1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Jennifer Louise Murray
v
EACH
(U2023/8898)
COMMISSIONER WILSON MELBOURNE, 16 JANUARY 2024
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - jurisdictional objection that there was no
dismissal – jurisdictional objection upheld – substantive application dismissed
[1] This decision deals with the question of whether Ms Jennifer Murray (the Applicant)
was “dismissed” within the meaning of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) from her employment
with EACH (EACH, or the Respondent) and thus eligible to make an application for unfair
dismissal remedy to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission).
[2] EACH objects to Ms Murray’s application on the basis that there was no dismissal as
defined. With such objection having been made the Commission is required to determine
whether the applicant was dismissed before the application can proceed any further.
[3] For the reasons set out below, I find Ms Murray was not “dismissed” within the meaning
of the Act.
PRELIMINARIES
[4] The objection was the subject of a determinative conference before me on Friday 15
December 2023 at which Ms Murray gave evidence and made submissions on her own behalf
and Ms Ione McKenzie a former colleague also gave evidence on her behalf. EACH was
represented by Ms Timea Caldow, Team Leader – Human Resources Business Partner.
Evidence was received on behalf of EACH from Ms Amanda Thomas, Manager – Special
Project, Mental Health and AOD; Ms Ivana Stipanovic, Program Stream Manager – Adult
Mental Health and Wellbeing; and Mr Derek Fagan, Manager – Mental Health and
Psychological Interventions.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[5] The term “dismissed” is defined in s.12 of the Act by reference to s.386, which provides
this definition:
“386 Meaning of dismissed
[2024] FWC 24
DECISION
AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2024] FWC 24
2
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on
the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so
because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her
employer.
(2) However, a person has not been dismissed if:
(a) The person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified
period of time, for a specified task, or for the duration of a specified season,
and the employment has terminated at the end of the period, on completion
of the task, or at the end of the season; or
(b) the person was an employee:
(i) to whom a training arrangement applied; and
(ii) whose employment was for a specified period of time or was, for
any reason, limited to the duration of the training arrangement; and
the employment has terminated at the end of the training
arrangement; or
(c) the person was demoted in employment but:
(i) the demotion does not involve a significant reduction in his or her
remuneration or duties; and
(ii) he or she remains employed with the employer that effected the
demotion.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a person employed under a contract of a kind
referred to in paragraph (2)(a) if a substantial purpose of the employment of the person
under a contract of that kind is, or was at the time of the person’s employment, to avoid
the employer’s obligations under this Part.”
[6] The Commission’s usual process for unfair dismissal applications is to deal with the
dispute by conducting a conciliation conference by a staff conciliator. However, in an
application where a respondent denies it dismissed the applicant and objects to the application
on this basis, the Commission will first determine whether the applicant was dismissed.
BACKGROUND
[2024] FWC 24
3
[7] Ms Murray commenced employment with EACH on 21 September 2021, having been
engaged to provide support and services to regional Victorians impacted by floods. At the time
she left EACH’s employment her title was Team Leader – Partners in Wellbeing.
[8] The basis of Ms Murray’s employment was a fixed term employment contract which
was due to expire on 31 August 2023, and ultimately did expire on that date. The precise terms
of the contract are not in evidence before me.
[9] In early to mid 2023 Ms Murray became concerned with EACH’s management in
general, and the support she was receiving from her immediate manager in particular. She
argues that the lack of support created a risk to her health and safety and as that was not
addressed the situation left her with “no choice but to resign”.1
[10] In August 2023 there were several developments on the part of both parties relating to
the renewal of Ms Murray’s employment contract.
[11] Ms Stipanovich, who had been Ms Murray’s direct manager for much of 2023, moved
to a different role on 7 August 2023.
[12] EACH submit that on 11 August 2023, Ms Murray made a request for a review of her
current pay rate.2 It submits that she followed this up on 15 August 2023 disclosing that she
had been made an offer of employment with a superior pay rate at another agency, which she
had declined.3 On 17 August 2023 Ms Murray’s manager called her and advised that a pay
increase at that time was not appropriate.4 Documents that may support these contentions are
not in evidence before me.
[13] At or around the same time Ms Murray had received a proposal for an extension to her
employment contract which was due to end on 31 August 2023. She is critical of EACH for
having no discussion with her on the subject until mid-August, and then only when she sought
clarification, by which time there were only “two weeks of employment remaining”.5 On a date
which is not clear from the evidence EACH provided Ms Murray with a “Variation of Contract
Form” which, if signed, would provide for an extension of the contract of employment from 10
August 2023 until 28 June 2024. I refer to this proposed variation as the First Contract
Extension Proposal. The evidence before me suggests the proposal was provided to Ms Murray
sometime between 10 August and 18 August 2023.
[14] On 18 August 2023 Ms Murray emailed a number of people within EACH and informed
them that she had “decided not to renew my contract with EACH”.6 After explaining that she
was grateful for the opportunity of working for EACH and she had valued the learning
opportunities and challenges, Ms Murray asked a question about her transition out of the
organisation;
“My contract ends on 31 August. Would you prefer that I finish then, or stay in the role
while you secure a new team leader?
It would be great if I could have your decision about this today so that I can provide
clear communication to my team who have already experienced major uncertainty.”7
[2024] FWC 24
4
[15] The communication serves as a rejection by Ms Murray of the First Contract Extension
Proposal.
[16] Ms Murray’s statement of resignation was accepted the same day by Mr Fagan who then
asked her “if she would consider staying on for a few months to help support the transition of
the program. Ms Murray initially agreed to this and new contractual dates were being drawn up
for Ms Murray to consider”.8 Mr Fagan communicated to Ms Stipanovic and Ms Wangman that
he had accepted Ms Murray’s “resignation for the end of September 2023”.9 Consistent with
this discussion a contract extension (the Second Contract Extension Proposal) was drafted and
put to Ms Murray for her consideration. While the contractual document itself is not before
me, Ms Denise Wangman, EACH’s Human Resources Business Partner, refers to it in
correspondence to Ms Murray on 24 August 2023 as being an extension until 29 September
2023.
[17] Mr Fagan gave evidence that in a Teams meeting on 25 August 2023;
“Ms Murray complained about EACH and its management. She stated again that she was
not being supported and that EACH management do not understand the regions. I asked
her directly – ‘What do you need? What can I do?’, I needed her to be specific or I
couldn’t assist her with required change. Ms Murray said, “you have no integrity and
you should be trying to build positive relations with me…” I asked her to explain what
she meant by this but she shut down the meeting and hung up. This was my last
interaction with Ms Murray”.10
[18] Ms Murray does not deny that she disconnected the call, but argues Mr Fagan was
“abusive” toward her.11
[19] Also on Friday 25 August 2023 at 4:36 PM, Ms Murray texted Ms Stipanovic and stated;
“Thank you for your call today. Roby and I have discussed it. it's not healthy for me to
continue. Thank you for sending the contract variation but I won't sign it. I'm sorry.”12
[20] Ms Stipanovic replied to the text shortly after, and writing;
“Ok, can you please confirm to me in an email your finishing date. Thanks for letting me
know [sad emoji].”13
[21] The text exchange was followed by a lengthy email from Ms Murray to Ms Stipanovic
and others, send 25 August 2023 at 4:39 PM. Amongst other matters, Ms Murray
communicated that in “light of recent developments it is obvious that I need to finish up my
Statewide Team Leader role immediately” and that she would “finish up on Thursday 31 as per
my contract”.14 These exchanges serve as a rejection by Ms Murray of the Second Contract
Extension Proposal.
[22] On Monday 28 August 2023 Ms Murray emailed Ms Stipanovic and Ms Wangman
expressing concern about the commencement of two new employees and offered to remain with
EACH until Friday 8 September 2023 in order to assist. Ms Stipanovic replied thanking Ms
Murray for her offer, but advising that would not be necessary and EACH would “keep to your
[2024] FWC 24
5
initial request of finishing up on the Thursday 31st August”. Ms Murray acknowledged the
communication.15 I refer to this exchange as the Murray Contract Extension Proposal.
[23] Following these exchanges, on Tuesday 29 August 2023, EACH confirmed in writing
to Ms Murray the end of her employment;
“This letter confirms your advice provided on Friday 18 August 2023, that after careful
consideration you will be not accepting a further extension of contract and will cease
your position as Team Leader – Partners in Wellbeing on Friday 29 September 2023”.16
CONSIDERATION
[24] It is likely that Ms Murray was at the time her employment came to an end a person who
was employed for a specified period of time and that her employment terminated at the end of
that period, being an exclusion to the definition of “dismissed” provided in s.386 (per s.386(2)).
However, since the full terms of the contract are not before me and because of the reasoning of
the Full Bench majority in Khayam v Navitas English Pty Ltd17 (Navitas) I am unable to make
a definitive finding on the subject.
[25] It is therefore necessary for me to consider the alternative, of whether Ms Murray’s
employment was terminated for the reasons set out in s.386(1) and in particular whether she
resigned from her employment but was forced to do so because of conduct engaged in by EACH
(s.386(1)(b)).
s.386(2) considerations – whether a contract for a specified period of time
[26] I consider first the matters relating to a contract for a specified period of time.
[27] The parties are agreed that Ms Murray’s employment was governed by a contract of
employment that specified her employment ended on 31 August 2023, that is, the same day that
Ms Murray alleges to be the date of her dismissal. When Ms Murray communicated to EACH
that she would not be renewing her contract, Ms Murray stated that “My contract ends on 31st
August”.18 For its part, EACH also accepted that Ms Murray’s employment was, if not
extended, due to end on 31 August 2023, acknowledging that such was the case by offering an
extension to the employment term through the First Contract Extension Proposal from 10
August to 28 June 2024 and then later the Second Contract Extension Proposal.
[28] When on 18 August 2023 Ms Murray declined the First Contract Extension Proposal
her action had the effect of simply leaving the extant contract running and its termination date
of 31 August 2023 unvaried.
[29] Further, when on 25 August 2023 Ms Murray rejected the Second Contract Extension
Proposal, her rejection also had the effect of leaving her employment unvaried and due to end
on 31 August 2023.
[30] When EACH declined on 28 August 2023 to agree to the Murray Contract Extension
Proposal that too had the effect of leaving Ms Murray’s employment contract as unvaried and
ending on 31 August 2023.
[2024] FWC 24
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[31] This analysis clearly engages the provisions of s.386(2)(a) which provides that a person
has not been “dismissed” within the meaning of the Act if they were employed, amongst other
things, for a specified period of time and their employment terminated at the end of that period.
While s.368(3) provides that the exceptions within s.386(2)(a) do not operate “if a substantial
purpose of the employment of the person under a contract of that kind is, or was at the time of
the person’s employment, to avoid the employer’s obligations under this Part”, there is no
submission or evidence before me to suggest that Ms Murray’s employment contract was
improperly characterised as a contract for a specified period of time. In fact, to the contrary,
there is material from EACH that suggests the continuation of Ms Murray’s employment was
reliant upon the receipt of funding from external sources.
[32] Nonetheless, I note the finding of the majority in Navitas that a contract which provided
for an unqualified right for either party to terminate the contract on four weeks’ written notice
or for Navitas to terminate on the provision of four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice was not a
contract of employment for a specified period, and that as a consequence the exclusion in
s.386(2)(a) did not apply. Since I do not have the contract before me I cannot exclude this
possibility.
s.386(1) considerations – whether dismissed at the initiative of the employer or Applicant
forced to resign
[33] Section 386(1) is in the terms set out above, providing the primary definition of the term
“dismissed”. That primary definition allows for two alternatives; situations in which an
employee’s employment has been terminated on the employer’s initiative (s.386(1)(a)) and
circumstances in which an employee has resigned but was forced to do so because of conduct,
or a course of conduct, engaged in by their employer (s.386(1)(b)).
[34] There is no contention by either party in this matter that Ms Murray’s employment was
terminated on the initiative of EACH and nothing within the evidence would allow such a
conclusion.
[35] Ms Murray however argues that she was forced to resign.
[36] After an extensive analysis of the law surrounding s.386(1) the Full Bench in Bupa Aged
Care Australia Pty Ltd t/a Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli19 (Bupa) held that the
Commission needed to distinguish whether it was argued the dismissal was not legally effective,
such as for reason of a “heat of the moment” communication or incapacity of some kind or
whether it had been “forced” through conduct or a course of conduct by the employer with an
intentional purpose of procuring a resignation. There is no submission to me in these
proceedings that Ms Murray left EACH’s employment through “heat of the moment” actions.
If there were, the Commission generally accepts that in special circumstances an employer may
be required to allow a reasonable period of time to pass and may have a duty to confirm the
intention to resign if, during that time, they are put on notice that the resignation was not
intended.20
[37] The actions of an employer in relation to a termination of employment are not the only
points of consideration. It is also necessary to consider the circumstances giving rise to the
[2024] FWC 24
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termination; the seriousness of the issues involved; and the respective conduct of the employer
and employee.21
[38] Assessment of Ms Murray’s contention is assisted by the summary of the general
principles laid out by Deputy President Hampton in Tao Yang v SAL HR Services Pty Ltd (Tao
Yang), noting that not all of the summarised principles are relevant to whether there was a
forced resignation:
“• The question as to whether there was a dismissal within the meaning of the FW Act is
a jurisdictional fact that must be established by the Applicant;
• A termination at the initiative of the employer involves the conduct (or course of
conduct) engaged in by the employer as the principal constituting factor leading to the
termination. There must be a sufficient causal connection between the conduct and the
resignation such that it “forced” the resignation;
• The employer must have engaged in some conduct that intended to bring the
employment relationship to an end or had that probable result;
• Conduct includes an omission;
• Resignations that are clear and unambiguous may be treated on face value unless
special circumstances are present which warrant the employer confirming the
intention of the employee;
• Considerable caution should be exercised in treating a resignation as other than
voluntary (forced) where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous and it is necessary
to determine whether the employer’s conduct was of such a nature that resignation
was the probable result such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to
resign; and
• In determining the question of whether the termination was at the initiative of the
employer, an objective analysis of the parties’ conduct is required.”22
[39] It is unambiguously the case as set out before that the parties took Ms Murray’s
employment to be terminating on 31 August 2023 unless it was extended. The First and Second
Contract Extension Proposals were communicated by EACH and rejected by Ms Murray.
EACH declined to agree to the Murray Contract Extension Proposal.
[40] When she declined the First Contract Extension Proposal Ms Murray used the language
of resignation. Notwithstanding that I view the overall situation as being one of failing to agree
to terms for the extension of an existing contract, I accept for the purposes of analysis of
s.386(1)(b) that Ms Murray gave notice to EACH on 18 August 2023 of her intended
termination of her employment contract. In turn, EACH communicated its acceptance of that
notification.
[41] The conduct, or course of conduct, on the part of EACH to which Ms Murray points as
forcing her resignation are the circumstances which arose “over the 6 months from February
[2024] FWC 24
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2023 to August 2023” affecting her and her team to such a degree that it “made it impossible”
for her to continue in her role.23 Further;
• Ms Murray says she had a supportive manager until February 2023. There then
followed a number of leadership changes after which she claimed she worked in an
unsafe environment.24
• After February 2023 Ms Murray reported to Ms Stipanovic who first acted as her
manager and then moved to the role on a substantive basis before moving away from
the role in early August 2023. Mr Fagan became the Partners in Wellbeing Manager
on 7 August 2023. Ms Murray accuses both of a lack of support and hostility toward
her. She says that Ms Stipanovic was promoted through an inconsistent process to that
required for other staff.
• Working remotely Ms Murray reports feeling isolated and not supported in her role.
She felt her workload was too great and at the same time she was grappling with
underperformance by members of her team. She says she went for long periods of
time with no contact from her supervisors.
• Between May and July 2023 Ms Murray raised concerns of “isolation, safety and lack
of support” with three different managers, Ms Wangman, Ms Thomas and Ms
Stipanovic. She reports that none of the matters she raised were “addressed or
responded to in any way”.25
• Ms Murray also says that she was subjected to “violence and aggression (a manager
with no relationship to me treated me with disdain in a witnessed phone meeting)”.26
This is apparently a reference to contact she had with Mr Fagan.
• Ms Murray argues that her employment from this time at least was characterised by
the presence of 8 of the 14 psychosocial hazards documented by Safe Work
Australia.27
[42] EACH denies the substance of this narrative, arguing that Ms Murray was well
supported but otherwise unhappy with changes to the management structure or decisions taken
by her managers, including with their adherence to internal policies and processes.
[43] I am not satisfied that the events relied upon by Ms Murray have sufficient causal
connection with her eventual resignation (if that is what it was) as to be capable of founding a
claim that her resignation was forced. The contention that her workplace was unsafe to the point
of breaching occupational health and safety obligations is not made out either at the factual
level or sufficiently connected with EACH as to allow a finding that its knowledge of the
situation, whether actual or vicarious, amounts to a course of conduct for the purposes of
s.386(1)(b). There was no report by Ms Murray to the safety regulator and there is no evidence
that she made an internal occupational health and safety incident report.
[44] Ms Murray’s complaint that Ms Stipanovic did not give her support is not adequately
made out in the light of a lengthy messaging chain between the two in February and March
which shows that the relationship was functional and civil at the least. Ms Stipanovic
[2024] FWC 24
9
acknowledges tensions in their relationship, but denies much of Ms Murray’s characterisation
and especially whether concerns with a connection to matters of workplace safety were raised
with her. Ms Stipanovic is positive that in mid-August 2023 and despite the concerns she held
about Ms Murray wanted to retain her.
[45] Ms Murray’s complaint of hostility being demonstrated toward her by Mr Fagan lacked
specifics as to the actions that were hostile or worse and so are not substantiated.
[46] In contrast to Ms Murray’s claims of dysfunction, isolation and hostility leading to her
being forced out of her job is the objective evidence about her last month in EACH’s
employment. In this period;
• Ms Murray criticises EACH for not communicating to her a proposal for a contract
extension until mid-August by which time there was only “two weeks of employment
remaining” with the proposal only being delivered after seeking clarification on the
subject from EACH. If nothing else, her request for an extension proposal suggests
that at the time Ms Murray sought clarification she was ready willing and available to
continue in EACH’s employment after 31 August 2023 and was concerned if it did
not.
• On 11 August 2023 Ms Murray sought a pay rise from EACH, which was refused on
17 August 2023. In between these two dates EACH says that Ms Murray emailed her
Manager for an update in the course of which she advised that “I was approached by
an agency with the offer of a statewide role, leading a team of MH Professionals. Up
to a 4yr contract. Their opening offer was $65/hour …. ”.28 While the documents
relating to this exchange are not before me, EACH’s submission on this subject was
not challenged by Ms Murray in the presentation of her case.
• When Ms Murray communicated her resignation to EACH on 18 August 2023 and
rejected the First Contract Extension Proposal she expressed gratitude for the
opportunities given to her in working at EACH.29 When Mr Fagan suggested she stay
on for a brief period for the purposes of transition Ms Murray agreed.
• Only on 25 August 2023 after meeting with Mr Fagan, during which Mr Murray says
he was hostile, did Ms Murray finally refuse the second contract extension proposal.
Ms Murray’s email after that meeting sets out why that may be the case:
“To have Derek misquote me as I was trying to explain some of the facts today
reassures me that the relationship is untenable. I can’t imagine speaking to a
team member with the disdain that I experienced today.
Today I suggested to Derek that given I am a relational person it might be more
productive if we got along together. I was 100% prepared to do this. His negative
response makes it clear to me that this relationship. can’t be effective.
EACH has a way of diminishing people who leave - there doesn’t seem to be an
inclination to reflect or hear the other side of the story - but I can guarantee that
there are recent actions that leadership are not aware of. The one fact that I want
[2024] FWC 24
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known is that I have not had supervision for 8 weeks. 8 Weeks during which the
program has undergone massive change and uncertainty I have been left entirely
alone and without support. For a program that delivers mental health and
wellbeing support this is indefensible.
Its untenable for me to continue to work in this environment and I am devastated
to be put in a position where I know that I will let others down. After driving an
11 hour day (5 hours of driving) yesterday – to come back to all this - I guess
it’s the last straw for me.”30
• On 31 August 2023 in preparation for an exit interview with EACH’s Program
Director, Ms Murray referred to having been offered jobs by two stakeholders, albeit
that it was unlikely she would take either role.31
[47] These matters do not show a forced resignation, but instead one that was chosen.
[48] In mid-August Ms Murray sought a pay-rise which implies that such wrinkles as there
may be in the employment relationship could be assuaged with a higher rate of pay. In mid-
August Ms Murray wanted a contract extension, was anxious when it was not provided, and
had to prompt EACH to provide one. She actively considered the First Contract Extension
Proposal and turned it down only after her pay-rise request was refused.
[49] Managerial and other leadership positions require development and maintenance of
sustainable relationships as well as resilience for withstanding not only the difficulties of
dealing with subordinates, but peers and superiors any of whom may have difficulties or
disabilities with one, some or all of their colleagues. The absence of workplace harmony or the
presence of workplace conflict are not in and of themselves always so significant that an
employee is left with no option other than to resign.
[50] Those matters of themselves are not unusual or untenable and on their own do not ordain
a forced resignation.
[51] Ms Murray’s reference to having received job offers plainly supports the view that she
thought at the point she left that she had options. In the context of this matter such situation
reinforces the likelihood her resignation was not forced. She was prepared to use the offers as
support to her request for a pay review, with the clear implication that a refusal may lead her to
consider her future with EACH.
[52] It follows I am unable to find that any conduct of EACH’s, whether actual or by
omission, had the intention or probability of forcing a resignation on Ms Murray’s part. A
finding of such type would be objectively inconsistent with EACH’s First Contract Extension
Proposal which was an offer of a further 10 months employment. EACH did not at that time
want her gone: it wanted her to remain. A similar message was given to Ms Murray through
provision of the Second Contract Extension Proposal This situation does not meet what may be
regarded as “forced”; that is a situation in which “[b]ut for the insistence of the employer,
termination of employment would not cross the mind of the employee”.32
[2024] FWC 24
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[53] A finding of this type is also not available for the action of EACH in declining the
Murray Contract Extension Proposal. By 28 August 2023 when Ms Murray made the proposal
EACH had received Ms Murray’s 25 August 2023 correspondence in which she set out
numerous complaints including about Mr Fagan’s hostility towards her; staff disgruntlement
and that “EACH has a way of diminishing people who leave - there doesn’t seem to be an
inclination to reflect or hear the other side of the story”.33 If this communication could
reasonably be taken as a reflection of Ms Murray’s true feelings about EACH there would then
be little if any imperative for it to consider her proposal for a further week’s work. Whether
Ms Murray’s complaints were accurate or not, EACH was within its rights to simply take the
view that it was time for them both to part company.
[54] It follows from the above I am not satisfied that Ms Murray was forced to resign from
her employment with EACH because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by EACH.
CONCLUSION
[55] On the material before me, I am satisfied that the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection
has been made out. I find the Ms Murray was not “dismissed” within the meaning of that term
as set out in s.386.
[56] The jurisdictional objection is upheld and Ms Murray’s substantive application is
dismissed through an order issued at the same time as these reasons for decision.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
J Murray, Applicant
T Caldow with A Thomas, I Stipanovic, and D Fagan for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2023.
Melbourne (via Microsoft Teams):
December 15.
Final written submissions:
Applicant, 4 December 2023
Respondent, 11 December 2023
WORK NORK 0 COMMISSION ISSION AUSTRALIA, THE SEAL OF THE F
[2024] FWC 24
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Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
PR769956
1 Employer Response Form (Form F3), Digital Hearing Book (DHB), p.36.
2 Form F3, DHB, p. 71.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Unfair Dismissal Application (Form F2), DHB, p. 7 – 8.
6 Respondent Outline of Argument - Document 1, DHB, p. 127.
7 Respondent Outline of Argument – Document 1, DHB, p. 127.
8 Fagan Witness Statement, DHB, p. 172.
9 Form F3 – Attachment A, DHB, p. 83.
10 Fagan Witness Statement, DHB, p. 172.
11 Applicant Outline of Argument, DHB, p. 39.
12 From F3 – Attachment E, DHB, p. 86.
13 Ibid.
14 From F3 – Attachment F, DHB, p. 87.
15 From F3 – Attachment G, DHB, p. 89 – 90.
16 From F3 – Attachment D, DCB, p. 84.
17 [2017] FWCFB 5162.
18 From F3 – Attachment A, DCB, p. 80.
19 [2017] FWCFB 3941, [47] – [54].
20 Ngo v Link Printing Pty Ltd Print R7005 (AIRCFB, McIntyre VP, Marsh SDP, Harrison C, 7 July 1999), [12].
21 Pawel v Advanced Precast Pty Ltd (Print S5904, AIRCFB, Polites SDP, Watson SDP and Gay C, 12 May 2000), at [13].
22 [2023] FWC 1325, [53].
23 Applicant Outline of Argument, DHB, p. 36.
24 Form F2, DHB, p. 6.
25 Applicant Outline of Argument, DHB, p. 37.
26 Ibid, p. 40.
27 Form F2, DHB, p. 6.
28 Form F3, DHB, p. 71.
29 Respondent Outline of Argument – Document 1, DHB, p. 127.
30 Form F3 – Attachment F, DHB, p. 87 – 88.
31 Form F2 – Email Attachment, DCB, p. 10.
32 Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200, p.206.
33 Form F3 – Attachment F, DCB, p. 88.
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2017fwcfb5162.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2017fwcfb3941.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2023fwc1325.pdf
