details:

2017

Melbourne

June, 30

 1   AE423267 PR590034.

 2   AE423267 PR594202.

 3   Transcript reference PN20.

 4   Transcript reference PN7-16.

 5   Transcript reference PN33-40.

 6   Transcript reference PN44-53.

 7   [2010] FCR 591.

 8   Transcript reference PN29.

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<Price code C, AE423267, PR594293>