1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
Dr Benjamen Gussen
v
Swinburne University of Technology
(C2024/7228)
COMMISSIONER REDFORD MELBOURNE, 2 DECEMBER 2024
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – jurisdictional objection – Applicant was not
dismissed – application dismissed
[1] Dr Benjamen Gussen is an accomplished academic and lawyer. His employment with
Swinburne University of Technology (Swinburne) ended in September 2024 in the manner set
out below. On 7 October 2024 Dr Gussen filed an application pursuant to s 365 of the Fair
Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging a breach of the general protections relating to dismissal (the
application).
[2] Swinburne alleged that Dr Gussen’s employment ended because he resigned, and he
was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act. It also argued the application should be
dismissed because Dr Gussen and Swinburne executed a Deed which provided that Swinburne
was released from any suits, actions, claims and demands in relation to the employment1.
[3] While ordinarily, the Commission does not have a determinative or decision-making
function in relation to an application of this kind, where a Respondent disputes that an Applicant
was dismissed within the meaning of the Act, a determination in relation to that dispute must
be made before any other step may be taken2. I conducted a hearing to determine the matter on
15 November 2024. Dr Gussen appeared at the hearing for himself, and Swinburne was granted
permission to be represented by Mr John Monroe.
[4] Dr Gussen and Ms Alexandra Marriot, the Workplace Relations Team and Project Lead
– Interim, within Swinburne’s People and Culture Department, gave evidence at the hearing.
[5] A large amount of material was filed by the parties prior to the hearing, particularly by
Dr Gussen. I have read and considered all of the material filed by the parties even if not
expressly referred to in these reasons for decision.
The end of Dr Gussen’s employment with Swinburne.
[2024] FWC 3316
DECISION
AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2024] FWC 3316
2
[6] On 29 July 2024 Dr Gussen received correspondence outlining allegations described as
serious misconduct he was said to have engaged in during his employment. He was advised of
a further allegation on 14 August 2024. The letters referenced clause 30 of the Swinburne
University of Technology – Academic & Professional Employees Enterprise Agreement 2024
(the Agreement) which applied to Dr Gussen’s employment – this clause of the Agreement
sets out a process for dealing with allegations of serious misconduct.
[7] Dr Gussen believes the allegations are illegitimate. At times he described them as
“false”3 although in his evidence he conceded that there was a factual basis to some of the
allegations. He denies vehemently the assertion that he engaged in serious misconduct.
[8] In particular, Dr Gussen believes the allegations were raised with him in retaliation for
behaviour he engaged in which he describes as “whistleblowing” regarding alleged fraud he
thinks Swinburne has perpetrated. He argues the allegations made against him are largely based
on conduct, in so far as it occurred, arising in 2023, which was known to Swinburne at the time
and in relation to which no issues were raised with Dr Gussen. He also believes that the
allegations have been put to him at this particular time because the Agreement had been
approved about a week earlier, resulting in a change to the process for dealing with allegations
of serious misconduct that meant Swinburne would not be compelled to conduct a formal
investigation into allegations if it chose note to – a choice that would apparently not have been
available to it under the previous Agreement. On this basis, he asserts that the allegations made
against him are a contrivance.
[9] Dr Gussen provided written responses to Swinburne to the allegations on 8 August 2024,
15 August 2024 and later on 4 September 2024. In these responses, while disputing that the
conduct alleged amounted to serious misconduct, Dr Gussen at times adopted concessional
language, such as to apologise to Swinburne for a lapse in judgement regarding high Turnitin
similarity scores, to apologise in respect to setting sighted essays for invigilated exams, to
apologise for failing to consult with management before deciding to recuse himself from
assigned moderation duties, to apologise for using inappropriate language in email
communications and offering to engage in professional development, supervision and training.
[10] It was put to Dr Gussen in cross examination that these concessions contradicted his
claims that the allegations made against him were false. In response, Dr Gussen said that he
was advised to adopt this approach to the correspondence by his Union, the National Tertiary
Education Union (NTEU), because it would improve his chances of avoiding termination of
employment as a result of the disciplinary process.
[11] On 22 August 2024 Dr Gussen received correspondence from Ms Amanda
Scardamaglia, Dean and Department Chair, Swinburne Law School, described as “findings of
serious misconduct process and intended outcome” which said that the allegations were
substantiated and that Ms Scardamaglia had formed the preliminary view that Dr Gussen’s
going employment with the University is untenable and cannot continue and the appropriate
outcome was for his employment to be terminated. This appears to be the “intended outcome”
of the process. Those words, apparently taken from clause 30 of the Agreement, are used
throughout the letter.
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[12] The letter also says that Ms Scardamaglia had determined that an investigation was not
required, pursuant to clause 30.5.3 of the Agreement.
[13] Dr Gussen’s Union, the NTEU initiated a dispute with Swinburne about the allegations
made against Dr Gussen, pursuant to clause 67 of the agreement. A meeting was held about the
dispute on 2 September 2024 involving Swinburne representatives including Ms Marriot and
NTEU representatives. Dr Gussen did not attend this meeting. As such, the direct evidence
before me of what was said in the meeting was that of Ms Marriot.
[14] At the commencement of the hearing I raised a question about the extent to which both
parties were seeking to advance evidence of conversations which took place in the lead up to
the end of Dr Gussen’s employment that might be said to be privileged communications,
including documents which were marked with the words “without prejudice” or “confidential”.
Both Dr Gussen and Swinburne confirmed that to the extent that any such conversations were
privileged, that privilege was waived. Taking into account that the privilege that extends to
without prejudice conversations concerning a dispute is a mutual privilege, I consider that any
such privilege was waived by the parties on a mutual basis.
[15] On the basis of evidence given by Ms Marriot about the meeting between NTEU
representatives and Swinburne on 2 September 2024, I accept that at some stage during the
meeting, one of the NTEU representatives raised the possibility of having a discussion about a
mutual separation between Dr Gussen and Swinburne and there was a request for time for the
NTEU representatives to discuss it with Dr Gussen.
[16] Dr Gussen authorised Mr Maloney of the NTEU to have discussions with Ms Marriot
about a mutual separation arrangement. Those discussions occurred between 2 September 2024
and 18 September 2024 and involved several verbal conversations and exchanges via email.
For example, by 13 September 2024 conversations had occurred such that a Deed had been
prepared, in relation to which Mr Maloney said “I have reviewed the proposed Draft … As has
Ben [Dr Gussen] … For the most part we are happy with it”. Several amendments were sought
by Dr Gussen, in relation to which, on 17 September 2024 Ms Marriot sent an email indicated
most were agreed, resulting in Mr Maloney saying in an email later that day “I have spoken
with Ben and he is agreeable to signing the deed as per the last email …”.
[17] A copy of a draft of the Deed was provided in evidence by Dr Gussen4. The draft
contains a range of “tracked changes” in various colours, some with references to the apparent
author by initials. It appears various people participated in the drafting of the Deed, including
Ms Marriot and Mr Maloney and perhaps other NTEU representatives. Clause 1 of the Deed
eventually provided that Dr Gussen would “resign from the Employment effective 5pm
Monday 16 September 2024”. I consider that the insertion of the words “Dr Gussen will resign
from the Employment”, which are shown in purple in the tracked changes, were inserted by an
NTEU representative, and that it is reasonable to conclude that this insertion occurred on Dr
Gussen’s behalf, or on his instructions, or with his approval.
[18] Dr Gussen executed the Deed on 18 September 20245. The Deed provided, among other
things:
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a. That Dr Gussen will resign from the Employment, effective 5pm Thursday 19
September 2024
b. That Dr Gussen would be paid a sum of money, together with employment entitlements
such as annual leave and outstanding salary.
c. That:
“In consideration for the Payments and Non-Financial Terms, the Employee fully and
unconditionally discharges and absolutely releases the Employer, or any of its
associated entities as defined by s 50AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("Group
Entities"), and each of their current and former employees, officers and Council
members from all suits, actions, claims and/or demands arising out of, or in connection
with, any of the following claims ("Employee Claims"):
a. the Employment;
b. the Contract;
c. the circumstances recited in this deed;
d. the Disciplinary Process;
e. the Dispute;
f. the Enterprise Agreement;
g. any other claim, whether under statute or otherwise; and/or
h. any act or omission of the Employer or any Group Entity during the Employment,
that the Employee has now or, but for the execution of this deed, could or may have had
in the future, and must not make, or take or institute any such Employee Claims,
excluding Employee Claims arising under any applicable workers' compensation or
superannuation legislation.”
d. That:
“The Employee confirms that he has been given the opportunity to obtain appropriate
independent professional advice before entering into this deed and that he understands
the provisions of the deed including, without limitation, the release at clause 5 and is
satisfied that the terms of the deed are fair and reasonable.”
[19] It appears a dispute has arisen in relation to the amount of the payment Dr Gussen
eventually received pursuant to the Deed, relating to its characterisation for tax purposes. This
appears to have been what has triggered these proceedings.
Was Dr Gussen dismissed within the meaning of the Act?
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[20] The term “dismissed” when it is used in s 365 of the Act has the meaning ascribed by s
12, which references s 386(1), which provides as follows:
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on
the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so
because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
[21] Dr Gussen argued he had been dismissed within the meaning of s 386(1), on the
following grounds:
a. That, pursuant to s 386(1)(a) of the Act, there was a termination of his employment at
Swinburne’s initiative, because the “critical action was triggering the serious
misconduct process under clause 30 of the EA 2024 by making false allegations against
me … ”, and that “given the seriousness of the allegations, this action had the probable
result of terminating my employment relationship with [Swinburne]”6.
b. That, pursuant to s 386(1)(a) of the Act, there was a termination of his employment at
Swinburne’s initiative because Swinburne by its actions repudiated his contract
employment, and the repudiation was accepted7.
c. That, pursuant to s 386(1)(b) of the Act, Dr Gussen’s “resignation was not voluntary but
rather coerced, fitting the legal standard for constructive dismissal”8, and occurred under
duress9, and as a result of unconscionable conduct engaged in by Swinburne10.
Critical action
[22] Referencing the decision of Wilcox CJ in APESMA v David Graphics Pty Ltd11 Dr
Gussen submitted that the “starting point is “to ask oneself what was the critical action, or what
were the critical actions, that constituted a termination of employment”. Dr Gussen argued that
the “critical action was triggering the serious misconduct process under clause 30 of the EA
2024 by making false allegations against me … ”. He submitted further that “given the
seriousness of the allegations, this action had the probable result of terminating my employment
relationship with [Swinburne]”12.
[23] Section 386(1)(a) is not concerned with circumstances in which the termination of
employment is the probable result of an employer’s actions, such that an employee had no
effective or real choice to resign – a circumstance often equated with the concept of
“constructive dismissal”13. The probable result of Swinburne’s actions and Dr Gussen’s
choices in response may be relevant to the other limb of s 386(1), as is discussed below. The
first limb of s 386(1) is concerned with whether an action on the part of the employer was the
principal contributing factor which resulted, directly or indirectly, in the termination of
employment14.
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[24] The actual result, as opposed to the probable result, of Swinburne’s decision to initiate
a serious misconduct process with respect to Dr Gussen was not the termination of his
employment, but rather to invite his response to a series of allegations, which were then
provided by him. By contrast, the critical action which led to the end of Dr Gussen’s
employment with Swinburne was his decision to sign a Deed which provided for his
resignation. Plainly, upon execution, the Deed which Dr Gussen signed, had the consequence
of causing his resignation effective on the date specified in the Deed. The Deed was the product
of a negotiation initiated on Dr Gussen’s behalf, with his authorisation, which had as its aim to
arrive at terms which would involve the end of his employment with Swinburne by way of
resignation. His decision to sign it caused the termination of his employment.
[25] There is no exhaustive description of what constitutes termination “at the employer’s
initiative”15. For example, an ostensible resignation by an employee may still give rise to a
dismissal within the meaning of s 386(1)(a) if it is given “in the heat of the moment, or when
the employee was in a state of emotional stress or mental confusion such that the employee
could not reasonably be understood to be conveying a real intention to resign16. I did not
understand it to be submitted by Dr Gussen that his decision to sign the Deed occurred in those
circumstances. Below, I discuss Dr Gussen’s submission that he was “forced to resign” in the
context of his submissions around constructive dismissal. Even if he was “forced to resign”
(which I do not accept, for reasons outlined below) he most certainly did not resign “in the heat
of the moment”. The terms of his resignation were negotiated over a period of about two weeks,
beginning when it was first mooted on 2 September 2024 and ending when he signed the Deed,
on 18 September 2024. His own representatives initiated the discussions about “mutual
separation”, draft Deeds were exchanged with amendments, his representatives included the
reference to resignation (in my view, with his approval), Dr Gussen, a lawyer, signed the Deed
and warranted that he been given the opportunity to obtain appropriate independent professional
advice before doing so, and that he understood the provisions of the deed including, without
limitation, its release provisions and that he was satisfied that the terms of the deed were fair
and reasonable.
Repudiation
[26] Dr Gussen also argues that his employment was terminated by Swinburne at its initiative
because it engaged in conduct which amounted to the repudiation of the contract of employment
and this was accepted17. Dr Gussen accepts the well established principle that whether there has
been a repudiation of contract is a question of fact not law18.
[27] First, Dr Gussen argued that the conduct engaged in by Swinburne which repudiated the
contract of employment was its engagement in fraudulent activities that undermines the
essential terms of trust and conduct that formed the foundation of the contractual relationship19.
[28] Secondly, Dr Gussen argued that as a legal professional and officer of the Supreme
Courts of Queensland and New Zealand, he is bound by a duty to uphold the proper
administration of justice, and Swinburne’s conduct, which he alleges involved fraud, makes it
impossible for him to discharge his duties while maintaining his legal and ethical obligations,
such that his contract was repudiated20.
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[29] As a matter of fact, I cannot conclude, on the basis of the evidence before me, that
Swinburne engaged in fraudulent activities. Therefore, I do not accept that Swinburne engaged
in conduct amounting to the repudiation of the employment contract on the basis of either of
these two submissions.
[30] Thirdly, Dr Gussen argues that Swinburne breached its duty of good faith by making
false allegations against him in retaliation for his whistleblowing, giving rise to the repudiation
of the contract.
[31] There is insufficient evidence before me to conclude that the allegations made against
Dr Gussen are false. Dr Gussen did appear to concede in oral evidence that there was a factual
basis for some of the allegations, while maintaining their illegitimacy. His responses provided
to Swinburne on 8 August 2024, 15 August 2024 and 4 September 2024 contain some
concessions as to some allegations. This is not to say that I consider the allegation that Dr
Gussen engaged in serious misconduct to have been made out. There is insufficient evidence
before me to make a conclusion one way or the other, and it is not necessary that I do so. I do
not accept, as a matter of fact, that it has been established that the allegations are false.
[32] Further, I do not have sufficient evidence before me to accept that Dr Gussen engaged
in “whistleblowing activities”, or that Swinburne considered his activities to be
“whistleblowing”, or had an issue with them, nor was there evidence provided of a casual
connection between Swinburne’s decision to initiate the disciplinary process and its views
(whatever they are) about Dr Gussen’s activities, that he describes as whistleblowing.
[33] I do not accept that Swinburne breached a duty of good faith by making false allegations
against Dr Gussen in retaliation for his whistleblowing and in doing so repudiated the contract
of employment.
[34] I do not consider Swinburne’s conduct to have otherwise repudiated the contract of
employment. Having found that there was no repudiation of the contract, it is not necessary for
me to consider whether Dr Gussen accepted any such repudiation.
Constructive dismissal
[35] In Balgowan, a Full Bench of this Commission considered that s 386(1)(b) is intended
to capture or reflect the common law concept of “constructive dismissal”. In considering s
386(1)(b) I have also, as the Commission so often does, had regard to the decision of the Full
Bench in Tavassoli, which stated as follows21:
(2) A resignation that is “forced” by conduct or a course of conduct on the part of the
employer will be a dismissal within the second limb of the definition in s.386(1)(b). The
test to be applied here is whether the employer engaged in the conduct with the intention
of bringing the employment to an end or whether termination of the employment was
the probable result of the employer’s conduct such that the employee had no effective
or real choice but to resign. Unlike the situation in (1), the requisite employer conduct
is the essential element.
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[36] It is well established this requires an objective analysis of the employer’s conduct is
required, or, as it was put in O’Meara v Stanley Works Pty Ltd22
It is not simply a question of whether “the act of the employer [resulted] directly or
consequentially in the termination of the employment.” Decisions which adopt the
shorter formulation of the reasons for decision should be treated with some caution as
they may not give full weight to the decision in Mohazab. In determining whether a
termination was at the initiative of the employer an objective analysis of the employer’s
conduct is required to determine whether it was of such a nature that resignation was
the probable result or that the appellant had no effective or real choice but to resign.
[References omitted]
[37] It appears Swinburne believes that the effect of clause 30 of the Agreement is that it was
obliged to advise Dr Gussen of what is described in sub-clause 30.5.5 as the “intended outcome”
of the disciplinary process. Thus, in its letter of 22 August 2024, Swinburne adopted this
language and told Dr Gussen that the “intended outcome” of the process was that his ongoing
employment with the University was untenable and cannot continue and the appropriate
outcome was for his employment to terminated. It also provided an opportunity to Dr Gussen
to respond to the “intended outcome” including to put to the University reasons as to why the
employment should not be terminated. On this language, it is understandable why Dr Gussen
submits, as he does, that the “probable” outcome of the process was the termination of his
employment.
[38] However, even if termination of employment was ultimately going to be the “probable
result” of Swinburne’s disciplinary process once it took its course, did Swinburne initiate the
process with the view that Dr Gussen’s resignation was the probable result, or such that Dr
Gussen had no effective or real choice but to resign? I think not.
[39] Dr Gussen provided lengthy and comprehensive responses to the allegations made
against him and to the “findings” letter of 22 August 2024. In these responses, he makes various
admissions and concessions, offers apologies and to engage in remedial measures such as
training or supervision. In his oral evidence, he said he made these concessions to improve his
chances of avoiding the termination of his employment. On the basis of this evidence, I must
conclude Dr Gussen himself thought, at last at the time he drafted these letters, that if he
engaged in the process this way, its result may not have been the termination of his employment.
[40] Accordingly, Dr Gussen had a choice not to resign and instead engage in the process.
This is what he did. Then, through his representatives, the NTEU, a conversation was initiated
with Swinburne about mutual separation. This presented Dr Gussen with another set of choices,
including whether or not to agree to particular terms involving mutual separation and ultimately
whether or not to sign a Deed with an express term giving effect to his resignation. He engaged
with this set of choices over a period of about two weeks, with the assistance of his
representatives, including going back and forth with Swiburne about the terms he required to
be included in the Deed such that he would be prepared to sign it.
[41] Dr Gussen submitted that s 386(1)(b) is activated where resignation is effectively
“coerced or pressured” by the employer23. He argued this occurred because Swinburne engaged
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in conduct amounting to “duress”24 and “unconscionable conduct”25. The conduct claimed to
constitute duress was an “instruction to resign as evidenced by Term 1 of the Deed”, effectively
leaving him with “no reasonable choice but to comply”, thus constituting undue pressure26, such
pressure being illegitimate, because, Dr Gussen submits, it arose from false allegations
motivated by retaliation27.
[42] The conduct alleged by Dr Gussen to be unconscionable was said to have been
“unfounded allegations” used “as leverage to pressure me into signing the Deed, effectively
compelling me to resign”28. This was said to have occurred against a backdrop that included
Swinburne negotiating to include in the Agreement clause 30, which Dr Gussen said was in bad
faith, and which “facilitated potential breaches of Part 3-1 general protections”29 and also
included an inequality of bargaining power and circumstances said by Dr Gussen to have placed
him at serious disadvantage, including health and financial challenges30.
[43] I do not agree that tortious conduct equating to duress or unconscionability is required
to be shown to establish that an employee has been forced to resign. However, I do not consider
Dr Gussen’s decision to sign the Deed, thus giving effect to his resignation, occurred under
duress or as a result of unconscionable conduct. In so far as the inclusion of a reference to
resignation in the Deed is said constitute undue pressure, I do not accept this submission: this
reference was inserted into the Deed by the NTEU with Dr Gussen’s approval, and he signed
the document on that basis. Above, I have found there is insufficient evidence before me to
conclude that Swinburne’s allegations against Dr Gussen are false or were levelled against him
in retaliation. I do not accept his submissions that Swinburne engaged in conduct amounting to
duress or unconscionability.
[44] An employer engaging in or conducting an investigation, including a disciplinary
investigation, will ordinarily not of itself be sufficient to “force” an employee’s resignation31.
But Dr Gussen appears to argue this is not just any disciplinary investigation. He believes the
investigation was falsified, in retaliation for what he describes as his whistleblowing activities,
relating to a fraud he believes he uncovered. This theory is the cornerstone of his argument that
he was forced to resign. However, as I have said above, there is insufficient evidence before me
to conclude that Swinburne has perpetrated a fraud, that Dr Gussen has engaged in
“whistleblowing activities”, that if he has, that Swinburne takes issue with those activities and
that the allegations it has made against him are false.
[45] Instead, the evidence before me is that Dr Gussen’s representatives initiated the idea of
mutual separation and then, over a period of about two weeks, a negotiation took place
involving the terms of Dr Gussen’s resignation of employment, which he then gave effect to by
signing the Deed. Dr Gussen made a choice – to sign the Deed and resign – and it was not
forced.
Conclusion - dismissal
[46] Dr Gussen was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act. His employment was not
terminated at Swinburne’s initiative, nor was he forced to resign because of conduct, or a course
of conduct engaged in by Swinburne.
The Deed
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[47] Swinburne argued that on the basis that the Deed executed by the parties provided a
release from any suits, actions, claims and demands including in respect to the employment, the
contract, the circumstances outlined in the recitals to the deed, the disciplinary process, the
dispute raised by NTEU, the Enterprise Agreement, any other claim, whether under statute or
otherwise, and/or any act or omission, that Dr Gussen’s application should also be dismissed
pursuant either s 587(1) of the Act or through the Commission’s inherent power to dismiss an
application for want of jurisdiction.
[48] Dr Gussen submitted on a range of grounds that the application should not be dismissed
on the basis of the Deed. These included that the Deed’s release, while expressed in
emphatically broad terms, did not encompass an application of the kind brought by Dr Gussen
(an application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute). Dr Gussen also submitted
that the Deed was made for an illegal purpose, obtained by fraud and is void on public policy
grounds.
[49] Having determined that Dr Gussen was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act, it
is not necessary for me to determine whether or not the application should be dismissed because
of the terms of the Deed and thus whether grounds advanced by Dr Gussen in support of his
position are accepted.
Disposition
[50] I have found Dr Gussen was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act. On this basis
the application is dismissed and an Order to that effect will issue with this decision.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Dr B Gussen, on his own behalf
J Monroe, K&L Gates, for the Respondent instructed by Ms Marriott and Ms Poulos
Hearing details:
THE FAIR WORKING OF NOISSIN THE SEAL
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2024.
Melbourne.
15 November 2024.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
PR781840
1 Respondent’s Outline of Submissions [19]
2 Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford [2020] FCAFC 152
3 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [17], [19], [20], [53.2], [67], [100], [108], [126], [135]
4 Affidavit of Dr Benjamen Gussen “Exhibit B”
5 Witness Statement of Alexandra Marriot “AM-4”
6 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [87]
7 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [101] – [111]
8 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [126]
9 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [118] - [126]
10 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [127] – [135]
11 Industrial Relations Court of Australia, NI 94/0174, 12 July 1995, unreported
12 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [87]
13 City of Sydney RSL & Community Club Limited v Roxana Balgowan [2018] FWCFB 5 [10]
14 Ibid [11]; Khayam v Navitas English Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 5162, [75]
15 Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200 at [205]-[246]
16 Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd t/a Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli [2017] FWCFB 3941 [47]
17 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [111]
18 Balgowan [18]
19 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [103]
20 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [104]
21 Tavassoli [47]
22 [PR973462] Giudice P, Watson VP, Cribb C, 11 August 2006 [23]
23 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [112]
24 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [118] – [126]
25 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [127] – [135]
26 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [123]
27 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [126]
28 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [132]
29 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [128]
30 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions [134] – [135]
31 See Adriana Zanoni v INA Operations Trust No.1 [2024] FWC 2737 [51] and the authorities cited therein
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2018fwcfb5.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2017fwcfb5162.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2017fwcfb3941.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/pr973462.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2024fwc2737.pdf
