1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Tanaya Kar
v
Action Drill & Blast Pty Ltd
(C2023/5192)
VICE PRESIDENT CATANZARITI
DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON
DEPUTY PRESIDENT ROBERTS
SYDNEY, 7 NOVEMBER 2023
Appeal against decision [2023] FWC 1961 of Deputy President O’Keeffe at Perth on 8
August 2023 in matter number C2023/3071 – permission to appeal refused.
Background
[1] Ms Tanaya Kar (the Appellant) has lodged an appeal under s.604 of the Fair Work Act
2009 (the Act), for which permission to appeal is required, against a decision of Deputy
President O’Keeffe issued on 8 August 2023 (the Decision).1 The Decision concerned an
application brought by the Appellant under s.365 of the Act, alleging that she had been
dismissed from her employment with Action Drill and Blast Pty Ltd (the Respondent) in breach
of sections s.340 and s.351 of the Act.
[2] The Respondent made a jurisdictional objection to the application on the grounds that
the Appellant resigned her employment and was thus not dismissed within the meaning of the
Act. The Deputy President was not satisfied that the Respondent terminated the Appellant’s
employment and therefore did not accept the Appellant’s resignation fell within the scope of
s.386(1)(a) or s.386(1)(b) of the Act. Accordingly, he dismissed the Appellant’s application.
[3] Section 386(1) of the Act provides that:
“(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person's employment with his or her employer has been terminated on
the employer's initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do
so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her
employer.”
[2023] FWCFB 204
DECISION
AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2023fwc1961.pdf
[2023] FWCFB 204
2
[4] Directions were set for the filing of material by the Parties, and the matter was listed for
hearing on 18 October 2023. The Appellant filed her outline of submissions on 6 October 2023
and the Respondent on 9 October 2023. On 16 October 2023, the Appellant consented for the
matter to be determined on the papers without the need for a formal hearing or oral submissions,
and the hearing was subsequently vacated. On 18 October 2023, the Appellant was allowed to
file further written submissions in lieu of oral submissions. We are satisfied this matter can be
adequately determined based on the materials before the Commission, pursuant to s.607(1) of
the Act.
[5] For the reasons that follow, permission to appeal is refused.
The decision under appeal
[6] The Appellant was employed by the Respondent as a Serviceperson at its Karara mine
site. On 20 April 2023, the Respondent was made aware of a safety incident relating to the
Appellant. The Respondent subsequently commenced an investigation. On 24 April 2023, the
Respondent sent a letter to the Appellant notifying her that she was stood down with pay
pending the outcome of the investigation, and on 26 April 2023 the Respondent sent a letter to
the Appellant which notified her of the allegations against her, invited her to either attend a
meeting or make a written response, and warned her of the ramifications if the allegation of a
safety incident was substantiated.
[7] On 5 May 2023, the Appellant attended a meeting to allow her to make a response to
the letter. Ms Caldwell of the Respondent gave evidence that she took contemporaneous notes
at the meeting on 5 May 2023 and advised the Appellant that the outcomes of the investigation
process could include termination. Ms Caldwell further claimed that the Appellant said at this
meeting that if the investigation’s findings suggested a possible case for termination, she would
like to resign, and that she responded by emphasising the need to proceed to a ‘show cause’
phase before resignation would be available. The Appellant challenged this evidence, claiming
that she only asked whether she would be allowed to resign in circumstances where a decision
to terminate had already been made. The Appellant also claimed that she understood the show
cause process as simply advising on the outcome of the investigation.
[8] A further meeting was held on 8 May 2023, described as an “outcomes meeting”, in
which the Respondent discussed the findings of the investigation. Following this meeting, the
Appellant tendered her resignation on the same day. The Appellant claimed that at this meeting
Ms Caldwell told her that the Respondent had decided to not continue with the Appellant’s
employment, and that upon the Appellant indicating that she would rather resign Ms Caldwell
offered her assistance in drafting a resignation letter, which offer she did not accept. Ms
Caldwell challenged the Appellant’s evidence, tendering her contemporaneous notes of the
meeting which demonstrated that she did not tell the Appellant that she was terminated. Under
cross-examination, Ms Caldwell claimed that the word “termination” would only have been
used on the basis that the Respondent was considering terminating the Appellant’s employment,
subject to any reasons given the Appellant as to why that should not take place.
[9] The Deputy President noted at [32] and [33] of the Decision that the Appellant’s answers
regarding the outcomes meeting were inconsistent, insofar as she wavered on whether she was
[2023] FWCFB 204
3
definitely told the words “your employment will not be continuing” or whether this was an
implicit meaning based on “contextual clues”.
[10] The Respondent cited case precedent to support the propositions that the Commission
must carefully weigh the employer’s behaviour with other factors to determine if it was the real
cause of the resignation,2 that the onus is on the employee to prove they did not resign
voluntarily in cases where they claim forced resignation,3 and that an employer conducting a
disciplinary process is not of itself sufficient to force an employee’s resignation.4 The Appellant
attempted to distinguish her matter from several of the Respondent’s authorities, claiming that
she did not resign until after she had been advised of her termination and not prior to the
outcome of a disciplinary process. The Respondent further submitted that the Appellant
voluntarily resigned and that its investigation process was proper. The Respondent claimed that
the Appellant had been advised at the outcomes meeting that she could provide the Respondent
with reasons as to why she should not be terminated which would be taken into consideration
prior to a final decision, but the Appellant did not do so and instead chose to resign to assist her
in seeking alternative employment.
[11] The Appellant, contrastingly, submitted that she only explored the possibility of
resignation in circumstances where the decision to terminate had allegedly already been made.
She submitted that at the outcomes meeting, she formed a view that there was nothing she could
have done that would have prevented termination, despite being given an opportunity to
respond. The Appellant further claimed that she was encouraged to resign, and that should the
Commission not find that her dismissal constituted a forced resignation, it was nonetheless a
termination for the purposes of s.386(1)(a) as her resignation was in the “heat of the moment”
and the Respondent had not sought to clarify within a reasonable time whether the Appellant
genuinely wanted to resign, both propositions which the Respondent firmly resisted.
[12] The Appellant also cited case precedent, suggesting that the only choice she had was the
manner in which she left her employment,5 and that a forced resignation can occur prior to the
completion of an investigation.6 Finally, the Appellant submitted that her case should be
considered in light of the recent decision in Jarouche v Lipa Pharmaceuticals Ltd,7 in which
Deputy President Anderson found that a situation in which there was “no realistic
counterfactual whereby… employment would have continued” constituted a forced resignation.
The Respondent argued that Jarouche was distinguishable from the present case as it had no
intent of procuring a resignation from the Appellant.
[13] Having set out the submissions and evidence from both Parties, the Deputy President
proceeded to determine the merit of the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection. At [34] of the
Decision, the Deputy President agreed with the Respondent’s submission that the “crux of the
matter revolves around what was or was not said” at the outcomes meeting. At the outset of his
consideration, at [35], the Deputy President rejected the Appellant’s submissions that her
resignation was given in the heat of the moment, as the Respondent had raised the possibility
of resignation on multiple occasions prior to the outcomes meeting and the resignation was
submitted five hours after the outcomes meeting. The Deputy President also rejected the
Appellant’s contention that her application should be likened to Jarouche at [36] as there was
no evidence that the Respondent intended to procure a resignation from the Appellant.
[2023] FWCFB 204
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[14] At [39] of the Decision, the Deputy President found that the Respondent’s account of
the events of the outcomes meeting was preferable, accepting the credibility of the
contemporaneous notes taken by Ms Caldwell in contrast to the “somewhat inconsistent and
consequently unreliable” evidence given by the Appellant in cross-examination.
[15] At [40] of the Decision, the Deputy President found that the Respondent’s disciplinary
process consisted of two stages: the first giving the employee an opportunity to respond to an
allegation, and the second being a consideration of what is an appropriate outcome if the
employee is found guilty. Should the Respondent consider termination an appropriate outcome,
it would also “[give] the employee a chance to make any submissions… as to why this should
not occur.” The Deputy President subsequently found at [41] of the Decision that:
“The Applicant by implication says that this second stage, at least in her case, was merely
a contrivance to make the process seem eminently procedurally fair. It was the
Applicant’s contention that there was nothing she could have said that would have
changed the outcome. While I accept that she firmly believes that to be the case, I do not
agree. While there were no particular circumstances offered up by Ms Caldwell when
asked a direct question about possible scenarios that may have forestalled termination,
that does not mean that none exist.”
[16] The Deputy President further reasoned at [44] of the Decision that:
“…the Applicant could have made any number of submissions in response to the “show
cause” letter and, if the Respondent was still minded to terminate her employment, have
tendered her resignation at that point. However, she chose not to avail herself of the
opportunity to engage with the Respondent’s process and instead resigned her
employment.”
[17] The Deputy President concluded at [45] of the Decision that he did not accept that the
Appellant had no choice other than to resign at the point of time at which she did, and that the
Respondent did not otherwise terminate her employment at the outcomes meeting. Accordingly,
the Deputy President upheld the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection and found that the
Appellant’s resignation did not fall within the scope of either s.386(1)(a) or s.386(1)(b) of the
Act, afterwards dismissing the Appellant’s application.
Grounds of appeal
[18] Across her Form F7 application and Outline of Submissions, the Appellant discloses
three main grounds of appeal, which we briefly summarise below.
Ground 1 – significant error of fact – disciplinary process
[19] Under Ground 1, the Appellant contends that the Deputy President made a significant
error of fact in his characterisation of the Respondent’s disciplinary process, which resulted in
the Deputy President making the finding that the Respondent’s investigation of the impugned
safety incident had not been completed upon the tendering of the Appellant’s resignation. The
Appellant claims that this finding played a large role in the Deputy President concluding that
the Appellant’s resignation was voluntary. The Appellant further claims that the Deputy
[2023] FWCFB 204
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President incorrectly distinguished Jarouche from the facts in her matter, since there was “no
realistic counterfactual” whereby her employment could be continued.
Ground 2 – significant error of fact – Appellant’s credibility as a witness
[20] The Appellant also submits that the Deputy President made a significant error of fact
under Ground 2, insofar as he misinterpreted various statements made by the Appellant in cross-
examination that led him to a finding that she was an inconsistent and consequently unreliable
witness. In particular, the Appellant claims that she was only inconsistent to the extent that she
wavered on whether the term “show cause” was used at the outcomes meeting, but maintained
throughout her cross-examination that she was definitively told that her employment would not
be continuing.
[21] The Appellant also variously submits throughout her Form F7 and Outline of
Submissions that the Deputy President placed too much weight on the Respondent’s account of
the events as a consequence of his finding that the Appellant was an unreliable witness, and
that the Deputy President did not come to a holistic consideration of all the evidence before
him, instead choosing to completely accept the Respondent’s version of events whilst rejecting
the Appellant’s version.
Ground 3 – failure to consider material facts
[22] Finally, the Appellant contends that the Deputy President failed to take the following
material considerations into account:
a) That the Appellant only preferred to resign in lieu of termination, or in circumstances
where the Respondent had made an indication that it would definitely terminate her
employment, and the Respondent was aware of the Appellant’s intentions; and
b) That the Appellant had no motive and did not seek to gain from resigning prior to
termination, and in fact believed there was an equal chance that she would not be
terminated.
Public interest grounds
[23] On the question of whether she should be granted permission to appeal, the Appellant
submits that the following considerations enliven the public interest:
a) The Respondent’s disciplinary process manifests an injustice and permission to appeal
should be granted such that it cannot exploit such a process in the future;
b) The appeal will clarify the definition of dismissal as it appears in s.386 of the Act and
thus touches on an issue of general application;
c) The appeal will further define the threshold question between forced and voluntary
resignation;
d) There is public interest in holding employers in the mining industry to account for a
culture of bullying, harassment and discrimination; and
[2023] FWCFB 204
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e) The Decision is affected by significant errors of fact, which have been set out above.
Principles on appeal
[24] An appeal under s.604 of the FW Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the
Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary
decision maker.8 There is no right to appeal under the Act and unless an enterprise agreement
provides to the contrary, an appeal may only be made with the permission of the Commission.
[25] Subsection 604(2) requires the Commission to grant permission to appeal if satisfied
that it is “in the public interest to do so.” The task of assessing whether the public interest test
is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment.9 The public interest is not
satisfied simply by the identification of error,10 or a preference for a different result.11 In
GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin a Full Bench of the Commission identified some
of the considerations that may attract the public interest:
“... the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issue of importance and
general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that
guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance
manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive or that the legal principles applied
appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar
matters...”12
[26] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of
appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of
appealable error.13 However, that the Member at first instance made an error is not necessarily
a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.
[27] An application for permission to appeal is not a de facto or preliminary hearing of the
appeal. In determining whether permission to appeal should be granted, it is unnecessary and
inappropriate for the Full Bench to conduct a detailed examination of the grounds of appeal.14
However, it is necessary to engage with the appeal grounds to consider whether they raise an
arguable case of appealable error.
Consideration
Ground 1
[28] The basis of the Appellant’s claim under Ground 1 is that the Deputy President
oversimplified the disciplinary process applied by the Respondent, and in turn mischaracterised
it. In particular, the Appellant contends that the meeting she attended on 5 May 2023, which
the Appellant terms the ‘response meeting’ in her submissions, already constituted an
opportunity for her to advance mitigating reasons for the alleged misconduct, whereas the
purpose of the outcomes meeting on 8 May 2023 was only to inform the Appellant of the
outcome of the Respondent’s investigation where the ultimate decision regarding the
Appellant’s employment had already been made.
[2023] FWCFB 204
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[29] The Appellant further claims that, although the outcomes meeting is characterised by
the Respondent as “an altruistic last call opportunity provided to the Appellant to redeem
themselves”,15 this is not possible in practice, given the Appellant had already provided a
significant number mitigating factors to the Respondent at the response meeting and could not
“produce new extraneous mitigating reasons” for conduct she had already responded to, three
days later at the outcomes meeting, as this would simply be a “re-run of the same trial”.16 As
such, the Appellant asserts that the outcomes meeting is merely an attempt for the Respondent
to “benefit from the illusion of procedural fairness.”17
[30] We disagree with the Appellant’s contention that the Deputy President’s
characterisation of the Respondent’s disciplinary process was a significant error of fact, as that
characterisation was reasonably open on the evidence before him. It is clear from [15] to [33]
of the Decision that the different stages of the disciplinary process were a subject of primary
concern for the Deputy President, who comprehensively summarised the evidence about that
subject presented to him from both parties. Subsequently, the Deputy President arrived at a
conclusion at [40], having taken into account all submissions. A Full Bench cannot change or
interfere with a conclusion that was reasonably open to the first instance decision-maker on the
facts.18
[31] We further consider that the Appellant’s claim that both the response meeting and
outcomes meeting required her to respond in essentially the same way is unsupported by
evidence. The Deputy President made an important distinction at [40] of the Decision between
the kind of response the Appellant was expected to provide at the response meeting as opposed
to the outcomes meeting. In the former, an employee of the Respondent is given an opportunity
to reply to the allegation of misconduct as to whether or not he or she is guilty. Contrastingly,
in the latter, an employee is given an opportunity to provide mitigating reasons as to why the
particular disciplinary outcome contemplated by the Respondent, which may or may not be
termination, should not be pursued. We consider that these were two different aspects of the
disciplinary process, which invited different responses. The finding at [40] was reasonably open
to the Deputy President on the evidence.
[32] Moreover, we consider that the Appellant’s assertion that the Respondent’s use of an
outcomes meeting only represented an illusion of procedural fairness where there was none is
an attempt to re-ventilate an argument already considered and disposed of at [41] of the
Decision, which we have already quoted above.
[33] Finally, we disagree that the Deputy President incorrectly distinguished Jarouche from
the matter at hand. This is not a case where there was no realistic counterfactual where
termination would not have occurred. Unlike the situation in Jarouche, the Respondent did not
embark on a process to procure a resignation or negotiate an exit from the business. The Deputy
President found, as was open to him, that the Respondent did not enter the disciplinary process
“with a view to forcing the Appellant to resign.”19 As such, the opportunity given to the
Appellant to respond was a legitimate one. Therefore, the Deputy President’s conclusion at [42]
of the Decision, that “Although in this instance the [Appellant] may have taken the view that
nothing she could have said would have changed the outcome, the reality is that she simply
could not know for certain that this was the case”, cannot be disturbed.
[34] As Ground 1 discloses no arguable case of appealable error, we reject it.
[2023] FWCFB 204
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Ground 2
[35] Under Ground 2, the Appellant is essentially contending that the Deputy President made
a significant error of fact in that he incorrectly identified the words “your employment will not
be continuing” as those which the Appellant gave inconsistent answers on during cross-
examination. Rather, the Appellant argues that she was only inconsistent regarding whether the
words “show cause” were used in relation to the Respondent issuing her a termination letter
following the outcomes meeting. The Appellant subsequently contends that the Respondent
witness, Ms Caldwell, also demonstrated similar inconsistencies in her answers during cross-
examination which did not lead to the Deputy President making a finding against her credibility.
[36] While the Appellant’s submission has some merit, insofar as the transcript of the first
instance hearing at PN132 and PN141 reveal that the Appellant gave answers that demonstrated
that she did not remember with certainty whether she was told the words “show cause
termination process” as opposed to “your employment will not be continuing”, we disagree that
this constitutes a significant error of fact. It remains that the Appellant was inconsistent on the
recollection of a material element of the outcomes meeting.
[37] The conclusion the Deputy President arrived at in [39] was that he preferred the account
of the Respondent witness of the events of the outcomes meeting. This conclusion was
predicated on a finding that some of the Appellant’s evidence in cross-examination was
inconsistent and consequently unreliable, having taken into account the Appellant’s own
response that she had been upset and so could not recall the exact wording used by Ms Caldwell.
This inconsistency was contrasted against Ms Caldwell’s contemporaneous notes taken at the
outcomes meeting and the evidence she previously gave about her process of taking
contemporaneous notes. The Deputy President’s finding as to credibility was therefore
reasonably open to him on the evidence.
[38] We also disagree with the assertion that the Respondent’s evidence on this issue was
equally inconsistent, and that the Deputy President should therefore not have preferred one
party’s account over another. PN67 and PN68 of the transcript of the first instance hearing,
which the Appellant draws our attention to in her submissions, do not reveal a similar
inconsistency. In those paragraphs, Ms Caldwell says in certain terms that the word
‘termination’ was used at the outcomes meeting, but suggests that if it were used, it would only
have been in the context of explaining what the show cause process was. We regard Ms.
Caldwell’s evidence as a plausible explanation for the use of that word in the context of the
meeting that was taking place.
[39] Finally, we also disagree with the Appellant’s related submission that the Deputy
President placed excessive weight on the Respondent’s evidentiary narrative as opposed to hers.
We consider the Deputy President accounted for all matters that he was required to and
accorded each matter such weight as he considered appropriate. We note that it is not open nor
appropriate for a Full Bench on appeal to interfere with decisions as to weight that is to be
attached to particular matters, except in rare cases where weight attributed is plainly
disproportionate or wrong.20 We agree with the Respondent’s submissions on this issue.
[2023] FWCFB 204
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[40] No arguable case of appealable error has been disclosed. Accordingly, we reject Ground
2.
Ground 3
[41] Under Ground 3, the Appellant asserts that the Deputy President failed to consider the
material fact that the Appellant only sought to tender her resignation in lieu of termination, or
where a decision to terminate had already been made. This submission is plainly wrong. The
Deputy President did consider this issue at [19] of the Decision, which subsequently factored
into his conclusion that the Appellant was not dismissed.
[42] We also disagree with the Appellant’s submission that the Deputy President did not
consider whether the Appellant stood to gain from resigning voluntarily and the related
submission that this constituted a failure to take into consideration a material fact. The Deputy
President found at [35] of the Decision that “the [Appellant] took the view that having a
resignation on her record as opposed to a termination was an advantage to her and that she had
given the issue some serious consideration.” This was a finding reasonably open to him on the
evidence.
[43] As Ground 3 discloses no arguable case of appealable error, we reject it.
Conclusion
[44] The issue for this Full Bench is whether, in all the circumstances and having regard to
the matters set out above in the context of the necessary principles, an appeal should be allowed.
We are satisfied that the Deputy President did not err in the application of the relevant principles
to the facts and evidence as presented to him.
[45] Further, we have considered whether this appeal attracts the public interest, and we are
not satisfied, for the purposes of s.604 of the Act, that it does so. In reaching this conclusion we
have had regard to the fact that:
• there is not a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an
appellate body is required;
• the appeal does not raise issues of importance and/or general application and in fact
involves the orthodox application of established principles surrounding forced
resignation;
• the Decision at first instance does not manifest an injustice, nor is the result counter-
intuitive; and
• the legal principles applied by the Deputy President were not disharmonious when
compared with other decisions dealing with similar matters.
[46] Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused.
[2023] FWCFB 204
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VICE PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Matter determined on the papers.
Final written submissions:
18 October 2023, for the Appellant.
9 October 2023, for the Respondent.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
PR768040
1 [2023] FWC 1961 (‘the Decision’).
2 Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 52 IR 200, Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged
Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli [2017] FWCFB 3941, Doumit v ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd (unreported,
AIRCFB, Munro J, Duncan DP, Merriman C, 9 December 1996) Print N6999.
3 Australian Hearing v Peary (2009) 185 IR 359.
4 Moore v Woolworths Group Limited T/A Big W [2020] FWC 963, Love v Alcoa of Australia Limited [2012] FWAFB 6754,
Davidson v Commonwealth [2011] FWA 3610, Davidson v Commonwealth [2011] FWAFB 6265, Pacific National
(NSW) Limited v Bell [2008] AIRCFB 555.
5 Costigan v KOR Equipment Solutions Pty Ltd [2022] FWC 176.
6 Jenny Yang v FCS Business Service Pty Ltd [2020] FWC 4560.
7 Jarouche v Lipa Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2023] FWA 493.
8 Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ. (Coal and
Allied Operations Pty Ltd).
9 O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210 at 216-217 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ: applied in Hogan v
Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal & Allied Mining Services
Pty Ltd v Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [44] – [46].
10 GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [24]-[27].
11 Ibid at [26]-[27], Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/ Warkworth [2010] FWAFB
10089 at [28], affirmed on judicial review; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 178; NSW Bar
Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2014] FWCFB
1663, 241 IR 177 at [28].
12 [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [24] – [27].
13 Wan v AIRC (2001) 116 FCR 481 at [30].
14 Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82].
15 Appellant’s Outline of Submissions at [51].
16 Ibid at [55].
17 Ibid at [56].
18 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505.
THE FAIR WORK VOISSIN THE SEA
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2023fwc1961.pdf
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2017fwcfb3941.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2020fwc963.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2012fwafb6754.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2011fwa3610.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2011fwafb6265.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2022fwc176.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2020fwc4560.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2023fwa493.pdf
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2010fwafb5343.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2010fwafb10089.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2010fwafb10089.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2014fwcfb1663.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2014fwcfb1663.htm
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2010fwafb5343.htm
[2023] FWCFB 204
11
19 Decision at [36].
20 Peter Elliot v LEAP Legal Software Pty Limited T/A LEAP Legal Software [2018] FWCFB 6032 at [35].
https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2018fwcfb6032.htm
