1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Mohammad Amin (Darius) Souraki Azad
v
Hammond Park Family Practice Pty Ltd T/A Jupiter Health Warnbro
(C2022/458)
VICE PRESIDENT CATANZARITI
DEPUTY PRESIDENT EASTON
COMMISSIONER MCKINNON
SYDNEY, 4 MAY 2022
Appeal against decision [2021] FWC 6683 of Deputy President Young at Melbourne on
23/12/2021 in matter number C2020/9293 – permission to appeal refused.
Background
[1] Dr Azad (the Appellant) has lodged an appeal against a decision (Decision) of Deputy
President Young (Deputy President) on 23 December 20211 in which the Deputy President
found that Dr Azad was not an employee and therefore could not make an application for relief
under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).
[2] Under s.604(1) of the Act, the Appellant must have permission from the Commission to
appeal the Decision. The Appellant does not otherwise have a right to appeal.
[3] The Appellant is a general practitioner and the Respondent is a registered company,
which owns and operates medical centres. The Respondent also provides services to
independently owned medical centres and general practitioners under the Jupiter Health banner.
The Respondent offered the Appellant work as a registered international medical graduate while
he was in Iran, and upon his acceptance, the Respondent guided the Appellant through the
process of coming to work as a general practitioner in Australia.
[4] The Appellant’s placement with the Respondent was subject to a standard form
Facilities Agreement (Agreement). Under the Agreement, the general practitioner engages the
Respondent to provide premises, equipment and administrative support services within a
medical centre from which the general practitioner provides medical care to patients.
Furthermore, the general practitioner pays a set percentage of their fees billed to patients to the
Respondent as a management fee.
1 Mohammad Amin (Darius) Souraki Azad v Hammond Park Family Practice Pty Ltd [2021] FWC 6683 (‘the Decision’).
[2022] FWCFB 66
DECISION
AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2022] FWCFB 66
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[5] On 2 October 2019, the Appellant commenced seeing and billing patients at Juniper
Health Warnbro. To work as a general practitioner in Australia, in compliance with Australian
Health Practitioner Regulation Agency requirements, the Appellant was subject to supervision
by Dr Hadipour. On 6 November 2020, the Appellant was advised that he would no longer be
supervised by Dr Hadipour. He did not see any patients or attend the practice after that day.
[6] The Appellant claimed that he was an employee of the Respondent and was dismissed
in contravention of the General Protections provisions of the Act. The Respondent raised a
jurisdictional objection, that the Appellant was not an employee of the Respondent and
therefore was not dismissed pursuant to s.386 of the Act.
[7] In her Decision, the Deputy President followed the earlier Full Bench decisions of Jiang
Shen Cai trading as French Accent v Michael Anthony Do Rozario (French Accent)2 and Amita
Gupta v Portier Pacific Pty Ltd; Uber Australia Pty Ltd t/a Uber Eats (Gupta)3 to determine
whether the Appellant was an employee or independent contractor. These authorities confirmed
the use of a multi-factorial approach but cautioned against a merely arithmetic application of it.
The Deputy President also directed the parties to make submissions on WorkPac Pty Ltd v
Rossato (Rossato),4 a recent High Court decision which emphasised the importance of
contractual terms when determining whether a relationship is one of casual or permanent
employment.
[8] Following these authorities, the Deputy President considered the contractual Agreement
between the Appellant and Respondent and also undertook a multi-factorial analysis, ultimately
finding that the fundamental elements of an employment relationship did not exist between the
Appellant and the Respondent.
[9] This matter was listed for permission to appeal and the merits of the appeal. Directions
were issued for the filing of material by both parties. The Appellant sought leave to adduce
further evidence in the appeal. The Full Bench requested that the parties produce submissions
on whether or not the new evidence should be admitted. Upon reviewing the new evidence, we
decided that leave to adduce further evidence would be refused and brief reasons for that
decision are set out below. Given that further evidence was not allowed at the hearing, both
parties consented to the appeal being determined on the papers without the need for oral
submissions at a formal hearing. Pursuant to s.607(1) of the Act, the appeal was conducted on
the basis of written submissions only.
[10] For the reasons that follow, permission to appeal is refused and the appeal is dismissed.
Statutory Context
[11] Generally, the Commission’s role in relation to applications under s.365 of the Act is to
deal with such applications by way of conciliation or mediation under s.368 of the Act. If
satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve a dispute under s.365 have been or are likely to
be unsuccessful, the Commission can issue a certificate under s.368(3). Section 370 of the Act
2 [2011] FWAFB 8307.
3 [2020] FWCFB 1698.
4 [2021] HCA 23.
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imposes a substantial restriction5 upon applicants by preventing a general protections court
application being made unless the Commission has issued a certificate under s.368(3)(a) in
relation to the dispute.
[12] The Full Court in Coles Supply Chain v Milford6 observed that the Commission’s
powers to deal with a dispute under s.368 are only enlivened if an application is properly made
under s.365. The proper making of an application under s.365 is an essential precondition to
the Commission’s performance of functions under s.368, and the Commission can determine
the limits of its authority to deal with a dispute under s.368, although it cannot conclusively
determine those limits.
[13] The question of whether the Appellant was an employee of the Respondent is one of
jurisdictional fact. If permission is granted, we must therefore determine whether the Deputy
President reached the right conclusion as to whether the Appellant was an employee, not simply
whether the Deputy President’s finding was reasonably open to her.7
[14] On this question, it is relevant to note that the High Court has recently revised the
applicable legal principles to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel
Contracting Pty Ltd (‘Personnel Contracting’) and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek
(‘Jamsek’).8 A useful analysis was applied in the Commission decision of Waring v Hage Retail
Group Pty Ltd:9
“[52] In two judgements delivered on 9 February 2022 the High Court of Australia
pronounced on the law that applies in determining whether, absent a specific statutory
rule, a person is an employee or contractor. In doing so, the Court reviewed past
decisions of the Court (and other courts) and set out afresh relevant legal principles.
[53] In important respects the law as expressed by the High Court in Jamsek and
Personnel Contracting has modified, if not replaced, former approaches. In particular,
the past approach of the Commission (itself based on past court authority) as outlined
in the leading full bench case of French Accent is, with some limited caveats, no longer
good law.
[54] The High Court, via the combination of judgements in both Jamsek and Personnel
Contracting, has largely rejected an approach whereby the relationship between parties
across its life span is examined (including how the relationship operates in practice).
The Court has stated that contractual terms and not performance, where those terms can
be ascertained and where the contract is not a sham, will determine the true nature of
the relationship. However, the Court has observed that the manner in which the
5Ward v St Catherine’s School [2016] FCA 790 at [3].
6 (2020) 300 IR 146 at 160, [2020] FCAFC 152 at [43], [51 and [63].
7 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v MGI Piling (NSW) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 IR 244, [2016] FWCFB 2654 at
[11], Voros v Dick (2013) 237 IR 248, [2013] FWCFB 9339 at [11], Pawel v Australian Industrial Relations Commission
(1999) 94 FCR 231; 97 IR 392 at [14].
8 Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; ZG
Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2.
9 Waring v Hage Retail Group Pty Ltd [2022] FWC 540.
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relationship is worked in practice may be relevant for certain limited purposes, such as
to find contractual terms where they cannot otherwise be ascertained or to determine the
nature of any variation to agreed terms.
[55] Indicia (such as those identified in earlier cases in the Court) may be relevant but
only insofar as the terms of the contract give voice to them. One approach, to be used
as a guide, is to look at whether, under the contract, the worker is engaged to work in
the business of another, though this may not necessarily be useful in all cases. The extent
of a contractual right to control, as evident from the terms of the contract itself, remains
a major signifier of an employment relationship. That an arrangement was brought about
by the superior bargaining power of one party has no bearing on the meaning and effect
of the contract.
[56] Amongst the caveats expressed by the Court, is that a mere label acting as a
subterfuge to the true nature of the contractual relationship will not determine the status
of the parties. In this respect at least, the law remains unchanged by these recent
decisions.” (footnotes omitted).
Appeal Principles
[15] Under s.604(2) of the Act, we are required to grant permission to appeal if we are
satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. We may otherwise grant permission on
discretionary grounds.
[16] The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one
involving a broad value judgment.10 In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin11 a Full
Bench of the Commission identified considerations that might attract the public interest:
“… the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and
general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that
guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance
manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied
appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar
matters…”
[17] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of
appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of
appealable error.12
Decision Under Appeal
[18] The Deputy President began by making some general observations regarding witnesses,
evidence and submissions. The Deputy President did not find the Appellant to be a helpful or
10 O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210, [1989] HCA 61, applied in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [2011] HCA 4
at [69]; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 78, (2011) 207 IR 177, [2011] FCAFC 54 at [44]–
[46].
11 GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin (2010) 197 IR 266, [2010] FWAFB 5343 at [27].
12 Wan v AIRC (2000) 116 FCR 481, [2001] FCA 1803 at [30].
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truthful witness for the reasons given at [13] of the Decision. The Deputy President found the
Respondent’s witnesses (Dr Marashi, Dr Gendy and Ms Chew) to be credible witnesses and
gave reasons for these findings at [14]. The Deputy President also noted that given the large
volume of material, a failure to specifically refer to a particular evidentiary matter or submission
should not be taken to indicate that it had not been considered.
[19] The Deputy President made the following key findings in relation to the Agreement:
“[45] Dr Azad’s evidence in his witness statement was that he signed the Agreement
because he assumed it was needed for his Visa nomination. His evidence was that at no
time prior to or after being sent the Agreement was he advised that he was going to be
engaged as an independent contractor, other documents (as set out in paragraph [38]
above) referred to HPFP as the employing organisation or employing practice sponsor,
nor was he asked if he was running his own business. Whilst I accept those matters and
also accept that the documentation is inconsistent as to the nature of Dr Azad’s
engagement with HPFP, I reject any suggestion that Dr Azad did not understand that it
was intended that he was engaged by HPFP other than as an employee. Firstly, Dr Azad
is a well educated, sophisticated, professional person. Further, he is currently a director
of a company investing in development of medical commercial and residential property
in Rockingham and considers himself to be a business person with the skill set necessary
to complete such a project, which is hoped to be in the millions of dollars. In those
circumstances any assertion that he did not understand the nature of the relationship
expressed in the Agreement lacks credibility. Secondly, the Agreement is clearly
labelled “Contract for Services Independent Contractor Agreement” and, as set out
above, in its express terms does not establish an employment relationship. I consider it
clear that in its express terms the Agreement clearly establishes an arrangement under
which HPFP provides services and facilities to Dr Azad for which Dr Azad pays a fee,
calculated as a percentage of his patient billings. Thirdly, the Agreement purports to
create a service agreement and the same service fee arrangements as was contained in
the First Contract. Dr Azad’s evidence under cross examination was that he read the
First Contract, he was “careful with documents”, he was a “person that asks a lot of
questions” but did not ask Ms Chew any questions about the First Contract, he
understood that the First Contract enabled him to conduct his own practice as a GP, he
understood that HPFP was in the business of providing facilities to GPs, and the terms
of the First Contract did not surprise him nor did the statement in the First Contract that
“Nothing in the agreement constitutes the parties as partners or employer/employee
relationship” alarm him or cause him any discomfort. Fourthly, he signed the Agreement
without asking Ms Chew any questions regarding it, he did not ask any questions about
the Agreement in the five months between returning the signed Agreement and arriving
in Australia, he knew the document would be relied upon by the Department of Home
Affairs in granting his visa, he agreed that the Agreement was a genuine agreement and
held it out to the Department as such and he was not surprised that the Agreement was a
contract for services.
…
[69] I have earlier set out in paragraphs [40-44], the most presently relevant terms of the
Agreement. I consider that the terms of the Agreement are inconsistent with an
[2022] FWCFB 66
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employment relationship. Dr Azad does not appear to contest this. I accept, as submitted
by Dr Azad, that the Agreement contains a number of internal inconsistencies. It also
suffers from a number of drafting irregularities.141 I also accept that the drafting of clause
8 is far from clear and, rather curiously, denies that HPFP is an employee of Dr Azad,
rather than denying that Dr Azad is an employee of HPFP. Accordingly, I accept Dr
Azad’s submission that the Agreement does not express deny an employment
relationship between him and HPFP. However, when read as a whole, I consider the
Agreement provides that Dr Azad would operate a medical practice and pay fees to
HPFP for facilities and services supplied at Jupiter Health Warnbro to enable him to
operate that practice. Further, whilst I accept that the Agreement does not, in every
respect, reflect what occurred in practice, for example in relation to the supply of
prescription medication, I consider it largely does so. In practice, Dr Azad was provided
with facilities and services at Jupiter Health Warnbro to enable him to operate a medical
practice and paid fees for the facilities and services so provided.
[70] As to the submission that the Agreement was a contract of adhesion with no ability
to negotiate its terms, I reject those submissions. Firstly, Dr Azad’s evidence was that
from 2009 his intention was to live and work in Australia and that from mid to late 2012
he commenced the necessary enrolments and examinations to enable him to do so. He
first provided his CV to Dr Gendy in May 2016 and thereafter followed an extensive
process of examinations (a number of which he sat multiple times) and satisfaction of
regulatory and immigration requirements. Accordingly, Dr Azad’s engagement with
HPFP was the culmination of three years effort directed towards living and working as
a GP in Australia. Secondly, Dr Gendy’s evidence under cross examination was that if
a doctor was not agreeable to signing the terms of an agreement “it’s all negotiable” and
that in the majority of cases an agreement can be reached. Thirdly, there is no evidence
that Dr Azad sought to negotiate any of the terms of the Agreement or the basis of his
engagement. Further, his evidence under cross examination was that he did not try to
negotiate or consider negotiation the remuneration structure contained in the
Agreement.
[71] Accordingly, in my view, the terms of the Agreement point to an independent
contractor relationship. However, the authorities make clear that while the terms of the
Agreement are relevant, they are not determinative and it is necessary to consider the
substance of the relationship rather than just the form expressed in the contract. I now
turn to those matters.” (Footnotes omitted)
[20] The Deputy President then turned to each of the various factors which are relevant to a
multi-factorial analysis and came to the following conclusion:
“[208] Having considered all of the various indicia I consider that Dr Azad was engaged
by HPFP as an independent contractor. I do not consider that when viewed in totality
the relationship between Dr Azad and HPFP contains the essential features of an
employment relationship, that being the right of HPFP to exclusively control over when
and how work was to be performed by Dr Azad. Further, Dr Azad was not serving in
HPFP’s business. The weight of the matters considered leads me to conclude that Dr
Azad was not engaged as an employee and was engaged as an independent contractor,
carrying on a business of his own.”
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[21] The Deputy President considered it unnecessary to detail the events leading to the
cessation of the relationship between the Appellant and Respondent, given her conclusion that
the Appellant was not an employee of the Respondent.
Further Evidence
[22] The Appellant sought to adduce several further documents as part of his appeal,
described as Volume 5 of his Appeal Book. The principles governing the discretion to admit
new evidence or to consider further material are set down in Akins v National Australia Bank.13
The Full Bench considered the material and did not find it to be sufficiently probative. Further,
all the material was capable of being adduced at first instance. The Appellant’s submission that
some of this material was not provided at first instance because of his former lawyer’s
negligence has not been substantiated, but in any event, the evidence is still not sufficiently
probative to be adduced in this appeal. Accordingly, we do not admit any of the new documents
as evidence in the appeal.
Grounds of Appeal
[23] The Appellant has raised a number of grounds of appeal, distilled as best we can as
follows:
1. The Deputy President erred in her assessment of the Appellant’s credibility by
not citing evidence or giving sufficient explanation to support the finding that
the Appellant’s evidence was less credible.
2. The Deputy President erred in finding that the Respondent’s witnesses (Dr
Marashi, Dr Gendy and Ms Chew) were credible and failed to adequately
challenge their evidence.
3. The wording of the Decision is similar to the Respondent’s submissions at first
instance.
4. The Deputy President failed to question the Appellant before making adverse
finds in relation to his credibility.
5. The Deputy President made a significant error of fact in finding that the parties
failed to refer to Clause 15 of the Agreement during the first proceedings,14 as
the Appellant did in fact refer to it in his closing submissions.
6. The Deputy President made a significant error of fact in finding that the
Appellant refused offers from Dr Marashi and Dr Gendy to supervise him.15
13 (1994) 34 NSWLR 155
14 Decision [94].
15 Decision [98].
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7. There is inconsistency in the Deputy President’s reasoning at [100] of the
Decision.
8. The Deputy President misjudged how many jurisdictional objections the
Respondent raised at first instance.
9. The Deputy President put too much weight on the Agreement and Medicare
Provider Number and failed to consider other evidence provided by the
Appellant. Specifically, Dr Gendy’s evidence regarding the Appellant’s Visa
requirements, the letter from Dr Marashi dated 27/10/2020 and the fact that the
Appellant suffered from attention deficit disorder and dyslexia.
10. The Deputy President erred in law in finding that the general contractual
arrangements between the Respondent (HPFP), Warnbro Family Practice Pty
Ltd and the Appellant did not amount to a labour-hire arrangement.
11. The Deputy President erred in law by concluding that the Appellant’s
supervision was only to fulfil the requirements of APRHA registration and was
not imposed for the purpose of monitoring his performance.16
12. The Appellant’s legal representative was negligent in failing to provide Joanne
Visser’s minutes of the meeting on 6 November 2020 to the Deputy President at
first instance for consideration.
13. The Deputy President erred in finding that the Appellant’s submissions failed to
mention that Ms Errington and Ms Viser attended the meeting on 6 November
2020.
Consideration
[24] We will first turn to the jurisdictional question of whether the Appellant was an
employee of the Respondent. As discussed above, the Deputy President found that the
Appellant was not an employee of the Respondent but was rather an independent contractor.
The Deputy President reached this conclusion by examining the express terms of the Agreement
and then applying a multi-factorial test.
[25] Having considered the materials, the Full Bench finds no arguable case of appealable
error in the Deputy President’s conclusions that the Appellant was not an employee of the
Respondent and therefore there can have been no dismissal for the purposes of s.365 of the Act.
We have taken into account the recent High Court decisions in Rossato, Personnel Contracting
and Jamsek and note in particular the Deputy President’s finding that the Agreement largely
(although not in every respect) reflects what occurred in practice.17
[26] Given these findings, it is not necessary to deal with the remaining grounds of appeal,
however for completeness we make the following observations.
16 Decision [89].
17 Decision [69].
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Grounds 1, 2 and 4
[27] Grounds 1, 2 and 4 relate to the Deputy President’s assessment of the Appellant’s
credibility and her acceptance of the Respondent’s evidence. In the context of appeals, Full
Benches have consistently held that findings of fact made by a Member at first instance should
stand unless it can be shown that the Member ‘has failed to use or has palpably misused his
advantage’ or has acted on evidence which was ‘inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly
established by the evidence’ or which was ‘glaringly improbable.’”18 This is because of the well
accepted principle that a trial judge has the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses
and is therefore usually best placed to assess credibility.19
[28] The threshold to overturn credibility assessments is high and the Appellant’s
submissions do not show that the Deputy President findings were clearly erroneous or
improbable. The Deputy President gave reasons for her findings in respect of credibility at [13]-
[14] of the Decision and such findings were reasonably open to her on the evidence before her.
No arguable case of error of fact is made out in relation to these grounds.
Ground 3
[29] Ground 3 asserts that the wording of the Decision is similar and, in some circumstances,
identical to the Respondent’s submissions. Similarities between the Decision and a party’s
submission alone, is not enough to substantiate appealable error. All it demonstrates is that the
Deputy President accepted the relevant submission(s). Ground 3 of the Appeal cannot succeed.
Grounds 5 and 6
[30] Ground 5 and 6 assert that the Deputy President made significant errors of fact by failing
to acknowledge that the Appellant referred to Clause 15 of the Agreement and in stating that
the Appellant rejected Dr Marashi and Dr Gendy’s offers for supervision. The Respondent
submits that no such errors exist, as the Appellant only referred to Clause 15 in his closing
submissions, which are not in evidence and the transcript (at [PN745]) from the first instance
proceeding confirms the Appellant’s refusal of offers for supervision. We agree that this is what
the record discloses and find no arguable case of error of fact on this basis. Further, even if such
errors did exist, it is not clear to us how this would change the outcome of the proceeding. We
consider Grounds 5 and 6 unlikely to succeed.
Ground 7
[31] Ground 7 asserts inconsistency in the Deputy President’s reasoning at [100] of the
Decision. We find no such inconsistency and cannot see how such inconsistency would be
enough to give rise to an appealable error.
Ground 8
18 City Motor Tranport Pty Ltd v Zlatko Devic [2014] FWCFB 6074, [29] citing Devries v Australia National Railways
Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472, [479].
19 Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646, 654-5.
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[32] Ground 8 asserts that the Deputy President miscalculated how many objections the
Respondent raised to the Appellant’s application. This ground fails to disclose any arguable
case of appealable error.
Ground 9
[33] Ground 9 alleges that the Deputy President put too much weight on the Agreement and
Medicare provider number and failed to consider the Appellant’s evidence. The weight to be
given to various aspects of the evidence was a matter for the Deputy President.
[34] It was appropriate for the Deputy President to place significant weight on the terms of
the contractual Agreement between the parties, as has recently been emphasised by the High
Court. We are not persuaded that the various factual findings made by the Deputy President
are likely to be disturbed on appeal.
Ground 10 and 11
[35] Ground 10 and 11 both assert errors of law. By Ground 10, the Appellant submits that
the Deputy President erred in her characterisation of the contractual arrangements between the
Respondent, Warnbro Family Practice Pty Ltd and the Appellant. The Respondent submits that
the Deputy President’s characterisation of these arrangements was open on the evidence before
her and was not attended by any misidentification or misapplication of the law. We agree and
find no case of appealable error in relation to this ground.
[36] By Ground 11, the Appellant submits that the Deputy President erred in law in finding
that the Appellant’s supervision was not imposed for the purpose of monitoring his
performance. Again, we consider this finding was open to the Deputy President on the evidence
and find no case of appealable error in relation to Ground 11.
Ground 12 and 13
[37] Grounds 12 and 13 deal with the Deputy President’s findings in relation to the meeting
on 6 November 2020. Ground 12 alleges representative error in failing to provide the Deputy
President with Ms Visser’s minutes of the meeting. The Appellant has failed to support this
submission with any additional evidence demonstrating his lawyer’s negligence. The
Respondent submits that even if such evidence did exist, any such failure did not result in an
appealable error. We agree. No arguable case of error is made out in relation to this ground of
appeal.
[38] Ground 13 submits that the Deputy President erred in finding that the Appellant’s
submissions fail to mention that Ms Errington and Ms Viser attended the meeting on 6
November 2020. In our view, little turns on the matter and no arguable case of appealable error
is disclosed.
Public Interest
[39] For these reasons, we are not satisfied that the Decision is attended by a relevant
arguable case of error such that it should be reviewed on appeal. The Deputy President reached
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her Decision using the then applicable and orthodox approach to the determination of the
Appellant’s application. In doing so, the Deputy President gave significant weight to the
contractual terms between the parties, which is consistent with recent High Court authority.
[40] The Deputy President considered and dealt with the evidence that was before her and
made findings of fact based upon that evidence. Furthermore, this appeal does not attract the
public interest because we are not satisfied that:
there is a diversity of decisions at first instance such that guidance from an appellate
body is required of this kind;
the appeal raises issues of importance and/or general application;
the Decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive;
or
the legal principles applied by the Deputy President were disharmonious when
compared with other decisions dealing with similar matters.
[41] Finally, the Appellant has not established that the Deputy President made an appealable
error in her ultimate conclusion that the Appellant was not an employee of the Respondent.
Conclusion
[42] We are not satisfied that it would be in the public interest to grant permission to appeal,
and nor are we satisfied that we should otherwise exercise our discretion to grant permission.
[43] Permission to appeal is refused.
[44] The appeal is dismissed.
VICE PRESIDENT
Hearing details:
Matter decided on the papers.
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PR741194
THE THE FAIR WORK WORK COMMISSION THE SEAS
