DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.437—Protected action

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia
v
Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd
(B2016/294)

Proposed protected action ballot by employees of Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd – whether employees to be balloted are properly specified, whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of notice of industrial action being more than three working days for certain forms of industrial action – description of employees to be balloted amended by agreement – exceptional circumstances found for certain forms of industrial action – ballot order issued.

[1] The Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU) made an application on 17 February 2016 pursuant to s.443 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for a protected action ballot order in respect of those employees of Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd (Armaguard) who are “Road Crew members of the TWU based at the Employer’s depots at 4 Kembla Street, Fyshwick ACT 2609 who will be subject to the proposed agreement and for whom the TWU is a bargaining representative.” The proposed agreement is to replace the Armaguard, Road Crew (ACT) Collective Agreement 2011 1 (the Agreement). The Agreement had a nominal expiry date of 1 July 2014. As at 15 February 2016, the parties had met on several occasions, including 25 November 2015 and 3 February 2016, but had been unable to reach agreement, with wages cited as the major outstanding issue2.

[2] Armaguard advised the Commission on 22 February 2016 that it had two objections to the application. Those objections were that:

(i) the group of employees to be balloted was not properly specified; and

(ii) were the Commission prepared to issue a protected action ballot order, there were exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in s.414(2)(a) of the Act being extended to five days.

[3] Against that background, the application was listed for telephone hearing on 24 February 2016. Mr Adam Guy appeared for the TWU, while Mr Karl Blake appeared with permission for Armaguard. Mr Klaus Pinkas, an organiser with the TWU’s NSW Branch provided a witness statement 3 for the Applicant. Mr Pinkas was not required for cross-examination. Mr William Beekman, Armaguard’s Regional Security Manager – Eastern Region and Australian Capital Territory (A.C.T.), gave evidence for Armaguard.

[4] By way of background, Armaguard provides cash in transit services to a range of businesses, including banks and large and small retailers, in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).

[5] For the reasons set out below, I have decided to make a protected ballot action order with the employees to be balloted more clearly specified and which requires the provision of five working days written notice for certain forms of industrial action.

The Respondent’s case

[6] Armaguard made no substantive submission as to whether or not a protected action ballot order should be made, contending that it was for the TWU to satisfy the Commission that the requirements of s.443 of the Act had been satisfied.

[7] With regard to the group of employees to be balloted specified in the application, Armaguard submitted that the group was not properly specified as the group was not clearly limited to those employees who would be covered by the proposed agreement.

[8] Further, as noted above, Armaguard submitted that were the Commission to decide to make a protected action ballot order the written notice period referred to in s.414(2)(a) of the Act should be extended under s.443(5) of the Act to five working days in respect of any industrial action to be authorised by questions 2 to 10 and 12 of the proposed ballot order. Those questions are as follows:

“Question 2

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 1 hour?

Question 3

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 2 hours?

Question 4

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 4 hours?

Question 5

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 8 hours?

Question 6

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 24 hours?

Question 7

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for 48 hours?

Question 8

An unlimited number of stoppages of work for seven days?

Question 9

An unlimited number of indefinite stoppages of work?

Question 10

An unlimited number of bans on processing of paperwork?

Question 12

A return to the depot for lunch?”

[9] Specifically, Armaguard contended that the circumstances of this case were exceptional and justify an extension of the notice period beyond three working days. The exceptional circumstances relied upon by Armaguard relate to the impact that the contemplated stoppages of work, bans on processing paperwork and return to the depot for lunch by Road Crew employees would have on Armaguard, its customers and potentially the public.

[10] Armaguard submitted that it would need to put in place contingency arrangements to minimise cash holdings on clients’ premises due to the inherent risks to clients’ employees of large amounts of cash being held on site. Armaguard further submitted that it was also necessary to maintain a constant availability of cash to major financial and retail institutions along with tens of thousands of automatic teller machines (ATMs), adding that there could be serious security consequences if appropriate contingency arrangements were not made.

[11] Armaguard highlighted that such concerns had been accepted by the Commission in a number of matters as constituting exceptional circumstances. Those matters related to Armaguard Road Crew in similar circumstances in South Australia 4 (SA matter), Victoria5 (Vic matter) and Queensland6 (Qld matter). Armaguard also stated that in the last two weeks, the TWU had made an application for two protected action ballot orders in Queensland in respect of negotiations to replace two enterprise agreements applying to different parts of Armaguard’s Queensland operations and had in relation to those applications consented to extending the notice period to five working days for industrial action in respect of periodic stoppages of between two and 48 hours and indefinite stoppages.

[12] Armaguard relied on Vice President Lawler’s decision in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Postal Corporation 7 (Australia Post) and also drew the Commission’s attention to a number of other decisions in which other circumstances have seen the Commission satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances as per s.443(5) of the Act.
[13] Key aspects of Mr Beekman’s witness statement were that:

● Armaguard had adopted the NSW Code of Practice for the cash in transit industry as a minimum level of compliance throughout all states of Australia;

● indefinite stoppages of work would result in excess cash being stored on clients’ premises;

● periodic stoppages of work were also likely to have the same effect, particularly where a number of periodic stoppages occurred consecutively;

● Armaguard cannot store large volumes of cash on clients’ premises for a number of reasons, including that there is an inherent risk to clients and because Armaguard has a unique insurance policy which limits the amount of cash insured, with cash holdings above a specified amount not covered by insurance;

● if stoppages occurred which resulted in no cash deliveries or collections to or from ATMs, financial institutions and retailers, cash would not be available to members of the public through either ATMs, banks or EFTPOS cash outs;

● if Road Crew employees ceased work, Armaguard will need to implement contingency arrangements for the delivery and collection of money so as to minimise cash holdings on client premises, to reduce the inherent risks to clients’ employees, to ensure that third party businesses do not sustain losses because money is stolen or because they are unable to service their customers and to maintain the availability of cash to major financial and retail institutions and ATMs;

● were Road Crew employees to engage in banning the processing of cashing dockets and associated paperwork, Armaguard would be prevented from collecting or delivering money, meaning that the ban would effectively amount to a stoppage of work;

● if Road Crew employees return to the depot for lunch this would result in the service to many clients being missed;

● until Armaguard received notification as to what industrial action was to be taken, its duration and/or what combinations of industrial action might be taken, it was unable to implement its Business Continuity Plan (BCP) which was necessary to ensure that any contingency arrangements were carried out safely and in a way which is consistent with its obligations under State Codes of Practice;

● the risks associated with the BCP will increase if employees undertaking BCP activities are not appropriately trained and experienced;

● Armaguard cannot implement contingency arrangements until it is advised of the nature and duration of any industrial action because it is unable to estimate how many business continuity employees will be required to continue operations in a safe manner and whether they will be available to travel to the ACT to undertake work;

● Armaguard will require more than five working days to put these contingency arrangements into place;

● although all team members are licensed hold a security licence in their home state, the relevant ACT regulatory body requires that all mutual recognition applicants need to attend in person to collect their license and have their photograph taken, with the application process taking approximately one week;

● in relation to firearm licenses issued by the Australian Federal Police, Armaguard has been informed that the process will normally take up to four or five weeks; and

● the effect of not having adequate time to implement the BCP and obtain mutual recognition to work in the ACT could be that Armaguard is unable to collect cash from clients or that clients do not have adequate cash to manage their business and meet the expectations of the public.

[14] In his oral evidence, Mr Beekman reiterated much of the above. Beyond this, he attested, inter alia, that:

(a) while Armaguard could contract out work to one of its competitors in circumstances where industrial action was occurring, this would take in the order of a month to arrange;

(b) Armaguard’s competitors were unlikely to be able to cover its ACT footprint and would be required to undertake a risk and site assessment for each site as well as deal with any licensing issues, with this likely to take longer than five days;

(c) employees working temporarily in the ACT would need to undergo a two-day firearms course before they could work in the ACT;

(d) it could take up to a week to obtain necessary approvals to allow the transfer of firearms across the NSW/ACT border; and

(e) a notice period of five working days as opposed to three working days would allow Armaguard to identify employees willing to work in the ACT, to train those people, to have them backed up in their home locality and transport them to the ACT.

[15] At the telephone hearing, Armaguard relied on its written submissions, adding that, in its view, exceptional circumstances exist in this case as a result of the nature of work involved, the uniqueness of the industry and the risks to safety of clients, clients’ employees, and members of the public and contingent labour in circumstances where industrial action is taken. Armaguard further submitted that steps to source contingent labour could only be taken at the time that notice of industrial action is given, with that contingent labour force drawn only from existing Armaguard employees. Further, those employees need to be available, to get to the ACT and be trained to meet ACT regulatory requirements. Armaguard also highlighted that were industrial action notified to occur in the ACT at the same time as in Queensland, both jurisdictions would be competing for the same contingent labour.

[16] Armaguard also pointed to the safety risks stemming from the proposed industrial action and pointed to its unique insurance policies which cut out when a threshold of cash held on site was passed. In particular, Armaguard highlighted the risk of clients and the public being significantly inconvenienced by industrial action given that it was the dominant provider of cash in transit services in the ACT. Finally, Armaguard highlighted that those aspects of Mr Beekman’s evidence going to security risks and the impact of the availability of cash or lack thereof on Armaguard’s smaller clients was unchallenged.

The Applicant’s case

[17] The TWU indicated that it did not object to the description of employees to be balloted being amended to incorporate reference to the Agreement.

[18] Specifically, the TWU relied on its application and the witness statement of Mr Pinkas. Mr Pinkas’ witness statement provided an overview of the participants in the negotiations for a replacement agreement, an indication of a number of meetings which had occurred to date and the progress of negotiations.

[19] Beyond that, the TWU addressed each of the requirements set out in s.443 of the Act, contending that it had satisfied those requirements and that a protected action ballot order should therefore be issued. The TWU accepted that the principles outlined by Vice President Lawler in Australia Post were appropriate and also referred to the decision in the Vic matter in which Commissioner Gregory acknowledged the existence of different circumstances to those existing in the SA matter, contending that the circumstances in the ACT do not meet the bar set out in s.443(5) of the Act. The TWU also pointed out that firearms training for contingent labour would take two days which would provide one day for Armaguard to identify potential contingent labour and make arrangements for them to travel to the ACT, adding that as a result five working days’ notice was not required. The TWU further contended that Armaguard clients would also be able to put in place contingency arrangements to secure any cash holdings and that Armaguard could put in place contingency plans as soon as a protected action ballot order was made by the Commission. Armaguard’s contingency plans, the TWU contended, could include contacting clients and competitors to discuss possible contingency arrangements. The TWU also submitted that it was not aware of any “heist” having occurred during previous periods of industrial action by Road Crew members.

[20] The TWU also drew the Commission’s attention to the decision of Senior Deputy President Harrison in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd 8 (the ACT matter) in which the Senior Deputy President granted a protected action ballot order but did not extend the period of notice required to be given.

[21] For all these reasons, the TWU submitted there should be no extension to the period of notice it was required to give under s.414(2)(a) of the Act.

Relevant statutory provisions

[22] The relevant provisions of s.443 of the FW Act are as set out below.

“437 Application for a protected action ballot order

Who may apply for a protected action ballot order

(1) A bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by a proposed enterprise agreement, or 2 or more such bargaining representatives (acting jointly), may apply to the FWC for an order (a protected action ballot order) requiring a protected action ballot to be conducted to determine whether employees wish to engage in particular protected industrial action for the agreement.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the proposed enterprise agreement is:

(a) a greenfields agreement; or
(b) a multi-enterprise agreement.
(2A) Subsection (1) does not apply unless there has been a notification time in relation to the proposed enterprise agreement.
Note: For notification time, see subsection 173(2). Protected industrial action cannot be taken until after bargaining has commenced (including where the scope of the proposed enterprise agreement is the only matter in dispute).

Matters to be specified in application
(3) The application must specify:

(a) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; and
(b) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.

(4) If the applicant wishes a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot, the application must specify the name of the person.

Note: The protected action ballot agent will be the Australian Electoral Commission unless the FWC specifies another person in the protected action ballot order as the protected action ballot agent (see subsection 443(4)).

(5) A group of employees specified under paragraph (3)(a) is taken to include only employees who:

(a) will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement; and
(b) either:

(i) are represented by a bargaining representative who is an applicant for the protected action ballot order; or
(ii) are bargaining representatives for themselves but are members of an employee organisation that is an applicant for the protected action ballot order.

Documents to accompany application

(5) The application must be accompanied by any documents and other information prescribed by the regulations.

443 When the FWC must make a protected action ballot order

(1) 1The FWC must make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if:

(a) an application has been made under section 437; and
(b) the FWC is satisfied that each applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted.

(2) The FWC must not make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1).

(3) A protected action ballot order must specify the following:

(a) the name of each applicant for the order;

(b) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted;

(c) the date by which voting in the protected action ballot closes;

(d) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action.

(3A) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(c), the FWC must specify a date that will enable the protected action ballot to be conducted as expeditiously as practicable.

(4) If the FWC decides that a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission is to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot, the protected action ballot order must also specify:

(a) the person that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(1), is to be the protected action ballot agent; and

(b) the person (if any) that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(3), is to be the independent advisor for the ballot.

(5) If the FWC is satisfied, in relation to the proposed industrial action that is the subject of the protected action ballot, that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days.

Note: Under subsection 414(1), before a person engages in employee claim action for a proposed enterprise agreement, a bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by the agreement must give written notice of the action to the employer of the employee.” (Underlining added)

Consideration of the issues

[23] The threshold issue to be determined is whether the Commission is satisfied that the statutory requirements set out in s.443 of the Act have been met, in which case the Commission is required to make a protected action ballot order. Should the Commission be satisfied of that, it will then be necessary to first determine whether there are exceptional circumstances in this case, second whether those exceptional circumstances justify the period of written notice being longer than three working days and, if so, whether it is appropriate for the Commission to exercise the discretion available to it to specify a longer period of up to seven working days. I will deal with each of these issues separately.

Should the Commission make a Protected Action Ballot Order?

[24] With regard to the statutory requirements set out in s.443(1) of the Act, as noted above the TWU submitted that it had satisfied those requirements and that a protected action ballot order should be made. Armaguard made no submissions in this regard, even when directly asked by the Commission if it wished to make any submissions regarding whether or not the TWU was genuinely trying to reach an agreement with it.

[25] In his witness statement, Mr Pinkas deposed that he was currently involved in negotiating an enterprise agreement on behalf of TWU members employed by Armaguard in the ACT. Mr Pinkas further deposed that the parties have met on several occasions to bargain for an agreement to replace the Agreement and that the steps taken by the TWU to attempt to reach agreement included accepting the offer put by Armaguard on 3 February 2016 but which was subsequently withdrawn. Mr Pinkas’ evidence was not challenged by Armaguard.

[26] What flows from Mr Pinkas’ evidence is that the TWU is a bargaining representative as required by s.437(1) of the Act, that there has been a notification time as required by s.437(2A) of the Act and that the TWU has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with Armaguard.

[27] Against that background, based on the material before me, I am satisfied that the requirements of s.443(1) have been met. Accordingly, the Act requires that the Commission make a protected action ballot order.

[28] As agreed during the telephone hearing, the description of employees to be balloted will be amended to incorporate reference to the Agreement to ensure that s.443(3) of the Act is satisfied.

Are there exceptional circumstances in this case?

[29] As previously alluded to, the meaning of exceptional circumstances was summarised, as set out below, by Vice President Lawler in Australia Post. That matter concerned a similar provision to s.443(5) of the Act which was set out in predecessor legislation to the current Act and has been cited on a number of occasions by members of the Commission in decisions relating to s.443(5) of the Act.

“[10] ....... In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

[11] However, it is important to note that when considering whether to make an order pursuant to s.463(5) the Commission is not simply concerned with determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There must be exceptional circumstances “justifying” the specification of a longer notice period. The notion of justification is critical and calls for a consideration of the purpose of the notice required by s.441.” (Underlining added)

[30] Vice President Lawler further stated:

“[21] Essentially, what is required in determining whether exceptional circumstances justify an extension of the required notices period is a weighing of the interests of the employer and third parties in the employer having a greater opportunity to take appropriate defensive action as against the diminution in the effectiveness of the employees’ bargaining power that results from such an extension. The fact that the legislature has seen fit to condition the ordering of an extension of the required notice period on the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying it, as distinct from merely conferring a simple discretion to extend the required notice period, indicates that ordinarily there should be no extension.” (Underlining added)

[31] I have adopted the approach taken by Vice President Lawler in determining the matter before me.

[32] Armaguard’s submissions were to the effect that it needs to put in plan contingency arrangements to address the security risks for its employees, clients, the employees of its clients and the broader public as a result of some of the forms of industrial action contemplated by the TWU. Armaguard submitted that this together with the need to comply with its obligations under relevant Codes of Practice and to mitigate the potential impact on clients and the public if the collection and distribution of cash was interrupted constituted exceptional circumstances. As noted above, the TWU contended that the factors relied upon by Armaguard did not satisfy the test set out in s.443(5) of the Act.

[33] Armaguard also pointed to previous Commission decisions in the SA, Vic and Qld matters where some or all of the above factors were relied upon by Armaguard in those cases and were found to constitute exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, the TWU pointed to the decision in the ACT matter. By way of background, the decision in the ACT matter related to an application by the TWU for a protected action ballot order in the context of the negotiations for the Agreement. It appears from that decision that Armaguard did not on that occasion request that a longer period of notice be specified in the order. No material was put before the Commission as to the circumstances existing at that time. Accordingly, little weight can be attached to that decision.

[34] Drawing on Vice President Lawler’s summary in Australia Post of what constitutes exceptional circumstances and the decisions in the SA, Vic and Qld matters, the abovementioned considerations identified by Armaguard support a finding that exceptional circumstances do exist in this case. In particular, I consider the potential increased security risks for Armaguard’s employees, its clients, its clients’ employees and the broader public, together with the potential economic impact on third parties such a small to medium retailers as a result of any interruption to cash collections and distribution to constitute exceptional circumstances. While industrial action invariably has an impact on the employer and sometimes on the employer’s customers and/or other third parties, the potential in this case for some forms of the proposed industrial action to impact in the above way is in my view out of the ordinary, unusual, special or uncommon to use the language of Vice President Lawler in Australia Post.

Do those exceptional circumstances justify a longer period of notice?

[35] The question then arises as to whether these exceptional circumstances justify an extension of the notice period beyond the three days written notice specified in s.414(2)(a) of the Act.

[36] For the reasons set out at paragraph [19] above, the TWU submitted that the circumstances did not justify the Commission exercising its discretion to extend the notice period. As noted above, the TWU contended that any contingency measures implemented by Armaguard could include it outsourcing work to some of its competitors.

[37] Armaguard essentially submitted that the public interest considerations involved in this case justified extending the notice period. This was reinforced by Mr Beekman’s evidence which set out the security risks attaching to some of the forms of industrial action proposed by the TWU and the timeframes involved in obtaining regulatory approval for contingent labour to work in the ACT. On the latter point, Mr Beekman’s evidence included the need for replacement employees to undertake a two-day firearms training course before they could work in the ACT and that the process involved in the mutual recognition of replacement employees could take up to one week. These timeframes are in addition to the need to identify available replacement employees, transport them to the ACT and put in place back fill arrangements at their home location. Other significant aspects of Mr Beekman’s evidence were that:

● Armaguard will require more than five working days to put in place contingency arrangements;

● Armaguard cannot implement contingency arrangements until it is advised of the nature and duration of any industrial action because it is unable to estimate how many business continuity employees will be required to continue operations in a safe manner and whether they will be available to travel to the ACT to undertake work;

● while Armaguard could contract out work to one of its competitors in circumstances where industrial action was occurring, this would take in the order of the month to arrange; and

● Armaguard’s competitors were unlikely to be able to cover its ACT footprint and would be required to undertake a risk and site assessment for each site as well as deal with any licensing issues, with this likely to take longer than five days.

[38] Being provided with written notice of the intention to take industrial action provides an employer with an opportunity to take steps to mitigate the impact of that industrial. In this case the evidence supports a finding that a key consideration for Armaguard in this case is on steps to put in place appropriate contingency measures to minimise the security risks for its employees, its clients, its clients’ employees and the broader public and to mitigate the impact of disruptions to the collection and distribution of cash. To that end, Mr Beekman’s evidence clearly sets out some of the timeframes involved in putting in place appropriate contingency measures, with some of the timeframes involved in the required regulatory steps exceeding three working days. These considerations support a finding that the exceptional circumstances in this case justify an extension of the notice period beyond the three days written notice.

What is the appropriate period of written notice?

[39] As to what extended period of notice should be required, Armaguard proposes five working days. The TWU did not proffer a view on this issue other than to submit that no extension was warranted. Armaguard relied on the Commission’s decisions in the SA, Vic and Qld matters where the Commission had extended the period of notice to five working days. Having regard to the timeframes involved in putting in place appropriate contingency measures and drawing on the Commission’s decisions in the SA, Vic and Qld matters supports extending the period of notice to five working days.

[40] While I note that in the SA matter, Commissioner Hampton determined that stoppages over four hours would be subject to five working days’ notice, no material was put before me and no submissions were made as to any differential impact attaching to the differing levels of industrial action contemplated in the TWU’s draft order. In the absence of any such submissions or material, I am satisfied that the extended period of notice should apply to the forms of industrial action contemplated by questions 2 to 10 and 12 in the TWU’s draft order.

Conclusion

[41] As previously indicated, based on the material before me, I am satisfied that the requirements of s.443(1) have been satisfied and accordingly must make a protected action ballot order. Further, for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice being extended to five working days for certain forms of industrial action. Further, the employees to be balloted will be clearly specified in the order. An order 9 that effect will be issued separately to this decision.

Appearances:

A. Guy for the Applicant.

K. Blake for the Respondent.

Telephone Hearing details:

2016.

Melbourne:

February 24.

 1   AE889729.

 2   Exhibit G1.

 3   Ibid.

 4   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 1753 and PR548666.

 5   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 7558 and PR557611.

 6   Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 8934 and PR559103.

 7   167 IR 4.

 8   [2011] FWA 4403 and PR511399.

 9   PR577480.

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