1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions
Panos Panayiotou
v
University of Adelaide
(C2019/4461)
VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT CLANCY
DEPUTY PRESIDENT MASSON
SYDNEY, 6 SEPTEMBER 2019
Appeal against decision [[2019] FWC 4363] of Commissioner Hampton at Adelaide on 16
July 2019 in U2019/3430.
Introduction
[1] Mr Panos Panayioutou has applied for permission to appeal against a decision of
Commissioner Hampton issued on 16 July 20191 (Decision) in which the Commissioner
declined to grant an extension of time for Mr Panayioutou to file his unfair dismissal
application against the University of Adelaide (University) pursuant to s 394 of the Fair Work
Act 2009 (FW Act).
[2] Section 394(2) of the FW Act requires an unfair dismissal remedy application to be
lodged within 21 days after the dismissal took effect or within such further period as the
Commission allows under s 394(3). Section 394(3) provides:
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person
under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances,
taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken
effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
1 [2019] FWC 4363
[2019] FWCFB 6214 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2019/7975)
was lodged against this decision.]
DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2019] FWCFB 6214
2
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
[3] Mr Panayioutou’s application was lodged on 26 March 2019. It is unclear when the
alleged dismissal from the University took place, or indeed whether there was a dismissal at
all given that the University denied it ever entered into an employment relationship with
Panayiotou. Mr Panayiotou contended before the Commissioner that he was dismissed
effective from 10 October 2018, and the Commissioner was prepared to treat this as the
relevant date for the purpose of the extension of time application even though, on one view,
Mr Panayioutou’s relationship with the University terminated as early as May 2018. This
meant that there was a delay of over four and a half months in filing the unfair dismissal
application.
[4] In the Decision, the Commissioner gave separate consideration to each matter required
to be taken into account under s 394(3). In relation to the reasons for the delay, the
Commissioner found that there was no reasonable explanation for the lengthy delay in
lodging the unfair dismissal application:
“[55] There is no plausible evidence that Mr Panayiotou was unable, for any reason, to
complete or send an unfair dismissal application to the Commission at almost any
point in the above sequence of events. All of the other circumstances alleged by Mr
Panayiotou to be creating stress and confusion, taken at their highest, fall well short of
providing an explanation or sufficient context to explain most of the delay in lodging
the application, particularly given the above events and the evidence before the
Commission. The fact that Mr Panayiotou finally did apply after being advised by the
AFP may be the case, but ignores the fact that the Commission itself directly advised
him on multiple occasions that he needed to lodge an application, had not done so and
that he could now do so, together with information about how to lodge and with the
offers of further assistance, none of which were properly taken up. At least in and
from December 2018, even on Mr Panayiotou’s best case about access to his
university email account – which is not supported by the evidence, the information
from the Commission was received by him at his personal email account and not acted
upon.
[56] I do not accept Mr Panayiotou’s contention that his engagements with the
Commission were ‘cookie cutter’ responses. He did have a series of engagements with
various bodies and these have a pattern of raising concerns or requests and then
tending to be adversarial with the agency if/when responses are not to his liking.
However, when considered in context, many of the responses to the Commission were
expressly dealing with issues and requirements raised by the Commission, including
references to exceptional circumstances and at one point attempting to debate whether
he had already filed, and at another point whether he should have to file at all. As early
as 13 December 2018, Mr Panayiotou informed the Commission that he intended to
lodge an unfair dismissal application by post, but did not file until 26 March 2019. All
of this took place in the context of repeated explicit information about the time limit
and the need, and capacity, to lodge an unfair dismissal application if he sought the
Commission’s intervention.
[57] Even allowing for all of the mitigating circumstances, including those pertaining
to Mr Panayiotou’s personal situation, there is no proper or reasonable explanation for
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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the very lengthy delay in lodging the unfair dismissal application. He is largely the
author of his own uncertainty in connection with making the unfair dismissal
application and fundamentally responsible for the delay in its lodgment.”
[5] In respect of the remaining considerations in s 394(3), the Commissioner found that
paragraph (b) did not weigh in favour of granting an extension. Paragraph (c) was found to
“faintly” support a finding of exceptional circumstances whilst paragraph (d) weighed against
the finding of exceptional circumstances; however this was offset to some degree due to the
University having been on notice of the contest for some time. Paragraphs (e) and (f) were
both treated as neutral considerations.
[6] It is not possible to fairly summarise the grounds of appeal contained in Mr
Panayioutou’s notice of appeal. They are set out in full in the attachment to this decision.
[7] Mr Panayioutou contended in his notice of appeal that the grant of permission to
appeal was in the public interest because:
the matter involved prioritising the interests of public safety;
it involved medical research practices that do not uphold the safety, health and
wellbeing standards of the community or adhere to government regulations;
it would bring to light evidence of poor public and private decision-making;
the research group did not communicate honestly and clearly to their employers or
to the public in relation to safety, risk, cost, fitness for purpose, reliability, and
community impact;
when the appellant presented research integrity concerns to the university,
authorities at the university and departments outside the university did not comply
with relevant government legislation or regulations;
when the appellant reported unlawful conduct, unethical behaviour and conflicts of
interest, there was no system to provide natural justice or procedural fairness and
this would undoubtedly impact past, present or future employees with the
university; and
apart from the unfair dismissal, the appellant was allegedly subjected to bullying,
harassment, assault, threats and blackmail. Additionally he receiving a trespassing
ban from the University and was accused of being a terrorist and had his home
infiltrated by counter-terrorism police.
[8] Mr Panayioutou’s oral submissions at the hearing of his application for permission to
appeal on 2 September 2019 canvassed a range of diverse matters. From time to time he
touched upon what he said were the reasons for his delay in filing his unfair dismissal
application, including that the University blocked access to his emails, that his emails were
hacked, and that he was given insufficient or misleading assistance by various
Commonwealth authorities including this Commission, the “Ombudsman” and the Australian
Federal Police. He did not at any stage turn to the Decision for the purpose of identifying
error.
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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Consideration
[9] An appeal under s 604 of the FW Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the
Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the
primary decision maker.2 There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with the
permission of the Commission.
[10] This appeal is one to which s 400 of the FW Act applies. Section 400 provides:
(1) Despite subsection 604(2), the FWC must not grant permission to appeal from
a decision made by the FWC under this Part unless the FWC considers that it is in the
public interest to do so.
(2) Despite subsection 604(1), an appeal from a decision made by the FWC in
relation to a matter arising under this Part can only, to the extent that it is an appeal on
a question of fact, be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error
of fact.
[11] In the Federal Court Full Court decision in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v
Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [43], Buchanan J (with whom Marshall and
Cowdroy JJ agreed) characterised the test under s 400 as “a stringent one”. The task of
assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value
judgment.3 A Full Bench of the Commission, in GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin,
identified some of the considerations that may attract the public interest:
“… the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and
general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that
guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance
manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles
applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with
similar matters.”4
[12] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of
appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence
of appealable error.5 However, the fact that the Member at first instance made an error is not
necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.6
2 This is so because on appeal the Commission has power to receive further evidence, pursuant to s.607(2); see Coal and
Allied v AIRC [2000] HCA 47, 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ
3 O’Sullivan v Farrer [1989], HCA 61, 168 CLR 210 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; applied in Hogan v
Hinch [2011] HCA 4, 243 CLR 506, 85 ALJR 398 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal
& Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others [2011] FCAFC 54, 192 FCR 78, 207 IR 177 at [44]-[46]
4 [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [24] – [27]
5 Wan v AIRC [2001] FCA 1803, 116 FCR 481 at [30]
6 Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/Warkworth [2010] FWAFB 10089, 202 IR
388 at [28], affirmed on judicial review in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler [2011] FCAFC 54, 192 FCR 78,
207 IR 177; NSW Bar Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation
Office [2014] FWCFB 1663, 241 IR 177 at [28]
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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[13] An application for permission to appeal is not a de facto or preliminary hearing of the
appeal. In determining whether permission to appeal should be granted, it is unnecessary and
inappropriate for the Full Bench to conduct a detailed examination of the grounds of appeal.7
However it is necessary to engage with those grounds to consider whether they raise an
arguable case of appealable error.
[14] The test of “exceptional circumstances”, in relation to extensions of time to lodge
applications under s 394(3), establishes a “high hurdle” for an application for an extension,
and a decision as to whether to extend time under s 394(3) involves the exercise of a broad
discretion.8 Therefore it will be necessary, in an application for permission to appeal against a
decision made under s 394(3), to demonstrate that there is an arguable case and that there was
appealable error in the exercise of the discretion. This will require the identification of error
of the type described in House v The King9 – that is, that the decision-maker has acted on a
wrong principle, has mistaken the facts, has taken into account an irrelevant consideration or
failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or has made a decision which is
unreasonable or manifestly unjust. Additionally, where an error of fact is alleged, s 400(2)
requires that it must be a significant error of fact. The overriding public interest requirement
of s 400(1) remains.
[15] Mr Panayioutou’s grounds of appeal do not contain any comprehensible let alone
arguable contention of appealable error. His grounds for the grant of permission to appeal in
the public interest raise matters which bear little or no relationship to the subject matter of the
Decision. His oral submissions re-agitated some of the matters which he argued before the
Commissioner, but he did not attempt to identify any error of fact or law in the Decision.
[16] Independent of Mr Panayioutou’s notice of appeal and submissions, we have carefully
reviewed the Decision. It is apparent that the Commissioner considered all the matters
required to be considered under s 394(3), made findings of fact that were firmly supported by
the evidence, and made evaluative judgments that were reasonably open to him to make. No
basis for an arguable contention of appealable error is ascertainable. Furthermore we wholly
agree with the Decision. The Decision does not raise any question of law or general principle
worthy of consideration at the appellate level.
[17] For these reasons, we are not satisfied that the grant of permission to appeal would be
in the public interest. As required by s 400(1) of the FW Act, permission to appeal must
therefore be refused. We so order.
VICE PRESIDENT
7 Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82]
8 Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations [2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21]
9 [1936] HCA 40, 55 CLR 499
OF THE FAIR WORK MISSION THE
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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Appearances:
Mr P Panayioutou on his own behalf.
Hearing details:
2019.
Melbourne:
2 September.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
PR712074
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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Attachment A
Sample Points that represent significant results to demonstrate reconsideration of exceptional circumstances. Outline of whiteness statements tested in hearing 1. Simplified discrepancies in Universities reason for dismissing the applicant 2. Counter Terrorism Police infiltrating applicant home during claimed dismissal period discussed in hearing 3. Legal representative for respondent - Minter Ellison (Mr. Andrew Short): false claims during hearing challenged: 4. Whiteness Statement Chief Information Security Officer (Mr. Shuichi Sakai): IT discrepancies [125] 5. Whiteness Statement Manager, HR Systems and Operations (Ms. Jane Smart-Foster): Employment status discrepancies [124] 6. Whiteness Statement (Ms. Donna Gould) Testes in hearing: Dismissal Process discrepancies [123] 1. Simplified discrepancies in Universities reason for dismissing the applicant Claimed significant reasons for dismissal from University: 1. Poor progress with experiments, including not taking advice from
supervisors regarding appropriate experimental design. 2. Lack of insight into the deficiencies in experimental design as presented in the Major review seminar. 3. Some lack of background knowledge in the project which would normally be expected at this stage of candidature. 4. Irretrievable breakdown in the student-supervisor relationship. [73] Commissioner Hampton: Mr Panayiotou is an intelligent, educated and resourceful person with evident research skills. 30 [135] Mr. Panayiotou: So why was I dismissed? Sample Reason for dismissal provided by research group: Questions validity of groups published work relating to experimental approaches, findings while seeking to modify protocols for the sake of curiosity. [53] Mr. Panayiotou: The group confirms that I was questioning research misconduct. 2. Counter Terrorism Police infiltrating applicant home during claimed dismissal period discussed in hearing PN381 Mr. Panayiotou: In early October 2018 the my home was visited by two undercover police officers in casual clothing. I wasn't home
on this first visit. when I got home my landlord informed me that police came to inspect my home and wanted to meet with me. asked if they left any information. My landlord said no and said they just flashed their badges. Concerned about the legitimacy of this I called SAPOL and inquired with multiple officers to ask if they needed to visit my home. No information was in SAPOL data base from multiple sites. The combination of the officers leaving behind no information besides they would be back tomorrow and the lack of reasons for Police to visit my home on SAPOL systems caused an immense amount of concern, stress, and fear. The day after initial visit, the officers came, spoke with my landlord and then search my home. I then went to meet with the officers at 100 Angus Street for them to perform a character check. This investigation was triggered by a University of Adelaide department of defense staff member who saw me communicating with an ethics officer regarding my research integrity concern with the university. At land forces 2018 event this university staff member grabbed and harassed me and then I was removed from the event. This police investigation occurred on 11 October 2018, within the time frame of when my payments from university ceased. Also note that Immediately after my hearing, many months after contact with these police authorities, the same counter terrorism police staff that searched my home started calling me again asking to have a private meeting to discuss closure options. This is
this discrepancy and non have been provided for weeks. The only information that was released was a letter confirming the visit from counter terrorism police to my home occurred and that no issues were identified in the SAPOL process. This investigation was performed by a SAPOL officer. 3. Legal representative for respondent - Minter Ellison (Mr. Andrew Short): false claims during hearing challenged: Mr. Short: It may be that Mr Panayiotou is of the mind that while he's disputing his relationship with the university he'll be able to stay in the country, because he's here on a student visa and his studies have been terminated. He's going to have to leave the country. This application is not something that is going to help stay here. PN 982 [166] Mr. Panayiotou: You mentioned that I want to stay in the country and that I'm fearful that I may get reported to Home Affairs but little do you recognise that I reported myself to the Department of Home Affairs immediately when all of this occurred. I called
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Immigration. I have a letter from the minister saying we've received all of your documentation and we find no issue with your claim. So the notion that I'm trying to stay in the country, that's very limited because I took the initiative to report myself to the Department of Home Affairs given my circumstances. The university tried to hide the issue and avoid reporting to Home Affairs to not kick me out because then somebody would have to ask why did you kick him out. PN 990-1 [166] 4. Whiteness Statement Chief Information Security Officer (Mr. Shuichi Sakai): IT discrepancies [125] Commissioner Hampton: Yes. So Mr Sakai, do you not know whether Mr Panayiotou had a Gmail account? You just were not aware of it or do you know for certain that he did not have a Gmail account? Mr Sakai: I'm not certain at this point. PN 796 [166] Shuichi Sakai University Statement [125]: Alle
11. The Applicant alleges, amongst other things, that his email account was periodically 'tampered with' between 23 May 2018 and 3 November 2018. I have reviewed the Email Account and have not identified any evidence that it was tampered with before, during or after that period. Specifically, I note that: (a) during that period, the Applicant successfully sent and received a substantial volume of emails without issue; (b) I have not identified any evidence of IT System 'black outs' that would have affected the Applicant's ability to send and receive emails; and (c) as discussed at paragraph 17 of my statement below, the Email Account was temporarily disabled between 10 October and 15 October 2018. However, this occurred as a result of
the termination of the Applicant's postgraduate research student status rather than due to 'tampering'. Mr. Panayiotou: This is the time frame when was trying to reach out for help from external agencies. There was more disabling than just from 10 October and 15 October 2018. For example see it ticket numbers: 644087, 626557, 626558 645974 630792 623684 63 1276 574220. The dates described above for temporally disabling my email confirms my claim that my email account that was used to communicate with the Office of the Training Advocate. I had a due date in early October 2018 to file my statement. If I didn't file my evidence by this date, I was told I would be reported to the Department of Home Affairs by both the OTA and SA OMB. Shuichi Sakai University Statement [125]: 12. The University utilises systems designed to automatically quarantine emails deemed 'malicious', either as a result of their content, the sender or recipient, or any attachments. If an individual attempts to send a 'malicious' email using a University-provided email account, that email will be
quarantined and a log will be recorded in the system. 13. There are no records of any of the Applicant's emails being quarantined during the relevant period. Mr. Panayiotou: This is good confirmation that I wasn't sending malicious emails. Yet I received an email from Dave Lamb - Executive Director: "I request that you immediately cease sending further email correspondence to various members of University staff" [127] and "This action is necessary because one or more persons with a University of Adelaide email address have received what are considered inappropriate and excessive emails" [128] Shuichi Sakai University Statement [125]:
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7. If an individual is both a staff member and a student of the University, they will be provided with an Office 365 and a Gmail account. If the individual subsequently ceases employment with the University or completes their studies, their Office 365 or Gmail account will be terminated, as appropriate. In these circumstances, the affected individual will be sent an automatically generated email advising them of the change. 8. Upon his commencement as a postgraduate research student at the University, the Applicant was provided with an Office 365 account (the Email Account). This was provided due to his status as a postgraduate student. He was never provided with a Gmail account.
Mr. Panayiotou: I refer to point 7: I was provided both staff and student email. Just because I didn't use my Gmail account does not mean that one wasn't created. I received a notification that "Your new primary email address is panos.panayiotou@student.adelaide.edu.au" [1] After having suspected tampering to my account, I wrote the below message to IT support at the University to confirm that no mail was being falsely sent from my student inbox that would be labeled as malicious. I wrote an IT request on Sat 7/07/2018 11:11 AM: Technology Service Request: 574220 "I would also like to request information about the two emails I have been provided with. 1) Student - gmail 2) Staff - outlook The staff one has been the only one of use and I would like to confirm that with IT." [115] NOTE: Sample proofs: Emails were sent to panos.panayiotou@student.adelaide.edu.au + a1714699@student.adelaide.edu.au and there would be no "message undeliverable" responses. Refer to [SS-4] - Row 7030 - On 9/3/2018 3:21:01 AM - In an email sent to Diana Tran diana.tran@adelaide.edu.au, Dusan Losic
dusan.losic@adelaide.edu.au, Panos Panayiotou panos.panayiotou@adelaide.edu.au, Panos Panayiotou (Student) a1714699@student.adelaide.edu.au Exportltem Id = 7D565BB37F039DA0A8C6D799C547E249 Incoming email was sent to a1714699@student.adelaide.edu.au and no message of failure in delivery notification was provided to the sender inbox. 5. Whiteness Statement Manager, HR Systems and Operations (Ms. Jane Smart-Foster): Employment status discrepancies [124] Mr. Panayiotou: So in the attachments you provided it periodically says employee ID and then lists my student ID. That's on the university side of things, not the bank? Jane Smart-Foster: Yes, so what you also need to reference is the type and so we had two categories of employees, in terms of everybody has an employee ID. We have a type called employee and we have a type called person of interest and in your situation you're a person of interest scholarship holder. Everybody in the university whether student or an employee get an ID and it's called an employee ID. PN 946 [166] Jane Smart University Statement [124]: Termination of scholarship: 25 September 2018, changes from staff to student language {122]
Mr. Panayiotou: The actual date of dismal was never made clear to me: Mr. Lamb University Statement [127]: You were notified, in writing, by Professor John Williams (on 30 July 2018) that a final determination had been made in response to the Adelaide Medical School's recommendation to terminate your Master of Philosophy candidature, as recommended following the Major Review of Progress submitted to the Adelaide Graduate Centre on 30 April 2018. This position regarding termination was reiterated to you in an email, from Professor Williams, on 31 July 2018. Technology Service University Statement [11]: your Candidature was discontinued in September International Student Support University Statement [10]: On 12 October 2018 "We're aware your scholarship is ending today Michael Physick Technology Service University Statement [7]: As you no longer have a Student role I believe this is why you are unable to access Adelaide.
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Donna Gould University Statement [123]: "the Applicant's candidature had been terminated with effect from 25 September 2018." Jane Smart University Statement [124]: The prospective student will be issued a student ID card, which will clearly identify the holder as a 'Student' [121] Mr. Panayiotou: I was provided with a SA Health Government Employee Work Badge listed as "Researcher [82] Jane Smart University Statement [124]: This is due to the identification of the student as a 'Person of Interest' in the Payroll and Human Resources System, which is linked to the Identity Management System. It is not reflective of an employment relationship between the student and the University; [122] Mr. Panayiotou: Circumstances that demonstrate that I was engaged as employee:
Circumstances that demonstrate employment as a Post Graduate Researcher Evidence to support Circumstance I Received payments described as "Salary - University of Adelaide" for over a year [78] Screen Shot of Bank Payment Description I was instructed to manage pay slips via Staff Services Online [79] Payslips are managed via Staff Services Online I was also provided with an employee email address and, in order to login to my account, I needed navigate to a page listed as "Staff Email." [80] Staff login image I had no course work that I was required to complete, and the scholarship acceptance [81] Commence Research not form explained that I am required to "commence research" (not coursework) .* studies or coursework I was provided with a SA Health Government Employee Work Badge listed as "Researcher [82] Employee badge I received notification from the University notifying me that "your roles have changed" [1] Access to emails revoked - date and "you will no longer have access to your staff email." access tampering commenced I meet several of the criteria that Fair Work Commission benchmark names to be considered an employee, these include: . Employer provides and maintains significant tools or equipment [83] unfair-dismissals-benchbook
Employer provides a uniform or business cards employee definition Employee is paid by periodic wage or salary I conducted an Australian Taxation Office survey and filled out my circumstances and It was determined that I am defined and an employee. [84] ATO-Questions decision tool "Worker is an employee" *Research in this sense implies an output for the employer (the university). If I was simply studying, I would just be gaining a degree though completion of coursework. I had no coursework and my efforts were being used to generate producible products for the University. I was being engaged as an employee according to the Fair Work Act and Fair work commission benchmark and Australian Taxation Office Survey. I was also being marketed as an employee to other agencies during my candidature. 6. Whiteness Statement (Ms. Donna Gould) Testes in hearing: Dismissal Process discrepancies [123] Donna Gould University Statement [123]: 12. 12 April 2018, an Early Intervention Group Meeting was held in response to behavioural concerns regarding the Applicant. I did not attend this meeting, however, such meetings are usually attended by Michael Physick (Manager, Student Affairs), Colleen Lewig (Associate Director, Student Life), Richard Duddy (Legal Counsel) and a
nominee from Student Affairs. I understand that the outcome of the Meeting was to ban the Applicant from entering the Basil Hetzel Institute, which was where the Applicant was undertaking his research; Mr. Panayiotou: On 19 April 2018 my access card to my work place of was cut with no notification. At that time, I was shocked and confused and had to call security myself to find this out my access was cut and security advised to go to the University. [52] When I went to go speak with the University support services they had no idea that my access card was cut and no reason for this. No official notification was provided to me about the outcome of the meeting Donna Gould describes. The only official notification of this came on 7 May 2018, 33 days later, when I received the first notification that my access to facilities would be cut from the Dean of Medicine. This letter included threats for me not to communicate with any University Staff or I could be fined $3000. [50]
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The reasoning for banning access found in Dean of Medicines Letter dated 7 May 2018 is not consistent with the reasons for termination found in the Major Review of Progress. [50, 53, 74, 75] Donna Gould University Statement [123]: 15. During this time, the Applicant failed to take appropriate steps to finalise his response, including by failing to attend meetings with relevant support staff and failing to avail himself of opportunities to attend at the University to collect relevant materials. Consequently, on 28 June 2018, an Early Intervention Group Meeting was held to consider how to conclude the termination process. This Meeting was attended by Colleen Lewig, Richard Duddy, Kate Borrett (Student Grievance and Conduct Advisor, Student Affairs), Seaneen Hopps (International Student Advisor, Student Life), the Dean of Graduate Studies and myself. It was determined that the appropriate course was to arrange a meeting between the Dean of Graduate Studies and the Applicant to enable him a final opportunity to respond to the termination recommendation in person. Mr. Panayiotou: The university provided biased support and engaged in severe bullying. There was prejudice toward me for being an international student there was biased support from staff designed to help me. Evidence of this is shown when I was instructed to
communicate with an Education Welfare Officer (EWO). The EWO engaged in biased support and suggested that I should just accept dismissal so that I would have a better chance of getting into Australia for my next visa application because I could lie to the next school I got accepted to by saying I just decided to quit the program. I asked what I would tell the immigration department and the EWO suggested that I could say whatever I wanted. [AUDIO 67,188] I'm the one I asked to meet with dean graduate studies due to the complexity stemmed from the Public Interest Disclosure (PID) + Research Integrity Issue. I wrote "By meeting with you prior to submission of evidence I will be able to ensure that I am not bringing unnecessary conflicts or issues to a situation that, in my opinion, can be dealt with out me presenting evidence of what my supervisors have done wrong. It is in my nature to not want to point out the flaws in others but rather focus on the ways that the obstacle can be overcome." [55] The Dean of Graduate Studies responded to this with "I am sorry that I do not believe it is appropriate in the circumstances to meet with you prior to the submission of a review." [55] After asking again I finally received approval to meet with The Dean of Graduate Studies when he wrote: "I now offer you three alternative appointments on which to meet with me; you are welcome to bring a support person of your choice, for example an
Cauca ella AS reviously avisEu ASSISL 10 mission as Taffl tre decision-maker in your case, however, you are welcome to lodge with me any written materials you consider to be relevant at the time of the meeting and of course, to make a verbal response to the candidature termination recommendation." [56] I replied: "it means a lot to me to be able to communicate my message verbally before preparing documentation that is to be officially submitted." [56] I didn't feel comfortable bringing EWO manager Terri Finn because she had already demonstrated biased support. I wrote to the EWO main office of several occasions to request another EWO due to the biased support and Terri responded telling me to only email her and later said that "it is not good or proper practice for me to allocate another EWO to see you." [102] Donna Gould University Statement [123]: 16. On 20 July 2018, in accordance with the determination of the Early Intervention Group, a meeting was held between the Applicant, the Dean of Graduate Studies and myself. During this meeting, we discussed: (a) various opportunities that had been provided to the Applicant to respond; (b) the fact that it was necessary for the Dean to make a final determination regarding termination of the Applicant's candidature and the Applicant was provided with a last opportunity to submit additional material for the Dean's consideration by close of business 27 July 2018; and (c) the Applicar isc 10
Mr. Panayiotou: (a) I had no fair chance to retrieve my usual work place material when my access to BHI was revoked with no notification: 26 June 2018: Dean of Medicine Regarding "It is now my understanding also that finalisation of your [85] Dean medicine - agc Access to Workplace Materials major review incl access to your computer is now being will assist accessing handled by the Graduate Centre" resources p 5 Dean of Graduate Studies 13 June 2018: [86] Dean of Graduate Regarding Access to Workplace "I have no jurisdiction in this matter and suggest that you Studies (AGC) no Materials pursue your request with Professor Symonds." jurisdiction to help with computer access p 10
[2019] FWCFB 6214
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(b) I wanted to also discuss the review of my thesis as an amicable solution. In response to this the Dean of Graduate Studies tried tricking me by saying I could submit my thesis after the dismissal process was over. The Dean of Graduate Studies wrote: "If the School does not support submission of your draft thesis for examination you can refer the matter to myself, as Dean of Graduate Studies for consideration. If you wish me to formally consider this matter, I will be happy to do so following the outcome of the Major Review process." [87] At the Meeting the Dean of Graduate studies claimed was not even aware of the letter from the Dean of Medicine that I both sent him and referred to in email on multiple occasions. The Dean also tried to finalize the matter early against what was agreed in email prior. [AUDIO 57.0] (c) At the meeting I presented a PID + Research Integrity Issue and none of this information was found in the list of topics covered
in the meeting as the root reason for my dismissal. [AUDIO 57.1] Instead of offering the resources of "Research Integrity Department" I was instructed that I could go to parliament if I was not happy with the research misconduct. [AUDIO 57.2] Donna Gould University Statement [123]: On 25 September 2018, Kate Borrett sent an email to the Dean of Graduate Studies and myself, advising that Student Affairs had concluded that the Applicant's appeal was without merit. Consequently, on 26 September 2018, I emailed Antoinette Brincat (Scholarships Officer) advising her that the Applicant's candidature had been terminated with effect from 25 September 2018. I sent this email for the purpose of ensuring the cessation of the Applicant's Wildcard Scholarship and instructed her not to recover any stipend overpayment incurred. Mr. Panayiotou: Before payments ceased I was only notified from SGRP - Kate Borrett that a "Preliminary Assessment of Appeal Application" was made. [73] Donna Gould University Statement [123]: Re: Signatures on Major Review. Pure Cowled sent Panos his major review on 19 April 2018 with all signatures excepts lan Symonds. This was because as per Prue's instructions, Panos was supposed to submit it to Roy
for signature which level did temfall ] Mr. Panayiotou: This Is completely false as I submitted the required paper work to Roy and he responded, "I've put that through for processing and will let you know when it's been completed." [116] On 26 July the Dean of Medicine wrote to me: "Please see attached copy of the major review form now with my signature." [13] Below are two extracted signatures from [Statement of Donna Gould & Annexures]. These signatures from the Dean of Medicine are for the same Major Review Document. I don't know why they are different. [117-118] [117] [118] 16/04/2018 Sign here Date 24/4/18 Tantomais 24/04/18
Sign here Date
