1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Canberra Urology Pty Ltd
v
Renee Lancaster
(C2021/140)
VICE PRESIDENT CATANZARITI
DEPUTY PRESIDENT YOUNG
COMMISSIONER WILSON
SYDNEY, 29 MARCH 2021
Appeal against decision [2020] FWC 6447 of Deputy President Dean at Sydney on 24
December 2020 in matter number U2020/10525 - permission to appeal refused.
Introduction
[1] Canberra Urology Pty Ltd (the Appellant) has lodged an appeal against a decision1 of
Deputy President Dean made on 24 December 2020 (the Decision).
[2] The Decision concerned the Appellant’s jurisdictional objection to the Respondent’s
application under s. 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 for an unfair dismissal remedy. Deputy
President Dean dismissed the Appellant’s jurisdictional objection.
[3] For the reasons that follow, we decline permission to appeal. The application for
permission to appeal is dismissed.
Background
[4] Ms Lancaster was employed by the Appellant as a part-time Medical Receptionist
from 18 March 2019 until 20 July 2020.
[5] The Appellant is a small business. Accordingly, in order to be a person protected from
unfair dismissal Ms Lancaster must have completed a minimum employment period of 12
months at the time of her dismissal.
[6] The Appellant claimed that Ms Lancaster resigned from her employment in November
2019 and was re-employed shortly thereafter. The Appellant argued that Ms Lancaster had
two periods of employment and that her second period of employment from November 2019
to 20 July 2020 fell short of 12 months. Accordingly, the Appellant contended that Ms
1 Renee Lancaster v Canberra Urology Pty Ltd [2020] FWC 6447.
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DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
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Lancaster did not satisfy the minimum employment period and therefore was not a person
protected from unfair dismissal.
[7] Ms Lancaster denied that the alleged resignation in November 2019 occurred and
maintained that she had continuous service with the Appellant of about 16 months.
The Decision
[8] The Deputy President commenced her consideration of the matter as follows:
“[29] The entire crux of this matter is whether the Applicant’s employment with the
Respondent ceased and recommenced in November 2019 by reason of the alleged
resignation which is contested by the Applicant.
[30] If I am satisfied that the alleged resignation occurred, the Applicant’s period of
continuous service with the Respondent would not satisfy the minimum employment
period by virtue of s.384 of the Act.”
[9] In the material and evidence before the Deputy President, the Appellant provided three
dates upon which the Respondent was said to have resigned. The Form F3 filed by the
Appellant provided a resignation date of 14 November 2019. Dr Mulcahy for the Appellant
filed two statements, one on 13 October 2020 and a second statement on 17 November 2020,
following the filing of the Respondent’s material. The Decision sets out the evidence of Dr
Mulcahy in the 13 October 2020 statement, as follows:
“[13] …
1. On the afternoon of Thursday 21 November 2019, upon him asking the
Applicant if she had dealt with some overdue accounts, the Applicant said
words to the effect of ‘That’s it. I’ve had enough of this place. I’m out of
here.’ The Applicant then proceeded to collect her personal belongings from
on and around her desk and put them in her bag.
2. He then asked the Applicant: “What are you doing?” to which she
responded: “I’m leaving. I’m out of here” and walked out of the office.
3. He took that the Applicant was resigning from her employment.
4. When he returned to work on Monday 25 November 2019, he noticed the
Applicant sitting at her desk. He then said to her: “What are you doing here?
You said you were leaving. The Applicant ignored his questions. He then went
to the Practice Manager and asked why the Applicant was there but was told
not to say anything to her and leave her alone.”
[10] In his statement on 17 November 2020, Dr Mulcahy corrected the date on which the
alleged resignation occurred to 13 November 2020 and the next date he saw the Respondent
in the office to Monday 18 November 2020.
[11] Dr Mulcahy explained these inconsistencies by saying he relied on a complex and
confusing diary that was managed by the Practice Manager.
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[12] The Decision records that in cross examination Dr Mulcahy:
• said that he was sure that the Applicant would not be returning after walking out on
13 November 2019.
• agreed that he received a text message from the Applicant at 1:05 pm on 14
November saying that she was going to leave work early because her son was unwell
and that he responded by saying: ‘No problem’.
• said that the Applicant’s text message implied that she had changed her mind and
returned to work.
• explained that he did not follow up with the Applicant after her ‘walk out’ and did not
ask for the return of the office keys and various things because she was in an agitated
mood and was very aggressive on 13 November and he did not want to ‘raise her
temperature even higher’.
• said that the Applicant was not paid out her annual leave entitlements after the
purported first period of employment because she returned to work and became re-
employed.
• said that he did not have any conversation with the Applicant about the ‘walk out’
because it was dealt with by the Practice Manager.2
[13] The Appellant submitted that on the basis of the unchallenged evidence of Dr Mulcahy
and the test provided by Rares J in Koutalis v Pollett3 (Koutalis), the Respondent’s conduct
and acts on 13 November 2020 indicated that her employment ended on that day.
[14] The Deputy President found that the Respondent did not resign from her employment
saying:
“[33] It is well established that a resignation must be clear and unequivocal. Having
considered the evidence and submissions made, I am not satisfied that the Applicant
resigned in November 2019. On the evidence before the Commission, there is nothing
that reaches that benchmark.
[34] The circumstances under consideration by Rares J in Koutalis can be
distinguished from those presently before the Commission. In Koutalis it was found
that the proper inference was that the employee resigned in a conversation with his
employer. That was made clear because immediately after that conversation the
employee had a further discussion with a third party and in unequivocal terms stated
that he had resigned his employment.
[35] To the extent there is a discrepancy between the evidence of the Applicant and the
Respondent, I prefer the evidence of the Applicant. The Respondent has proposed three
different dates upon which the resignation purportedly occurred. Dr Mulcahy’s
2 At [17].
3 [2015] FCA 1165.
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contention in this regard was not assisted by his uncertainty as to when the resignation
was supposed to have occurred, despite his explanation that it was a result of the
complexity of his diary which was managed by the Practice Manager. The Applicant,
by way of contrast, was unequivocal in her denial that she did not, at any stage in
November 2019, tender her resignation or ‘walk out’ with the intention not to return.
[36] Even if I accept the version of events advanced by Dr Mulcahy that the Applicant,
on 13 November 2019 (ie the third date put forward by the Respondent), said “That’s
it. I’ve had enough of this place, I’m out of here” and “I’m leaving. I’m out of here”
and took her belongings and left, those words and conduct alone do not in my view
constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to resign. This is particularly so given the
conduct of the Applicant afterward, in that she attended work the following day as
normal.
[37] Despite Mr Wilson’s submission that there was no suggestion of a case of a ‘heat
of the moment’ resignation, it was Dr Mulcahy’s evidence that the Applicant was in an
agitated state and was aggressive at the time in question. Even if I did accept the
Respondent’s evidence in this regard, the Applicant’s words and conduct could not be
reasonably understood to be conveying a real and unequivocal intention to resign.
[38] In summary, I am not satisfied that the evidence supports a finding that the
Applicant resigned in November 2019. Accordingly, I am satisfied and find that the
Applicant had more than 12 months employment with the Respondent when her
employment ceased on 20 July 2020. As a consequence, she is a person protected from
unfair dismissal.”
Appeal grounds
[15] The Appellant raises two grounds of appeal in its written material.
[16] Appeal ground one contends that the Deputy President erred in finding that the
Respondent’s statements on 13 November 2020 did not amount to a real and unequivocal
intention to resign.4 The Appellant contends that was a significant error of fact contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. 5
[17] Appeal ground two contends that the Deputy President erred in not providing a reason
as to why the Respondent’s 13 November 2020 statements did not amount to a clear and
unequivocal intention to resign.6
Permission to appeal
[18] An appeal under s.604 of the Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the
Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the
primary decision maker.7 There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with
the permission of the Commission.
4 Statement of Reasons for the Decision Being Appealed Against at [12].
5 Statement of Reasons for the Decision Being Appealed Against at [17].
6 Statement of Reasons for the Decision Being Appealed Against at [18-19].
7 Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.
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[19] This appeal is one to which s.400 of the Act applies. Section 400 provides:
“(1) Despite subsection 604(2), the FWC must not grant permission to appeal from a
decision made by the FWC under this Part unless the FWC considers that it is in the
public interest to do so.
(2) Despite subsection 604(1), an appeal from a decision made by the FWC in relation
to a matter arising under this Part can only, to the extent that it is an appeal on a
question of fact, be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error
of fact.”
[20] In Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others, Buchanan J (with
whom Marshall and Cowdroy JJ agreed) characterised the test under s.400 of the Act as “a
stringent one”.8 The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary
one involving a broad value judgment.9 In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin a Full
Bench of the Commission identified some of the considerations that may attract the public
interest:
“… the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance
and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so
that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first
instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal
principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions
dealing with similar matters.”10
[21] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of
appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence
of appealable error.11
[22] The decision under appeal is of a discretionary nature. Usually, such a decision can
only be successfully challenged on appeal if it is shown that the discretion was not exercised
correctly.12 It is not open to an appeal bench to substitute its view on the matters that fell for
determination before the Deputy President at first instance in the absence of appealable error.
As the High Court said in House v The King:
“The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is
governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the
appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they
would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in
exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows
extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does
8 (2011) 192 FCR 78; (2011) 207 IR 177 at [43].
9 O’Sullivan v Farrer and another (1989) 168 CLR 210 at 216-217 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; applied
in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal &
Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78; (2011) 207 IR 177 at [44]-[46].
10 GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [27].
11 Wan v AIRC [2001] FCA 1803, 116 FCR 481 at [30].
12 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at [504]-[505] per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ.
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not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be
reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if
it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached
the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly
unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly
to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a
case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the
discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.” 13
Consideration
Public interest
[23] The Appellant contends that the Deputy President’s failure to give adequate reasons
was an error such that it is in the public interest to grant permission to appeal.14 Further, the
Appellant contends that the Decision manifests an injustice and is counterintuitive, enlivening
the public interest such that permission to appeal ought be granted.15
[24] We are unable to identify any public interest ground such that permission to appeal
ought be granted. Specifically, we reject the submission that the Deputy President failed to
give adequate reasons for her conclusion that the Respondent did not resign on 13 November
2020 and discern no error in the Decision in this regard. We consider the Deputy President’s
reasons are adequately articulated at paragraphs [33] to [38] of the Decision. In particular, we
note that at paragraph [36] the Deputy President finds that even on the Appellant’s own
version of events, she is not persuaded that the Respondent resigned on 13 November 2020,
most particularly in light of the fact that the Respondent attended for work as normal the
following day.
[25] Further, we do not find the Deputy President’s decision to be counterintuitive or to
manifest any injustice. We consider the Deputy President’s conclusion to have been one
which was open to her on the evidence. We are also not persuaded that the appeal raises any
issues of importance or general application, or that there is a need for Full Bench guidance on
any question.
Appeal grounds
Appeal ground one - significant error of fact
[26] As to appeal ground one, for the reasons set out above, we reject the submission that
the Deputy President’s conclusion that the Respondent’s conduct on 13 November 2020 did
not amount to a real and unequivocal intention to resign constitutes a significant error of fact,
contrary to the weight of evidence. In addition to the matters set out at paragraph [9] above,
the evidence before the Deputy President was that no issue was raised with the Respondent by
Dr Mulcahy or anyone else when she attended for work on 14 November 2020 and further,
later that day the Respondent advised Dr Mulcahy she was required to leave work early to
13 Ibid.
14 Statement of Reasons for the Decision Being Appealed Against at [19].
15 Appellant’s Outline of Submissions at [11-12].
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care for an ill child, to which Dr Mulcahy responded by texting “no problem”. No question
was raised as to the Respondent’s purported resignation. Further, Dr Mulcahy’s evidence was
that when he next saw the Respondent at work on 18 November 2020, his Practice Manager
told him to “Don’t say anything to her. Leave well enough alone” and he was content to leave
the matter with the Practice Manager. Accordingly, we reject that the Deputy President’s
conclusion was contrary to the weight of evidence before her and discern no error of fact in
the Deputy President’s conclusion.
[27] In oral submissions the Appellant submitted that the events of 14 November 2020
were not relevant matters and, inter alia, consideration of them was not consistent with Rares
J’s decision in Koutalis. Further, it was submitted that the Deputy President’s reading of
Koutalis was incorrect and that what minded Rares J in that matter to find that the resignation
had occurred was the conversation between the employer and the employee. For the reasons
that follow, we reject those submissions.
[28] In Koutalis, at issue was whether Mr Pollett resigned or was constructively dismissed.
In relation to the former issue His Honour said:
“The question whether a resignation did or did not occur does not depend upon the
parties’ subjective intentions or understandings. Rather, it depends upon what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood was the
objective position immediately after Mr Pollett left the Koutalis’ business’ premises on
the morning of 5 May 2014, based on what each party to the conversation had said or
done, in light of the surrounding circumstances. In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm
Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 179 [40], Gleeson CJ, Gummow,
Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ said:
This Court, in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [(2004) [2004] HCA 35; 218
CLR 451], has recently reaffirmed the principle of objectivity by which the
rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract are determined. It is not the
subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and
liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each
party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position
of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties
to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person
would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their
agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be
determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to
mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of
the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and
object of the transaction [Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA
35; (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 461-462 [22]]. (emphasis added)
In my opinion, the same considerations apply to the evaluation of the circumstances
where parties engage in conversations and conduct that affects their legal rights under
a contract, including the assessment of whether or not words and or conduct can be
seen to amount to a resignation. Nonetheless, in employment contexts, a court must be
conscious that situations can arise in which one or other of the parties acts in the heat
of the moment in such a way that a reasonable person in the position of the parties in
all the circumstances would not understand the employee to be resigning or the
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/35.html#para22
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282004%29%20218%20CLR%20451
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/35.html
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/35.html
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=218%20CLR%20451
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=218%20CLR%20451
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/35.html
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/52.html#para40
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282004%29%20219%20CLR%20165
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2004/52.html
[2021] FWCFB 1704
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employer to be terminating the employee’s employment, as the case may be. So much
is reflected in what May LJ, with whom Croom-Johnson and Woolf LJJ agreed, said
in Sovereign House Security Services Limited v Savage [1989] IRLR 115 at 116,
namely:
In my opinion, generally speaking, where unambiguous words of resignation are
used by an employee to the employer direct or by an intermediary, and are so
understood by the employer, the proper conclusion of fact is that the employee
has in truth resigned. In my view tribunals should not be astute to find
otherwise. However, in some cases there may be something in the context of
the exchange between the employer and the employee or, in the circumstances
of the employee him or herself, to entitle the Tribunal of fact to conclude that
notwithstanding the appearances there was no real resignation despite what it
might appear to be at first sight.”16 (emphasis omitted)
[29] At paragraph [46] of that decision His Honour then went on to say:
“In my opinion, the proper inference, having regard to all of the circumstances, is that
Mr Pollett resigned in the conversation he had with Mr Koutalis on the morning of 5
May 2014. I am satisfied that what happened was set out, in substance, in the evidence
of Mr and Mrs Koutalis. That is because immediately after his conversations with his
employers, Mr Pollett went across the road and confirmed, in unequivocal terms, that
he had resigned to Mr Malovini. Mr Malovini’s evidence satisfied me that, among
other things, Mr Pollett had decided over the previous two weeks of his leave to start
up his own business and that he had had enough of dealing with Mr and Mrs
Koutalis.”
[30] We see nothing inconsistent in the decision of Rares J as set out above and the
approach taken by the Deputy President. We reject any suggestion that Koutalis stands for the
proposition that whether or not a resignation occurred is to be determined without any regard
to surrounding circumstances and events. Indeed, His Honour expressly stated that this
question is to be determined “based on what each party to the conversation had said or done,
in light of the surrounding circumstances.” (emphasis added). Further, in Koutalis His
Honour had regard to Mr Pollett’s conduct after the conversation with the employer.
Accordingly, we reject the contention that the events of 14 November 2020 are irrelevant and
consideration of them is inconsistent with Koutalis. We consider they are matters to which the
Deputy President was properly able to have regard.
[31] At paragraph [34] of the Decision, the Deputy President said:
“The circumstances under consideration by Rares J in Koutalis can be distinguished
from those presently before the Commission. In Koutalis it was found that the proper
inference was that the employee resigned in a conversation with his employer. That was
made clear because immediately after that conversation the employee had a further
discussion with a third party and in unequivocal terms stated that he had resigned his
employment.”
16 At [43-44].
https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1989%5d%20IRLR%20115
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[32] We are unable to see how this is inconsistent in any material way with the statement
made by His Honour at paragraph [46] of Koutalis set out above.
[33] Accordingly, we do not consider that appeal ground one demonstrates an arguable
case of appealable error.
Appeal ground two – failure to provide reasons
[34] We have already addressed the substance of appeal ground two at paragraph [24]
above. We refer to and repeat those comments.
[35] Accordingly, we also do not consider that appeal ground two demonstrates an arguable
case of appealable error.
Other matters
[36] For completeness, we address two further matters raised in oral submissions.
[37] At paragraph [35] of the Decision, the Deputy President said:
“To the extent there is a discrepancy between the evidence of the Applicant and the
Respondent, I prefer the evidence of the Applicant. The Respondent has proposed three
different dates upon which the resignation purportedly occurred. Dr Mulcahy’s
contention in this regard was not assisted by his uncertainty as to when the resignation
was supposed to have occurred, despite his explanation that it was a result of the
complexity of his diary which was managed by the Practice Manager. The Applicant, by
way of contrast, was unequivocal in her denial that she did not, at any stage in
November 2019, tender her resignation or ‘walk out’ with the intention not to return.”
[38] Firstly, it was submitted, inter alia, that paragraph [35] of the Decision incorrectly
refers to a “discrepancy” between the evidence of the Appellant and the Respondent. It was
submitted that Dr Mulcahy’s evidence was unchallenged and therefore there was no
discrepancy in the evidence. We do not consider that this is a fair reading of the Deputy
President’s comments. Firstly, the Deputy President’s comments at paragraph [35] are
qualified by the introductory words “to the extent there is a discrepancy”. Secondly, the
Respondent proposed three dates upon which the purported resignation occurred,
notwithstanding that Dr Mulcahy proffered an explanation for the alternate dates provided in
his evidence. We consider the Deputy President was entitled to give consideration to the
Respondent and Dr Mulcahy’s changing evidence and, in our view, on a fair reading that is
what the comments in paragraph [35] are directed to.
[39] Secondly, it was submitted that paragraph [35] misrepresents the Respondent’s
evidence. It was submitted that the Respondent did not give evidence that she did not “at any
stage” in November 2019 tender her resignation nor that she did not resign on 13 November
2019. We accept that paragraph [35] of the Decision does not reflect the evidence actually
given by the Respondent as to this matter. However, even if that be the case, the fact that the
Commission member at first instance made an error is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the
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grant of permission to appeal.17 In the present circumstances, and for the following reasons,
we do not consider that any error by the Deputy President as to this matter provides a
sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal. Firstly, the Respondent’s evidence was
that she commenced employment with the Appellant on 18 March 2019 and was continuously
employed for a period of 16 months.18 It is axiomatic that she therefore contended that she did
not resign on 13 November 2019 or at any other time prior to her employment ceasing on 20
July 2020. Secondly, the reference to “at any stage in November 2019” needs to be read in the
context of Dr Mulcahy’s evidence, which firstly provided that the purported resignation
occurred on 21 November 2019, and then subsequently provided that it occurred on 13
November 2019 and the Form F3 which provided that the date of resignation was 14
November 2019. In those circumstances, and in light of the Respondent’s contention that her
employment had been continuous since 18 March 2019, it seems clear that she did contend
that she did not resign “at any stage” in November 2019.
Disposition
[40] On the material before us and for the reasons set out above, we are not satisfied, for
the purpose of s.400 of the Act, that it would be in the public interest to grant permission to
appeal or that the Decision involves a significant error of fact. Further, we are not persuaded
that the matters set out in the grounds of appeal otherwise raise an arguable case of error in
the Deputy President’s exercise of her discretion. We do not consider the Decision to be
attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration, nor are we persuaded that
substantial injustice will result if permission to appeal is refused.
[41] Accordingly, permission to appeal is refused. The Appellant’s application for
permission to appeal is dismissed.
VICE PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr J Wilson on behalf of the Appellant
Mr G Pinchen on behalf of the Respondent
17 Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/Warkworth [2010] FWAFB 10089, 202 IR
388 at [28], affirmed on judicial review in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler [2011] FCAFC 54, 192 FCR 78,
207 IR 177; NSW Bar Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation
Office [2014] FWCFB 1663, 241 IR 177 at [28].
18 Witness Statement of Renee Lancaster at [13]
THE FAIR WORK COMMISSION ARUTRY THE SEA
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Hearing details:
2021.
Telephone hearing.
9 March.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
PR728190
