1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
v
KAEFER Integrated Services Pty Ltd
(C2017/4431)
VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN
COMMISSIONER HARPER-GREENWELL SYDNEY, 20 NOVEMBER 2017
Appeal against decision [2017] FWCA 3839 of Commissioner Gregory at Melbourne on
21 July 2017 in matter number AG2017/2240
Introduction and background
[1] The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) has lodged an
appeal, for which permission to appeal is required, against a decision issued by Commissioner
Gregory on 21 July 20171 (Decision) to approve the KIS North West Onshore Operations
Enterprise Agreement 2017-2021 (Agreement).
[2] The CFMEU was not a bargaining representative for the Agreement. However, having
become aware of the application for approval, the union advised the Commission that it
objected to it. In particular, it stated that it did not believe the Agreement passed the “better
off overall test” (BOOT), as required by s 186(2)(d), and sought to be heard.
[3] In the Decision, the Commissioner noted that the CFMEU had not identified any
particular reason why it believed the requirements of the BOOT had not been satisfied,2 and
stated that, in the circumstances, he was not satisfied that the union should be given an
opportunity to be heard.3 The Commissioner concluded that he was satisfied that the
requirements for approval of the Agreement had been met and approved the Agreement,
subject to various undertakings.4
[4] In its Notice of Appeal, the CFMEU contended that it represents workers in the
construction industry, that the Commissioner’s decision to approve the Agreement affects its
members, and accordingly it is a “person aggrieved” by the decision of the Commissioner for
the purposes of s 604(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). The respondent, KAEFER
1 [2017] FWCA 3839
2 Decision at [6]
3 Decision at [10]
4 Decision at [3]
[2017] FWCFB 5630
DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2017] FWCFB 5630
2
Integrated Services Pty Ltd (Kaefer) accepted that the CFMEU had standing to bring the
appeal, consistent with the decision of the Full Bench in CFMEU v CSRP Pty Ltd.5
[5] An appeal under s 604 of the FW Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the
Commission’s powers on appeal are exercisable only if there is error on the part of the
primary decision maker.6 There is no right to appeal and an appeal may be made only with the
permission of the Commission. Subsection 604(2) requires the Commission to grant
permission to appeal if satisfied that it is “in the public interest to do so”. Permission to
appeal may otherwise be granted on discretionary grounds.
[6] Other than the special case in s 604(2), the grounds for granting permission to appeal
are not specified. Considerations which have traditionally been treated as justifying the grant
of permission to appeal include that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant
its reconsideration and that substantial injustice may result if leave is refused.7
[7] The CFMEU’s Notice of Appeal puts forward four grounds of appeal, all of which
contend that the Commissioner erred by approving the Agreement. These were elaborated
upon in the CFMEU’s written submissions and in oral argument before us.
Ground 1: The better off overall test
[8] The first ground of appeal submits that the Commissioner erred by concluding that the
Agreement passed the BOOT. The modern award for the purposes of assessing the BOOT in
this matter is the Building and Construction General On-site Award 2010 (Award).
[9] It is well established that the test requires the identification of terms which are more
beneficial for an employee, terms which are less beneficial, and an overall assessment of
whether an employee would be better off under the agreement.8 The overall assessment
involves a global comparison.9 However, it is clear from s 193(1) that this global comparison
must be satisfied in relation to each award covered and prospective award covered
employee.10 The test is not directed at whether most employees or most classes of employees
are better off.11
[10] The Agreement provides for a higher base rate of pay than the Award. However, the
CFMEU points to various allowances and other provisions in the Award which are not
reflected in the Agreement, and which it says result in the Agreement not passing the BOOT.
[11] The CFMEU’s outline of submissions provided a comparative financial analysis of the
terms of the Agreement against those of the Award, as they would apply to a weekly hire
‘general labourer’ under the Agreement and a weekly hire CW1(d) employee under the
Award. It was not in contest that these are analogous positions. The CFMEU’s financial
analysis was modelled on a work pattern of 50 hours per week. We accept that this is a
5 [2017] FWCFB 2101
6 Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ
7 Also see CFMEU v AIRC (1998) 89 FCR 200; and Wan v AIRC (2001) 116 FCR 481
8 See AKN Pty Ltd t/a Aitkin Crane Services [2015] FWCFB 1833; Armacell Australia Pty Ltd [2010] FWAFB 9985
9 CFMEU v TR Construction Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 1928 at [20]
10 Hart v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd and Bi-Lo Pty Limited [2016] FWCFB 2887 at [33]
11 See CFMEU v SESLS Industrial Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 3659
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common work pattern in the construction industry and the employer did not take issue with it.
The CFMEU’s analysis is then built on data that comprises 38 ordinary hours and 12 overtime
hours, as well as payments for crib time, meal allowance, fare allowance and pro rata
redundancy. On the CFMEU’s analysis, the overall result was that a general labourer engaged
on a 50 hour week would be $483.72 worse off per week under the Agreement.
[12] In its outline of submissions, Kaefer contended that the CFMEU’s Attachment B
contained errors and mistaken assumption. It submitted that the CFMEU had used the
incorrect base rate of pay, had incorrectly calculated overtime rates (which under the
Agreement are payable after 7.6 hours), had wrongly assumed that the company would not
provide a crib break to employees, and had wrongly included a pro-rata redundancy benefit
that might never fall due.
[13] In response to Kaefer’s written submissions, the CFMEU filed an amended analysis. It
comprised an “amended Attachment B”; however this attachment is in fact a new document
which examines the position of a CW1(d) labourer engaged on a “daily hire, casual
arrangement”, and indicates that such a worker would be $159.98 worse off under the
Agreement than would be the case under the Award. The CFMEU also submitted a table ‘C’;
this is in substance a revised version of the original Attachment B dealing with a CW1(d)
labourer engaged on a weekly hire basis. It indicates that such a worker would be $216.31
worse off per week under the Agreement than under the Award, rather than $483.72, as it had
originally submitted.
[14] At the hearing before us, argument focused largely on the BOOT, and in particular the
significance and application of the meal allowance, fare allowance and crib time provisions in
the Award. At the conclusion of oral argument, we invited the parties to file further written
submissions in relation to the BOOT.
[15] The CFMEU subsequently filed a further submission in relation to the BOOT. It
attached a further amended financial analysis which this time indicated a shortfall in the
Agreement, as against the Award, of $126.06 for a CW1(d) labourer engaged on a casual
basis, and $162.06 for such a labourer engaged on a weekly basis. Kaefer also filed a further
submission, in which it contended that the union had again used the incorrect base rates of
pay, and that overtime arrangements under the Agreement had not been properly reflected in
the union’s analysis. It also disputed the application of the crib, meal and fares allowances to
the circumstances of the work that is covered by the Agreement; the company’s position is
that the financial comparison of the Agreement and the Award should omit these amounts
from the Award ledger.
[16] The Commission’s modelling indicates that if crib time, meal allowance and fares
allowances are all applicable, a CW1(d) weekly hire employee would be $154.72 worse off
under the Agreement than under the Award (see Attachment 1 to this decision). If none of
these allowances are applicable (or if they are provided as per the Award), the Commission’s
modelling indicates that employees are $73.73 better off under the Agreement than under the
Award (Attachment 2 to this decision). We now consider the application of these three
Award-based allowances to the work covered by the Agreement.
Crib time
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[17] Clause 35.3(b) of the Award provides that when employees are required to work two
or more hours of overtime, they are entitled to a crib break of 20 minutes, without deduction
of pay, after the normal finishing time. If the crib break is not taken, the employee is taken to
have worked the 20 minutes (in effect, taken to have worked 20 minutes more than they
actually worked), and is paid accordingly. It is common in the construction industry for the
crib break to be paid out.
[18] Kaefer contended that the CFMEU had wrongly assumed in its analysis that the crib
break would not be taken, and would therefore, under the Award, have to be paid out.The
Agreement does not make any provision for crib time. Clause 11.3 deals with rest breaks and
provides that an employee who works three consecutive hours or more on a day or shift is
entitled to a paid 10 minute rest break during the day or shift. In the case of shift work, clause
11.4 provides that a paid twenty minute rest break is taken. However, the Agreement does not
deal with paid rest breaks in relation to the working of overtime.
[19] Although Kaefer might choose to arrange its working arrangements such that crib
breaks are actually taken, the BOOT must be conducted on the basis of what is provided for in
the two instruments which are the subject of the comparison, namely the Agreement and the
Award. What the employer might choose to do as a matter of discretion would not ordinarily
be taken into account. Accordingly, we consider that crib time is an Award provision that is
relevant to the application of the BOOT in the present circumstances.
Meal allowance
[20] Clause 20.2(a) of the Award provides that a meal allowance of $14.78 is payable
whenever an employee is required to work overtime for a least one and a half hours after
working ordinary hours. However, clause 20.2(b) states that the allowance is not payable to an
employee who is provided with reasonable board and lodging.
[21] Kaefer submitted that, given the geographical coverage of the Agreement, employees
are “overwhelmingly likely” to be FIFO workers on remote project work, not residential
workers. Kaefer says that the significance of this is that employees will be provided with three
meals per day, as required by clause 9 of the Agreement. The exception in clause 20.2(b)
would therefore be engaged and no meal allowance would be payable under the Award.
[22] The CFMEU submitted that it was realistic and not fanciful that the company might
engage employees on a residential basis, in which case they would be eligible for a meal
allowance under the Award. We accept this contention. We note that the Agreement applies to
work undertaken north of the 26th parallel in Western Australia.12 Above this line of latitude
there are many population centres in which employees performing work under the Agreement
might realistically be based. Although the BOOT is to be considered “as at the test time,”13
this requires the Commission to consider how an agreement is capable of being applied at that
time; the analysis is not confined to the working arrangements that an employer currently has
in place.
[23] The assessment of the BOOT should take into account how an agreement might
reasonably operate, including which prospective employees might be engaged under it. We
12 Clause 2(a) of the Agreement
13 See ss 193(1) and 193(5) of the FW Act
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agree with the union that the Commission should consider whether it is realistic that the
company might engage employees on a residential basis, and that the answer to this is ‘yes’.
In our view, the meal allowance under the Award is properly to be taken into account in
conducting the analysis of the BOOT.
Fares allowance
[24] Clause 25 of the Award concerns a “fares and travel patterns allowance”. Clause 25.2
provides that an employee must be paid an allowance of $17.43 for each day worked at a
construction site located within a radius of 50km of the GPO in a capital city or the principal
post office in a regional city or town.
[25] The fares allowance would be payable in relation to ‘residential’ workers residing in
cities or towns. In this regard, the same arguments are engaged as discussed above in relation
to the meal allowance. Although Kaefer contends that the use of residential workers under the
Agreement is a mere theoretical possibility, we consider that it is realistic and not fanciful that
workers might be engaged in this way. We consider that the fares allowance under the Award
is relevant to the consideration of the BOOT in this regard.
[26] It is appropriate that we also consider the application of the fares allowance to distance
work. Clause 25.3 states that in relation to employees employed on distance work as defined
in clause 24.1, the fares allowance is payable when work is carried out within a 50km radius
from the place where, with the employer’s approval, the employee is accommodated. This
might include a place of accommodation used for FIFO purposes. However, clause 25.8 then
provides that no allowances (with some presently irrelevant exceptions) will be payable on
any day on which the employer “provides or offers to provide transport free of charge from
the employee’s home to the place of work and return”.
[27] However, the CFMEU contends that distance workers are entitled to a fares allowance
despite clause 25.8. It invokes clause 24.7(d) of the Award, which states that an employee
required to “reside elsewhere than on site (or adjacent to the site and supplied with
transport)” must be paid the fares allowance in clause 25. The CFMEU says that clause
24.7(d) imports the allowance in clause 25 (the monetary benefit), but not the various
conditions (in particular, the exclusion in clause 25.8).
[28] In relation to the application of clause 24.7(d), the CFMEU points to a decision of the
Commission in which Riordan C found that a place of residence some 12km from a worksite
was not ‘adjacent’ to it, for the purposes of this clause. On the CFMEU’s argument, this gives
clause 24.7(d) a potentially wide application; and it is not fanciful that the employer might
employ a person to reside at a place that is not ‘adjacent’ to the site in this sense, such that a
fares allowance would be payable.
[29] Kaefer contends that remote projects often feature employee accommodation located
within the boundaries of the site or a short distance away; and if accommodation is further
away, employers almost invariably arrange transportation between the accommodation and
the work site. Kaefer says there is no entitlement under the Award to fares allowance for
distance work in FIFO circumstances, where the employee is transported at the employer’s
expense and arrangement from the home base to the accommodation, and between the
accommodation and the work site.
[2017] FWCFB 5630
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[30] The idea that a FIFO worker in a remote area who is provided with transportation to
and from their accommodation should be paid a ‘fares allowance’ seems to us
counterintuitive. In our view clause 25.8 excludes it. We do not read clause 24.7(d) as
importing only the allowance and none of the conditions. As noted in clause 25.1, the purpose
of a fares allowance is to recognise travel patterns and costs peculiar to the industry. If the
employer is covering this travel and cost, the rationale for the payment of a ‘fares allowance’
would not appear to be applicable.
[31] However, we note that the Agreement does not state that employees will be
transported at company expense and arrangement from the home base to their
accommodation, and between the accommodation and the work site. Whilst we accept that
this is common in FIFO work, it cannot be taken for granted. If it were not to be provided, we
consider that the fares allowance would apply to distance work under the Award.
Accordingly, it is relevant to the BOOT analysis.
[32] In its further submissions, the CFMEU points to an alleged error in the Award that is
said to be relevant to the analysis of the fares allowance. We have not taken this into account.
We proceed on the basis that the Award is to be read on its terms. If there is said to be an error
in the Award, the proper course is to seek to amend it pursuant s 160 of the FW Act, not to
impugn it in an appeal, after the conclusion of argument and on the basis of new evidence.
BOOT implications arising from the application of the three allowances
[33] We have found that each of the above allowances provided for in the Award is capable
of application to the work covered by the Agreement. In light of the Commission’s analysis of
the financial implications of these allowances applying to an award covered employee or
prospective award covered employee, we conclude that the Agreement does not pass the
BOOT. The Commissioner’s conclusion to the contrary was in error.
[34] It was suggested by Kaefer that the CFMEU’s challenge to the Commissioner’s
decision in ground 1 of the notice of appeal invoked legal unreasonableness. This is not so. In
the present case, by failing to factor into the financial analysis the application of the three
allowances, the Commissioner did not take into account material considerations, as referred to
in the ‘first limb’ of House v R.14
[35] Our conclusion in relation to the application of the three allowances would provide a
sufficient basis for us to dispose of the appeal. However, given Kaefer’s submission that it
would seek the opportunity to provide further undertakings upon rehearing in the event the
appeal were upheld, it is appropriate that we consider the further grounds of appeal that might
prevent the future approval of the Agreement.
Other BOOT issues
[36] The CFMEU submitted that the Agreement did not contain several site and general
wage-related allowances found in the Award, including underground allowance, multi-story
allowance and laser allowance. However, in our view, the absence of specialist allowances
that appear to have no relevance to the employer’s operations does not call into question the
Commissioner’s application of the BOOT. They were not the subject of argument before us.
14 (1936) 55 CLR 499
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[37] The CFMEU further contends that the Agreement allows a span of ordinary hours of
6.00am to 6.00pm, whereas the Award provides for 7.00am to 6.00pm; and that the 38 hour
week can be averaged over an undefined work cycle under the Agreement, rather than over 4
weeks under the Award. It notes also that individual flexibility arrangements can be
terminated under the Agreement by giving 28 days’ notice, rather than 13 weeks’ notice under
the Award. Finally, the CFMEU submits that clause 8.1(a)(iv) of the Agreement allows the
company to engage employees on a specified task basis, whereas the Award does not. We do
not consider any of these differences affect the outcome of the financial analysis discussed
above.
Ground 2: substantial undertakings
[38] The CFMEU’s second ground of appeal contended that the Commissioner erred in
accepting undertakings that resulted in substantial changes to the Agreement. Section 190(3)
of the FW Act provides that the Commission may only accept a written undertaking if it is
satisfied that the effect of accepting it is “not likely to cause financial detriment” to any
employee covered by the agreement, or “result in substantial changes to the agreement”.
[39] The changes brought about by the undertaking provided by Kaefer remove, rather than
cause financial detriment to employees. However, the CFMEU contends that the undertakings
resulted in significant changes to the Agreement, including by replacing several allowances
and the minimum ordinary hourly rates of pay, and inserting clauses related to apprentice
rates. The CFMEU refers to the decision in Perth Access Scaffolding Pty Ltd,15 in which it
was found that the significant number of undertakings provided by the employer had resulted
in the agreement bearing no resemblance to the instrument on which employees had voted.
The Commissioner found that the essential character of the agreement in question was that it
would exclude the award, and that employees would instead receive a small margin above the
award rate. The Commissioner found that this essential character would have been changed
by accepting the numerous undertakings.
[40] In our view, simply increasing the quantum of various benefits will not ordinarily
result in “substantial changes” for the purposes of s 190(3). It seems to us that the legislative
concern is to avoid imposing on employees arrangements that they have not approved;
employees are not likely to object to higher monetary amounts. The position might be more
complex in relation to the reintroduction through undertakings of award-based benefits that
were otherwise excluded by the agreement, if this were to have a significant bearing on
working arrangements. However, this does not arise in the present matter.
[41] Section 190(3) does not permit undertakings that result in the wholesale reshaping of
the agreement, such that it bears no resemblance to the pre-undertaking agreement that was
approved by employees.16 In considering the application of s 190(3), each case will turn on its
own circumstances. However, in the present case, we do not consider that the undertakings
provided to date have resulted in substantial changes.
Ground 3: whether the Agreement was genuinely agreed
15 [2016] FWC 8042
16 Re AKN Pty Ltd t/a Aitkin Crane Service [2015] FWCFB 1833 at [34]
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[42] The third ground of appeal submitted that the Commissioner erred in concluding that
employees had genuinely agreed to the Agreement for the purposes of s 188, because future
pay rates under the Agreement are unilaterally determined by the company. It was contended
that employees could not have given informed consent to such rates of pay.
[43] In fact, clause 22.1(d) of the Agreement states that the minimum hourly rates of pay
will be increased in July each year in accordance with the labour market, and the performance
of the company and individual employees, but in any event by at least the CPI percentage
movement for the year to March quarter for the eight capital cities in Australia. This formula
is readily comprehensible. It is also certain enough to allow the Commission to effectively
assess the BOOT. We see no merit in this ground of appeal.
Ground 4: significance of erroneous information in the F17 declaration
[44] The fourth ground of appeal submitted that the Commissioner erred in concluding that
employees had genuinely agreed to the Agreement in circumstances where Kaefer had
provided erroneous information in its Form F17 statutory declaration, to the effect that no
terms of the Agreement were less beneficial than the Award.
[45] The CFMEU refers to the decision of Binet DP in BCG Contracting Pty Ltd,17 in
which the employer failed to identify in its F17 the terms and conditions that were less
beneficial than the relevant award. The Deputy President found that, as in Falcon Mining Pty
Ltd,18 this provided reasonable grounds for believing that the employer did not take
reasonable steps to explain to employees the terms of the agreement and their effect, as
required by s 180(5). However, in Falcon Mining, the error in the Form F17 was only one of
many factors which led Asbury DP to the conclusion that the employer had not complied with
its obligation to explain the agreement to employees, including direct witness evidence as to
the inadequacy of the explanation.19 This is not the case in the present matter.
[46] We note that the Commission’s Form F17 statutory declaration is in a question and
answer format. Question 3.5 in the Form F17 asks the deponent:
“Does the agreement contain any terms that are less beneficial than the equivalent
terms and conditions in the reference instrument(s) listed in questions 3.1 and 3.2
and/or does the agreement confer any entitlements that are not conferred by those
reference instruments.”
[47] The deponent in this case marked the “no” box on the form. That answer was
incorrect. The Agreement contains a number of terms that are less beneficial than the
equivalent terms of the Award. The deponent should have marked the “yes” box and
identified the terms and conditions of the Agreement that are less beneficial than the Award or
not conferred by the Award. Evidently, Kaefer believed that its agreement, as submitted to the
Commission, passed the BOOT. However this is not the question posed by question 3.5 and
care must be taken when answering it.
17 [2017] FWC 852
18 [2016] FWC 5315
19 See Falcon Mining at [160]
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[48] The CFMEU contends that in light of the incorrect answer to the F17, it would have
been impossible for the company to take reasonable steps to explain the terms of the
agreement and their effect to employees. We do not agree. The information that the
Commission requires the maker of a statutory declaration to depose to, in support of an
application for approval of an enterprise agreement, is a matter determined by the
Commission pursuant to its Rules. The obligation on an employer to take all reasonable steps
to ensure that the terms of the agreement and its effect are explained to relevant employees is
imposed by s 180(5). It need not necessarily cover the same information in the F17.
[49] An incorrect answer in the F17 might well give pause to query whether the employer
understood the full effect of the Agreement, and whether it could then impart relevant
information to employees. In this case, the only evidence before the Commission on this
question is the sworn evidence of the deponent in response to the question in the Form F17
concerning the steps taken to explain the Agreement. This was to the effect that Kaefer’s
industrial relations manager met personally with the five employees who were to be covered
by the agreement and explained the terms of the Agreement and its effects on them. In the
circumstances, the CFMEU’s contention that Kaefer did not meet the requirements of s
180(5) has not been substantiated.
Conclusion
[50] In follows from our conclusions above that the Agreement does not pass the BOOT
and that the Commissioner’s decision to the contrary was in error. On this basis, permission to
appeal should be granted, the appeal should be upheld and the decision quashed.
[51] The company’s application for approval of the Agreement will need to be re-
determined. We consider that the application should be referred to a member of this Full
Bench for this purpose. The company will have an opportunity to offer further undertakings to
rectify the BOOT deficiencies.
[52] We order as follows:
(1) Permission to appeal is granted.
(2) The appeal is upheld.
(3) The decision ([2017] FWCA 3839) is quashed.
(4) The company’s application for approval of the KIS North West Onshore
Operations Enterprise Agreement 2017-2021 is referred to Commissioner
Harper-Greenwell for re-determination.
[2017] FWCFB 5630
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VICE PRESIDENT
Appearances:
K.Wilson on behalf of the CFMEU.
A.Pollock of counsel with B. Milne on behalf of KAEFER Integrated Services Pty Ltd.
Hearing details:
2017
Brisbane:
18 September
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Price code C, PR597223
OF THE FAIR WORK MISSION THE
[2017] FWCFB 5630
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Attachment 1
Crib time, meal allowance, fares allowance apply - $154.72 per week worse off
Agreement
Ordinary Rate $21.80
Award
Ordinary Rate $20.58
Hours Loading weekly total Hours Loading
weekly
total
Mon 7.6 100% $165.68 Mon 8 100% $164.64
Tues 7.6 100% $165.68 Tues 8 100% $164.64
Wed 7.6 100% $165.68 Wed 8 100% $164.64
Thurs 7.6 100% $165.68 Thurs 8 100% $164.64
Fri 7.6 100% $165.68 Fri 6 100% $123.48
Overtime (time
and a half) 10 150% $327.00
Overtime (time
and a half) 10 150% $308.70
Overtime
(double) 2 200% $87.20
Overtime
(double) 2 200% $82.32
Allowances Amount Value Allowances Amount Value
Fares Allowance 0 $0.00 $0.00 Fares Allowance 5 $17.43 $87.15
Meal Allowance 0 $0.00 $0.00 Meal Allowance 5 $14.54 $72.70
Crib Time 0 $0.00 $0.00 Crib Time 5 $13.72 $68.60
Annual Leave Yes $63.72 Annual Leave Yes $60.16
Leave Loading Yes $11.15 Leave Loading Yes $10.53
Totals 50.00 Hrs $1,317.47 Totals 50.00 Hrs $1,472.19
Agreement Total Weekly Rate $1,317.47
Model Summary
Award Total Weekly Rate $1,472.19
Dollar / Actual Percentage Difference
-$154.72 The Dollar / Actual Percentage Difference identifies the
modelled difference between the agreement and the award
in dollar terms and as a percentage.10.51%
Agreement Percentage Increase Required
11.74%
The Agreement Percentage Increase Required is the
amount the agreement rate would need to be increased by
to satisfy the BOOT under this modelling.
[2017] FWCFB 5630
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Attachment 2
No crib time, meals or fares allowances apply - $73.73 per week better off
Agreement
Ordinary Rate $21.80
Award
Ordinary Rate $20.58
Hours Loading weekly total Hours Loading
weekly
total
Mon 7.6 100% $165.68 Mon 8 100% $164.64
Tues 7.6 100% $165.68 Tues 8 100% $164.64
Wed 7.6 100% $165.68 Wed 8 100% $164.64
Thurs 7.6 100% $165.68 Thurs 8 100% $164.64
Fri 7.6 100% $165.68 Fri 6 100% $123.48
Overtime (time
and a half) 10 150% $327.00
Overtime (time
and a half) 10 150% $308.70
Overtime
(double) 2 200% $87.20
Overtime
(double) 2 200% $82.32
Allowances Amount Value Allowances Amount Value
Annual Leave Yes $63.72 Annual Leave Yes $60.16
Leave Loading Yes $11.15 Leave Loading Yes $10.53
Totals 50.00 Hrs $1,317.47 Totals 50.00 Hrs $1,243.74
Agreement Total Weekly Rate $1,317.47
Model Summary
Award Total Weekly Rate $1,243.74
Dollar / Actual Percentage Difference
$73.73 The Dollar / Actual Percentage Difference identifies the
modelled difference between the agreement and the award
in dollar terms and as a percentage.5.93%
Agreement Percentage Increase Required
-5.60%
The Agreement Percentage Increase Required is the
amount the agreement rate would need to be increased by
to satisfy the BOOT under this modelling.
[2017] FWCFB 5630
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