[2013] FWC 10101

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.394—Unfair dismissal

Stephen Vaughan
v
Anglo Coal (Drayton Management) Pty Ltd
(U2013/1509)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAWRENCE

SYDNEY, 24 DECEMBER 2013

Application for relief from unfair dismissal.

Introduction

[1] On 10 May 2013 an application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for a remedy for unfair dismissal was lodged by Mr Stephen Vaughan (the Applicant). against his former employer, Anglo Coal (Drayton Management) Pty Ltd (the Respondent).

[2] The application was filed by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Mining & Energy Division (CFMEU) who continued to represent the Applicant throughout the various stages of proceedings in the Fair Work Commission (the Commission).

[3] The matter was the subject of conciliation on 11 June 2013, at which it was not resolved, and consequently listed for hearing.

[4] I conducted a programming hearing by teleconference on 23 September 2013.

[5] The matter was heard in Newcastle by me on 25 September. It could not be completed, mainly because of the unavailability on medical grounds of one of the Respondent’s witnesses.

[6] A further telephone programming conference took place on 15 October 2013.

[7] Concluding evidence and submissions were made before me in Sydney on 4 November.

[8] The Applicant and Respondent provided further written material with respect to the Applicant’s earnings to the Commission on 8 and 12 November respectively.

[9] The Applicant was represented by Mr K. Endacott of the CFMEU and the Respondent by Ms R. Taumalolo, its Employee Relations Specialist.

[10] The Applicant relied on oral evidence and submissions and:

[11] The Respondent relied on oral evidence and submissions and:

Background

[12] The Applicant was employed as an operator at the Drayton mine in the Hunter Valley of New South Wales from 17 November 2008. He was notified of his dismissal on 30 April 2013 and the dismissal took effect on that date.

[13] In his F2 form, the Applicant stated the reasons for the dismissal were:

[14] In its F3 form, the Respondent stated the reasons for dismissal were:

Protection from Unfair Dismissal

[15] An order for reinstatement or compensation may only be issued where I am satisfied the applicant was protected from unfair dismissal at the time of the dismissal.

[16] Section 382 sets out the circumstances that must exist for the applicant to be protected from unfair dismissal:

[17] There is no dispute, and I am satisfied, the Applicant has completed the minimum employment period, and whilst his earnings are above the high income salary cap at $150,412 per annum (Transcript PN349) he is covered by an enterprise agreement. Consequently, I am satisfied the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal.

Was the dismissal unfair?

[18] A dismissal is unfair if I am satisfied, on the evidence before me, that all of the circumstances set out at s.385 of the Act existed. Section 385 provides the following:

Was the Applicant dismissed?

[19] A person has been unfairly dismissed if the termination of their employment comes within the definition of “dismissed” for purposes of Part 3–2 of the Act. Section 386 of the Act provides that:

[20] There is no dispute that the applicant was dismissed, the mining company is a large employer and this is a case of summary dismissal.

Harsh, unjust or unreasonable

[21] Having dealt with each of s.385(a),(c)-(d) of the Act, I must consider whether I am satisfied the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The criteria I must take into account when assessing whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable are set out at s.387 of the Act:

Approach of the Commission

[22] The ambit of the conduct which may fall within the phrase ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’ was explained in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24; (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 465 by McHugh and Gummow JJ as follows:

[23] Vice President Ross, as he then was, in B Rose v Telstra Corporation Limited (1998) Q9292 (Rose) restated the above proposition and also stated:

[24] The Applicant submits the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable because:

[25] The Respondent submits the dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable because:

[26] I will now consider each of the criteria contained in s.387 of the Act separately.

Valid Reason - s.387(a)

[27] In Container Terminals Australia Limited v Toby [2000] Print S8434, a Full Bench said ‘In our view, the consideration of whether there was a valid reason for termination is a separate issue from the determination of whether a termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.

[28] Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 said:

[29] In Parmalat Food Products Pty Ltd v Wililo, (2011) FWAFB 1166, the Full Bench held:

[30] The Applicant was dismissed because of his lack of openness during the interview process. Most of the focus in the evidence and submissions was, appropriately in my view, placed on this and whether dismissal was an appropriate response by the employer.

[31] There was not a great deal of conflict over the evidence. There are, however, two matters which need to be dealt with.

[32] Firstly, Mr Endacott argued that there was a divergence between the standard which the Applicant was tested against, the Australian Standard AS4308 and the standard specified in the Respondent’s policy statement which was higher.

[33] Mr Pisters at PN503 admitted that there was an error in the company document and that it had always tested to the Australian standard level.

[34] Ms Smith-Eckman gave evidence as to the Respondent’s testing practices which I accept (Transcript PN954 - 982, PN1018 - PN1089).

[35] Some confusion was created by the different measurements referred to in the Respondent’s policies and by different measurements in respect of cup tests and the more reliable subsequent laboratory test.

[36] However, there was no dispute that the Applicant had a reading at the initial cup test which justified the subsequent laboratory test and that the laboratory test found a level of methylamphetamine above the Australian Standard. I find that this was the appropriate standard and the Respondent was entitled, indeed obliged, to take action once it had those results.

[37] Secondly, there was some disagreement as to when the Applicant received written notification of the test results. The Applicant says that he and the union delegate asked for a copy of the test results at the 11 April meeting and that the Respondent’s representatives refused to provide them. He admits that Mr Wynter reads from the pathology report and advised that the Applicant had tested positive for methylamphetamine.

[38] Mr Graham gave the following evidence about the 11 April meeting:

[39] I accept, on the balance of probabilities, the evidence given by Mr Graham above. It is consistent with the Respondent wanting to establish the Applicant’s veracity subsequent to receiving the test results.

[40] The 16 April “show cause” letter to the Applicant attaches the pathology laboratory report. There was some doubt as to when the Applicant received that letter as he was on leave in Queensland but it is clear he received it well before the 26 April meeting. (Transcript PN432 - 456) The report does not contain the details of readings.

[41] I find that the Respondent was obliged to treat the test report seriously and question the Applicant about it.

[42] The evidence was that the Applicant had not had positive tests in the employ of the Respondent but that he had when he was employed by a contractor at the mine, Damstra (Transcript PN75 - PN80).

[43] The Respondent was obliged to place an emphasis on health and safety protection in the context of the coal mining industry.

[44] It was also entitled to seek from the Applicant an explanation of the test results which exceeded the standard.

[45] It is true that the Respondent had a disciplinary policy which had a warning as a first step but this also maintains the parallel right to summary dismissal. The application of the policy does not mean that the Respondent was not entitled to investigate what happened and seek an explanation from the Applicant.

[46] The Respondent’s representatives did not volunteer the test results at the 11 April meeting but this was consistent with giving the Applicant the opportunity to provide an explanation.

[47] Mr Pisters gave the following evidence:

[48] And again at Transcript PN826 - PN831

[49] I accept this evidence.

[50] I also accept Mr Pisters account as to why the Respondent decided to dismiss:

[51] In all the circumstances of this case, I find that there was a valid reason for dismissal. I do so because:

Notification of the Valid Reason - s.387(b)

[52] Notification of a valid reason for termination must be given to an employee protected from unfair dismissal before the decision is made, Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Thomas Print S2679 at [41] in explicit terms, Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137, 151 and in plain and clear terms, Presvisic v Australian Quarantine Inspection Services Print Q3730. In Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137 a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission dealing with similar provision of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 stated the following:

[53] I find that the Applicant was given sufficient notification of the reason for the dismissal and the likely consequences of his failure to disclose before the dismissal took place.

[54] The 16 April “show cause” letter stated clearly that the positive test and “your dishonesty in responding to queries about what drugs you have consumed” were the reasons that dismissal was under consideration.

[55] These reasons were expanded upon at the meetings on 26 and 30 April.

Opportunity to Respond - s.387(c)

[56] An employee protected from unfair dismissal must be provided with an opportunity to respond to any reason for dismissal relating to the conduct or capacity of the person. This criterion is to be applied in a common sense way to ensure the employee is treated fairly and should not be burdened with formality RMIT v Asher (2010) 194 IR 1, 14-15.

[57] I find that the Applicant had a real opportunity to respond to the reasons for dismissal because:

Unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow a support person - s.387(d)

[58] Where an employee protected from unfair dismissal has requested a support person be present to assist in discussions relating to the dismissal, the employer should not unreasonably refuse that person being present.

[59] The CFMEU delegates were in attendance at all relevant meetings with the Applicant.

[60] The Applicant did not submit that this sub-section had not been complied with.

Warnings regarding unsatisfactory performance - s.387(e)

[61] This is not in issue as the dismissal was for failure to disclose following the test result.

Impact of the size of the Respondent on procedures followed - s.387(f)

[62] The Respondent is a large mining company. I find the size of the Respondent’s enterprise did not impact on the procedure followed in effecting the dismissal.

Absence of dedicated human resources management specialist/expertise on procedures followed - s.387(g)

[63] There was no lack of human resources expertise available to the respondent.

Any other matters that the FWC considers relevant

[64] The Applicant had been employed by the Respondent for four and a half years and appears to have a good work record. There was also some reference to personal difficulties that he was undergoing. However, I do not consider these factors should outweigh the other considerations.

[65] Having considered each of the matters specified in s.387, I am satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

K. Endacott for the Applicant.

R. Taumalolo for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2013

Sydney:

September 23 (telephone conference)

October 15 (telephone conference

November 4.

Newcastle:

September 25.

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<Price code C, PR546186>