1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Ms Traie Hansen
v
Supported Options In Lifestyle And Access Services Ltd T/A Solas
(U2015/14933)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT ASBURY BRISBANE, 26 AUGUST 2016
Application for relief from unfair dismissal.
1. Background
[1] Ms Traie Hansen applies to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for an
unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Ms Hansen
alleges that the termination of her employment by Supported options in Lifestyle and Access
Services Ltd T/A SOLAS (SOLAS) was unfair. On the basis of the information provided in
the Form F2 – Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – it was lodged with the
Commission one day outside the 21 day period allowed for such applications.
[2] The application was filed by her then representative, Unfair Dismissals Australia, on
10 November 2015. The application states that Ms Hansen began working for SOLAS on 16
March 2015 and was notified of her dismissal on 19 October 2015. The application also states
that Ms Hansen’s dismissal took effect on this day. It is acknowledged in the application – at
1.4 of the Form F2 – that the application was not made within 21 days of the dismissal taking
effect. The explanation for the delay set out at 1.4 of the Form F2 is that Ms Hansen was
medically unfit from the day following her dismissal until the application was lodged with the
Commission.
[3] The Commission corresponded with Ms Hansen and her then representative on a
number of occasions seeking further information and supporting medical evidence in relation
to her incapacity and its effect on her ability to file her application. Ms Hansen and her then
representative responded to that correspondence and provided some information which did
not specifically address whether the incapacity prevented her from making her application
within the required time.
[4] A series of submissions and supporting material was also filed in response to
Directions issued by the Commission, in which Ms Hansen raised a number of grounds
additional to those set out in the Form F2 Application, upon which she asserted that an
extension of time should be granted.
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DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
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[5] When it became apparent that the facts upon which Ms Hansen based her argument for
an extension of time were contested by SOLAS, a notice of listing was issued for a hearing to
be conducted on 31 May 2016 in relation to the question of whether Ms Hansen should be
granted a further period in which to lodge her application. Directions were issued requiring
the parties to file and serve outlines of submissions and witness statements. Ms Hansen’s
representative filed an outline of submissions on 13 April 2016. In that outline of
submissions, it was asserted that Ms Hansen was not immediately aware of her dismissal and
that her application may not have been made outside the 21 day time limit. SOLAS filed its
material on 28 April 2016.
[6] On 24 May, Unfair Dismissals Australia filed a Notice of representative ceasing to act
and withdrew from the matter. On 27 May Ms Hansen corresponded with the Commission to
advise that she had not received the submissions filed on her behalf by her former
representative until that date, and that she wished to file further submissions and witness
statements. Ms Hansen also sought an adjournment of the extension of time hearing.
Notwithstanding objection from the Respondent the adjournment was granted and both parties
were given further time to file further submissions and response material respectively. Ms
Hansen filed her further submissions on 13 June 2016. In that further submission, Ms Hansen
asserted that she was not immediately aware of her dismissal due to her absence on personal
leave and maintained that there is “doubt” about whether her application was made outside
the 21 day time limit.
[7] The material on behalf of SOLAS was filed on 1 July 2016, four days outside the
additional time allowed. Notwithstanding objection from Ms Hansen, I accepted the revised
submissions filed by SOLAS. I did so because Ms Hansen was permitted to file multiple
submissions and has altered her position during the course of the matter. Given the point at
which it was raised, I have considered Ms Hansen’s evidence about when she became aware
of her dismissal as part of the consideration of the criteria for determining whether a further
period should be allowed for Ms Hansen to make her application. In the circumstances of this
case, it is not necessary to consider whether the dismissal did take effect on 20 October 2015.
[8] The application was heard by telephone to Townsville, Mt Isa and Sydney, on 21 July
2016. Ms Hansen gave evidence on her own behalf. All of the material filed by Ms Hansen
(much of which was irrelevant to the issue of whether she should be granted an additional
period in which to lodge her application) was identified page by page at the hearing and
admitted as evidence. I have considered all of Ms Hansen’s material and given her a number
of opportunities to supplement it with a range of documents.1 Evidence on behalf of SOLAS
was given by Ms Kate Gamble, Service Co-ordinator in charge of the Mt Isa Office of
SOLAS.2
2. Legislation and principles
[9] By virtue of s.394(2) of the Act, an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must
be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, or within such further period as the
Commission allows under s.394(3). Ms Hansen’s application was made 1 day outside the time
required in s.394(2). It is necessary to determine whether a further period should be allowed
under s.394(3) for the application to be made. That sub-section provides as follows:
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“(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a
person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional
circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had
taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar
position.”
[10] The approach to deciding whether there are “exceptional circumstances” in a
particular case is that the term is given its ordinary meaning, and encompasses circumstances:
out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, but not necessarily
unique, unprecedented or rare; or
involving a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a
combination of ordinary factors that taken together are exceptional.3
3. Consideration
Reasons for the delay in filing Ms Hansen’s application – s. 394(3)(a)
[11] There must be an acceptable reason for the delay in filing the unfair dismissal
application.4 An Applicant for unfair dismissal remedy seeking that the Commission exercise
discretion to grant a further period for making an application needs to provide a credible
reason for the whole of the period that the application was delayed.5
[12] Ms Hansen has provided a range of reasons for her delay and those reasons have
changed over a series of correspondence and submissions from Ms Hansen and her former
representative. In the Form F2 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy, completed and
filed on her behalf by Unfair Dismissals Australia, it was stated that Ms Hansen was notified
of her dismissal and that it took effect on 19 October 2015. In relation to the reason for the
application not being filed within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect, it is stated that:
“The Applicant was medically unfit for the entire duration from the day following her
dismissal until lodgement.”
[13] Following receipt of the application, the Commission corresponded with Ms Hansen
and her representative to advise that as it was filed outside of the time required by the Act, a
Member of the Commission would consider whether to grant a further period for her
application to be made. Ms Hansen was requested in that correspondence to file a written
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statement explaining why the Commission should extend time. Ms Hansen was also informed
that if she relied on a medical condition she should supply a medical certificate or report.
[14] On 7 December 2015, Ms Hansen filed a letter and attachments in response to that
correspondence. The attachments to Ms Hansen’s letter are a Queensland Worker’s
Compensation medical certificate, a letter from the North and West Health with a referral to
its counselling and wellbeing service and the letter of termination from SOLAS. On 8
December 2015, Mr Tom Hakkinen, of Unfair Dismissals Australia, also corresponded with
the Commission in response to the correspondence. The material filed by Ms Hansen and by
her former representative did not address the question of whether Ms Hansen’s incapacity
prevented her from lodging her application within the required time. On 20 January 2016, the
Commission again corresponded with Ms Hansen informing her that any medical evidence
relied on should address the incapacity preventing Ms Hansen from lodging her application.
There was no response to that correspondence.
[15] In her correspondence of 7 December 2015, Ms Hansen stated:
“...the reason why for the delay in not submitting the Unfair Dismissal application on
time is due to my current mental illness in which I am currently suffering from anxiety
and depression.
On the day of 19/10/2015, I was on stand by for a doctor’s appointment with Gidgee
Healing. I had informed work that I was not attending work that morning and that I
was taking stress leave and that I [had] an appointment to see the doctor on the
20/10/2015, but was on standby for any cancellations for that day has (sic) I needed to
see the doctor due to work related stress.” 6
[16] In relation to the contention that the reason for the delay in lodging her application
was that she suffered from a medical condition, Ms Hansen said that following an
appointment with a doctor on 20 October 2015, she was referred to the North West Remote
Health service for counselling and that as of 7 December 2015, Ms Hansen was waiting for an
appointment.
[17] The Queensland Workers’ Compensation Medical Certificate issued on 20 October
2015 was completed by Dr Sudarsheni Duraisamy of Gidgee Healing. The Certificate
indicates that the “provisional diagnosis” is “Work related stress” and that Ms Hansen was
first seen at Gidgee Healing in relation to “this injury/disease” on 20 October 2015. The
Certificate also states that Ms Hansen claimed the date of injury was 4 May 2015. The cause
of injury is recorded as follows:
“Patient states ongoing intimidation, harassment and bullying from her boss since early
April 2015.”
[18] The Certificate states that Ms Hansen has no capability for any type of work from 20
October 2015 to 18 January 2016, has no history of depression, anxiety or mood disorders,
will be reviewed on 3 November 2015 and referred to an allied health professional, being a
Counsellor. Further material filed by Ms Hansen in response to Directions, includes
consultation notes recorded by her treating medical practitioner. Those notes indicate that Ms
Hansen did not consult that medical practitioner for the period from 20 October 2015 until 24
March 2016. The notes relating to the consultation on 20 October 2016 indicate that there
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was a discussion about whether Ms Hansen could make a claim for Workers’ Compensation
in light of the fact that her employment had been terminated. In her oral evidence to the
Commission at the hearing on 21 July, Ms Hansen agreed that she had not been reviewed by
her treating medical practitioner or a counsellor in the period from 20 October 2015 until 24
March 2016. In her oral evidence, Ms Hansen stressed that she was under a great deal of
stress at the point she was dismissed and for the period following her dismissal.
[19] In correspondence filed on 8 December 2015, Ms Hansen’s then representative stated
that the reason for the delay in filing her application was that at the time of her dismissal she
was diagnosed as suffering from work related stress and an assessment by her treating
medical practitioner was that she would have no capability for any type of work from 20
October 2015 until 18 January 2016. The letter goes on to state that:
“Around 7 – 8 November 2015, the Applicant describes her state as suffering from
severe anxiety and depression. In deciding whether to proceed or not with her claim
the Applicant also had to balance a possible effect making an unfair dismissal
application with [the Commission] may have on her daughter who is still employed.
The Applicant also advises that it was her intention to make the application within
time and that at the time of submitting her application she was of the mistaken belief
that she was within time.”
[20] In their respective correspondence to the Commission on 7 and 8 December 2015, Ms
Hansen and her then representative also stated that Ms Hansen was concerned about the effect
of filing an unfair dismissal application on her daughter, who remained employed by SOLAS
at the point Ms Hansen was dismissed. Documentation tendered by Ms Hansen includes a
number of emails which indicate that Ms Hansen’s daughter resigned her employment on 16
March 2016 and that attempts on the part of SOLAS HR Manager Ms Williams to persuade
her to the contrary were not successful. Ms Williams emails state that Ms Hansen’s daughter
is a valued employee and that she would like to discuss the resignation to see if there is
anything that can be done to persuade Ms Hansen’s daughter to withdraw her resignation. It
is apparent that Ms Hansen’s daughter proceeded with her resignation but made a complaint
about Ms Gamble to the effect that she had resigned because she did not want to work with
Ms Gamble and believed that she had been treated unfairly after Ms Hansen was dismissed.
[21] SOLAS submits that the medical condition relied upon by Ms Hansen did not prevent
her from giving instructions to Mr Hakkinen on 10 November 2015. Further, SOLAS submits
that there is a lack of medical evidence to support any change in Ms Hansen’s medical
condition since the termination of her employment. SOLAS also submits that most employees
whose employment is terminated would suffer a degree of stress. This is said to establish Ms
Hansen’s reason for delay is not exceptional.
[22] As to Ms Hansen’s contention that in considering whether to file an unfair dismissal
application she had to consider her daughter’s ongoing employment with SOLAS, it is
submitted that SOLAS is a “sympathetic and supportive” employer. There is no evidence to
support the proposition in respect of Ms Hansen’s allegation regarding her daughter’s
employment.
[23] Ms Hansen has referred to two Decision of the Commission in respect of the reason
for delay: Ovenden v Fortezza Pty Ltd T/A High Country Automotive Group7 (Ovenden) and
Rose v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd8 (Rose). In Ovenden, Commissioner Deegan granted Mr
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Ovenden and extension of time. Mr Ovenden relied upon his medical condition as the reason
for the delay in filing his application for unfair dismissal remedy. The medical evidence was
that Mr Ovenden was suffering from depression and anxiety exacerbated by work stress as
well as exhibiting signs of post-traumatic stress disorder and suffered from an intellectual
impairment. The Respondent in Ovenden did not dispute the Applicant’s medical condition.
[24] Commissioner Deegan held that Mr Ovenden’s case was “particularly unusual”9 and
was satisfied that the medical evidence supplied by Mr Ovenden established that he was in no
fit condition to deal with the matter until the application was eventually filed. Commissioner
Deegan also considered the sequence of events leading to Mr Ovenden’s dismissal
exacerbated the situation, which included the Respondent refusing to accept Mr Ovednen’s
medical certificates for the period.
[25] In Rose the Applicant asserted that the reason for the delay was because she was
suffering from “shock and trauma as a result of the dismissal”10 and that she was not aware of
the time limit for making an application for unfair dismissal remedy. During the two week
period following her dismissal (the relevant timeframe being 14 days at the time Rose was
decided) Ms Rose did not attend a doctor. In that case, Commissioner Roe was not satisfied
that the evidence established that Ms Rose was incapable of taking any action in respect of
her dismissal during the timeframe. The evidence did not include any assertion that Ms Rose
was suffering from any incapacity. Commissioner Roe held that it was not uncommon for
employees to suffer shock and trauma as a result of a dismissal.
[26] I am not satisfied that Ms Hansen’s circumstances are similar to those in Ovenden.
While I accept that there is medical evidence that Ms Hansen was suffering from stress and
anxiety, that evidence does not establish that Ms Hansen’s medical condition was such that
she was unable to file her application within time or that she was incapacitated such that she
was prevented from filing her application within the required time. In this regard, I note that
the diagnosis of 20 October 2015 is provisional and said to be based on statements made by
Ms Hansen. It is also the case that Ms Hansen did not see her doctor again until 24 May
2016. It is also the case that other than the inconclusive medical certificate, the only evidence
of Ms Hansen’s incapacity is her own assessment of her medical condition11 which goes
beyond what is indicated in the medical certificate.
[27] While I accept that Ms Hansen was distressed at the loss of her job, as a Full Bench of
the Commission observed in Australian Postal Corporation v Zhang12 this is not uncommon
in such circumstances. On 20 October 2015, Ms Hansen was capable of discussing whether
she should make a Workers’ Compensation claim with her doctor and of obtaining a medical
certificate for that purpose. There is no evidence of any change in her medical condition
between 20 October 2015 and 10 November when she consulted Unfair Dismissals Australia
and gave instructions to file an unfair dismissal application. Ms Hansen also said in her oral
evidence that she consulted other law firms before speaking to Mr Hakkinen of Unfair
Dismissals Australia. Ms Hansen’s medical evidence does not explain why she could not take
this step at an earlier time. I also note that Ms Hansen was capable of making a complaint to
the Police about alleged “stalking” on the part of Ms Gamble who had driven past her home
on 19 October 2015 notwithstanding that she was unable to file her application within the
required 21 day time frame.
[28] I do not accept that Ms Hansen’s concerns about her daughter remaining employed by
SOLAS provide a compelling or credible explanation for the delay in filing her application.
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The evidence establishes that Ms Hansen’s daughter was a valued employee of SOLAS and
that effort was made to dissuade her from resigning when she did so some six months after
Ms Hansen was dismissed.
[29] Further, Ms Hansen’s statement that she thought that she was within time on 10
November when she consulted Unfair Dismissals Australia indicates oversight or mistake,
which is not an exceptional circumstance. None of the matters advanced by Ms Hansen to
explain the delay in filing her application constitute exceptional circumstances either
individually or collectively.
The date on which Ms Hansen first become aware of her dismissal – s. 394(3)(b)
[30] In her Form F2 Application, Ms Hansen states that she became aware of her dismissal
on 19 October 2015 and that it took effect on that date. In subsequent submissions, Ms
Hansen states that she was not immediately aware of her dismissal. Essentially Ms Hansen
bases this assertion on the fact that she was notified of her dismissal by email on 19 October
2015, to which the letter of dismissal was attached, and that she did not open the email until
after the time that SOLAS closed for business on that date. Ms Hansen also contends that a
hard copy of the letter was placed in her letter box on 20 October 2015. These factors are said
to cast doubt as to whether her dismissal took effect on 19 October 2015 and to create the
possibility that her application was not made outside the 21 day time limit allowed under the
act.
[31] In her letter to the Commission dated 7 December 2015, Ms Hansen states that at 2.00
pm on 19 October 2015 she received a letter of termination by email and opened the email
after 5.00 pm on that date when she was the premises of SOLAS picking up her daughter. Ms
Hansen also asserted that management of SOLAS did not make any attempt to contact her on
19 October 2015 before sending the email. Ms Hansen further asserted that Ms Gamble and
another employee of SOLAS drove past her residence on a number of occasions on 10
October but did not stop. As previously noted, Ms Hansen later reported this conduct –
described by her as “stalking” – to the police.
[32] Ms Gamble tendered a “read receipt” from Ms Hansen indicating that she opened the
email attaching the termination letter at 4.58 pm on 19 October 2015. Ms Gamble also stated
that she made a number of attempts to personally deliver the letter of termination to Ms
Hansen and did leave the letter of termination in Ms Hansen’s letter box on 19 October 2015.
Ms Gamble agreed that she did drive past Ms Hansen’s house on 19 August to ascertain
whether she was home.
[33] A dismissal does not take effect unless and until it is communicated to the employee
who is being dismissed.13 In the present case, regardless of whether Ms Hansen was contacted
by telephone, in person or by email, it is not in dispute that at or around 4.58 pm on 19
October 2015, Ms Hansen opened and read an email informing that a letter terminating her
employment was attached. It is not relevant whether the email or the attached letter of
termination was read prior to, or after, close of business. Ms Hansen did not become aware of
her dismissal after it had taken effect. The dismissal took effect on 19 October 2015 and Ms
Hansen was aware of the dismissal on that day.
[34] Even if Ms Hansen did not read the letter attached to the email, the email opened by
her at 4.58 pm on 19 October 2015 stated:
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“Traie Please find attached your termination letter, please contact Alison or Petrina if
you have any questions.”
[35] I do not accept that there is any doubt about the date upon which Ms Hansen was
notified of her dismissal such that this is a consideration pointing to the existence of
exceptional circumstances. This assertion is inconsistent with Ms Hansen’s own evidence
and with the statements she made to the Commission in her application and subsequently.
Action taken by Ms Hansen to dispute her dismissal – s. 394(3)(c)
[36] Action taken by the employee to contest the dismissal, other than lodging an unfair
dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time.14 There is no evidence
before the Commission that Ms Hansen took any steps to dispute her dismissal prior to
making contact with Australian Unfair Dismissals on 10 November 2015 and attempting to
hold discussions with other law firms in the days prior to 10 November 2015. Ms Hansen
has also made no submissions in this regard.
Prejudice to SOLAS in granting in extension of time – s. 394(3)(d)
[37] SOLAS concedes that apart from the usual inconvenience associated with litigation, it
will not suffer significant prejudice should an extension of time be granted. However, the
‘mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of
time.”15
Merits of Ms Hansen’s application – s. 394(3)(e)
[38] A highly meritorious claim may persuade a decision-maker to accept an explanation
for delay that would otherwise have been insufficient.16 In considering the merits of the
application, the Commission may consider whether the Applicant has a sufficient case but
should not make findings on contested matters without hearing evidence.17 It is not usual that
the Commission would receive detailed evidence in considering an extension of time matter
and accordingly should not embark upon a detailed consideration of the substantive case.18
[39] Ms Hansen submits that it would be unfair to refuse to grant an extension of time,
thereby preventing her from pursuing a meritorious application. Ms Hansen submits that her
dismissal was effected without any valid reason but rather a mistaken belief on behalf of
SOLAS that Ms Hansen was still within her probationary period and that because of this, no
reason for dismissal was required.
[40] Ms Hansen submits that her dismissal was otherwise harsh given her personal
circumstances, the effect the dismissal has had on her professional reputation and the fact that
Ms Hansen lives in a remote area with limited employment prospects. It was also submitted
that Ms Hansen’s dismissal was procedurally unfair.
[41] SOLAS has filed a number of documents in respect of Ms Hansen’s performance. Ms
Hansen’s employment was the subject of an initial probation period of 6 months. On 16
September 2015, this initial period of probation was extended by a further 3 months. SOLAS
submits that as Ms Hansen was on probation as at the date of dismissal it was lawfully
entitled to dismiss her “without giving detailed reasons”. The “usual statutory protections
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governing job security are not normally extended to employees during a probation period
except by express agreement”. SOLAS submits that Ms Hansen did engage in unsatisfactory
conduct and performance during her employment. SOLAS submits that should Ms Hansen be
allowed to proceed with her application and the Commission order her reinstatement it would
be “entitled” to dismiss Ms Hansen due to incapacity to perform the work. An order for
reinstatement is said to be unlikely.
[42] SOLAS has identified some performance issues. There is no evidence before me of
performance discussions with Ms Hansen or warnings being given to Ms Hansen to indicate
that her employment was in jeopardy. There is no evidence before the Commission about
steps taken to discuss Ms Hansen’s dismissal prior to the decision being made to dismiss.
[43] It is also the case that the submissions of SOLAS in relation to the effect of a
probationary period are misconceived. An employee is protected from unfair dismissal if,
among other things, the employee has completed the minimum employment period. There is
no suggestion that Ms Hansen has not completed the minimum employment period. The usual
considerations in respect of an unfair dismissal arise, including whether there is a valid reason
for dismissal and whether the employee has been told of that reason and been provided an
opportunity to respond. This is so regardless of whether or not Ms Hansen was subject to a
probationary period. I am unable conclude that Ms Hansen’s case is without merit. However,
notwithstanding the misconception about the effect of the probationary period and the absence
of evidence about warnings, I am also unable to conclude that her case is of such merit that
this should be a positive consideration in the decision about whether to grant a further period
for Ms Hansen to make her application for an unfair dismissal remedy.
Fairness between Ms Hansen and other persons in a similar position – s. 394(3)(f)
[44] This consideration ordinarily arises in respect of fairness between the present
Applicant and Applicants in matters of a similar kind currently before the Commission or that
have been decided in the past.19 Ms Hansen submits that granting an extension of time will
not create unfairness between her circumstances and those of other Applicants in a similar
position. Ms Hansen has filed medical documentation in respect of her mental health
immediately following her dismissal and for the entire period of the 21 day timeframe.
[45] Cases where extensions of time have been granted because of the considerations that
arise in this case establish that the following may constitute exceptional circumstances
justifying the exercise of the Commission’s discretion to extend the time for making an unfair
dismissal application:
Medical or other incapacity established by probative evidence that prevents an
applicant from filing an application within the 21 day time period and for the relevant
period of delay; or
Lack of awareness about when a dismissal took effect because of factors such as
confusion created by the conduct of the employer or by reason of some other
compelling or credible circumstance.
[46] Further, this is not a case of representative error. Notwithstanding that it withdrew
from the matter prior to hearing, Unfair Dismissals Australia filed the application on behalf of
Ms Hansen on the day that she contacted the organisation and instructed it do so. In the
circumstances applicable to Ms Hansen’s case where none of the major grounds advanced by
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Ms Hansen are credible or compelling, it would be unfair to grant an extension of time when
in other cases involving similar circumstances, extensions have been refused.
4. Conclusion
[47] The considerations in s. 394(3)(a), (b) and (f) do not point to exceptional
circumstances and weigh against the exercise of the discretion to extend time. The
considerations in s. 394(3)(c), (d) and (e) are at best neutral. Having considered all of the
factors set out in s. 394(3), I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances
warranting the exercise of discretion to grant a further period for the making of Ms Hansen’s
application for an unfair dismissal remedy. That application must be dismissed and an Order
to that effect will issue with this Decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Price code C, PR584494
1 A bundle of documents filed by Ms Hansen at various times were tendered and marked as Exhibit 4.
2 Exhibit 3 – Statement of Kate Gamble.
3 Nulty v Blue Star Group (2011) 203 IR 1at [13] and see also Parker v Department of Human Services [2009] FWA 1638;
Johnson v Joy Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd t/as Joy Mining Machinery [2010] FWA 1394.
4 Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 299‒300.
5 Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers (2010) 197 IR 403, 408‒409.
6 Exhibit 4.
7 [2010] FWA 3863.
8 [2011] FWA 673.
9 Ibid at [27].
10 Ibid at [6].
11 Underwood v Terra Firma Pty Ltd T/A Terra Firma Business Consulting [2015] FWCFB 3435 at [16].
12 [2015] FWCFB 3285.
13 Burns v Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) (unreported, AIRCFB, Williams SDP, Acton SDP, Gregor C,
21 November 2000) Print T3496 [24].
ORK COMMISSION AUSTRALIA THE SEAS OF FAIR
http://cmsplus/cmsplus/PrintDetail.do?method=load&index=581956
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14 Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 299‒300.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Giudice J, Acton SDP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421
[14].
18 Ibid.
19 Wilson v Woolworths [2010] FWA 2480 (unreported, Richards SDP, 15 April 2010) [24]‒[29] (in passing).
