1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions
Andrew Townsley
v
State of Victoria (Department of Education & Early Childhood
Development)
(C2013/5001)
VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT HAMILTON
COMMISSIONER WILSON
SYDNEY, 20 SEPTEMBER 2013
Appeal against decision [[2013] FWC 1836] of Commissioner Gregory at Melbourne on 14
June 2013 in matter number U2012/12667 - no case to answer.
[1] On 24 August 2012 Mr Andrew Townsley filed an application under s.394 of the Fair
Work Act 2009 (the Act) for an unfair dismissal remedy concerning the termination of his
employment on 16 August 2012 by the Department of Education and Early Childhood
Development (the Department).
[2] On 14 June 2013 Commissioner Gregory handed down a decision1 (Decision) in
which he granted an application made by the Department under s.587(1)(c) of the Act
dismissing the application. He dismissed the application after the conclusion of Mr
Townsley’s evidentiary case. No witness evidence was led by the Department. On 2 July
2013 Mr Townsley lodged an appeal against the decision under s.604 of the Act.
[3] The grounds of appeal and submissions are many, and included amongst them are two
principal issues. The first concerns the procedure followed by the Commission in dismissing
Mr Townsley’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy, and the associated question of
whether Mr Townsley had an entitlement to cross-examine the Department’s witnesses.
Secondly, Mr Townsley made a number of challenges to the Commissioner’s finding that
there was a valid reason for his dismissal based on his failure to comply with three lawful and
reasonable directions, and in particular contended that the second of the three directions was
not lawful or reasonable because he was on sick leave at the time it was issued.
[4] On 15 August 2013, before the hearing of the appeal commenced, Mr Townsley and
the Department agreed pursuant to s.607(1)(b) that the appeal should be determined on the
basis of written submissions without the need for a hearing, and we determined pursuant to
s.607(1)(a) that the appeal could be adequately determined in this way. Written submissions
had earlier been filed in accordance with the Commission’s directions, and we permitted
further written submissions in reply to be filed. The Department was granted permission to
1 [2013] FWC 1836
[2013] FWCFB 5834
DECISION
E AUSTRALIA FairWork Commission
[2013] FWCFB 5834
2
appear through a lawyer pursuant to s.596(2)(a), after the parties were given an opportunity to
put written submissions on the issue.
The Decision at First Instance
[5] Commissioner Gregory firstly discussed at some length the evidence and submissions
concerning three directions to Mr Townsley issued by the Principal of the school at which he
worked2. These were firstly a direction to Mr Townsley dated 14 September 2011, in which
he was directed by the School Principal to provide certain assessment records for a number of
classes, and to provide lesson plans for all of his lessons for the week beginning 19 September
2011. Secondly, on 18 September 2011 he was again directed to provide specified assessment
records and lesson plans. Thirdly, on 16 May 2011 he was directed not to approach any of the
students named in a complaint against him.
[6] Commissioner Gregory concluded in relation to s.387(a):
“[71] I do not accept the Applicant’s submissions on this point. I am satisfied that in all
the circumstances the Principal gave lawful and reasonable directions to the Applicant.
I am also satisfied they were appropriate directions to provide to a teacher in
circumstances where concerns about that teacher’s work performance were being
explored and investigated. In that context a fundamental part of any process of review
and evaluation would be to seek from the teacher what plans or structure were in place
for the forthcoming lessons the teacher was to provide to students at the school. In
these circumstances and in the face of the Applicant’s failure to provide what was
requested I am satisfied the Principal’s directions to the Applicant were entirely
appropriate.
[72] I am also satisfied that the evidence indicates those directions were not complied
with. It is acknowledged that different teachers may prepare and use different lesson
plan formats, but this does not remove the obligation to produce that documentation to
a person with the requisite authority to make such directions in circumstances where
the teacher’s work performance is being reviewed and evaluated.
[73] The second direction was given to the Applicant by the Principal following
complaints made about him by two year eight students. Those complaints were made
in writing to the Principal in May 2011. Upon receipt of those complaints the Principal
wrote to the Applicant on 16 May detailing the complaints and setting up a process to
enable the Applicant to respond. The letter concluded with a direction that the
Applicant was not to approach any of the students named in the complaint. However,
later in that year the Applicant did approach both students on separate occasions and
did raise the issue of the complaint that each had made to the Principal. The first
occasion occurred in October when the student was in a detention class being
supervised by the Applicant. The second occasion occurred in the following month
when the Applicant raised the issue in a discussion with the student during a lesson.
The Applicant did eventually acknowledge in cross-examination that if he had his time
over things would have been handled differently, and the issue should not have been
raised with the two girls. However, the submission made on his behalf in response to
this application do not reflect those acknowledgements. It questions the veracity of the
2 Ibid, paragraphs 12-33
[2013] FWCFB 5834
3
complaints made by the students involved and submits there was no evidence of
discomfort or intimidation when the students were approached by the Applicant about
the complaints they had made. Those submissions also suggest there was no specific
direction in place stating that the Applicant was prevented from speaking to the
students about the complaints some five or six months after they were first made. The
Applicant’s witness statement also questions the motivation of the students who had
made the complaint and takes issue with how many were involved. However, it does
not make reference to the breach of the direction from the Principal to not approach
those students about the complaint they had made.
[74] In my view these submissions are at odds with the Applicant’s own evidence
adduced in cross-examination and ignore what should be clearly evident to a teacher in
a position of power and authority with an appropriate understanding of his/her role and
responsibilities. I am satisfied it should be evident to any teacher in that situation that
it is inappropriate in any circumstances to approach a student in this way. It is a
consequence that stems from the imbalance in the relationship between the teacher on
the one hand and the student on the other. It is a situation that should apply regardless
of whether the teacher has been given a specific direction by a Principal or not, and
regardless of when it occurs. Ironically in this context the Applicant subsequently
sought to rely on the fact he made a complaint against the Principal as reason why the
Principal should not be in any form of contact with him.
[75] The Applicant’s representative also responded to a question from the Commission
by indicating the directions were “a stunt” and in no way, under any circumstances,
could they be considered to be lawful or reasonable. Again, I do not accept this
submission. I am satisfied the so-called document and investigation directions given
by the Principal to the Applicant were in the circumstances lawful and reasonable. I
am also satisfied the evidence indicates they were received and understood by the
Applicant in terms of what was being asked of him. I am also satisfied that despite
them being lawful and reasonable they were either not complied with or deliberately
disobeyed. Further, they deal with matters of fundamental importance in a relationship
involving a principal and teacher.
[76] Having considered the evidence provided in this matter I am satisfied that the
Respondent had a valid reason to dismiss the Applicant related to his conduct based on
the evidence adduced in cross-examination about the issuing of those directions and
the failure of the Applicant to either comply with or obey them. I am also satisfied that
finding can be made at this point based on the evidence adduced in cross-examination
without further testing of the Respondent’s evidence.”
[7] After making the required findings in relation to ss.387(b)-(g), which are not in
contention, he turned to deal with the procedure he followed in determining the matter in
making findings about s.387(h). He concluded:
“[91] I am satisfied that both the requirements of natural justice and “a fair go all round”
have been provided to the Applicant. He has had the opportunity to make submissions
and provide the evidence he relies on in support of his unfair dismissal application. I
am also satisfied that during the testing of that evidence it has been established that on
three occasions he failed to comply with lawful and reasonable directions given to him
by the Principal of his school without providing plausible explanations in response for
[2013] FWCFB 5834
4
this failure. In these circumstances and having considered all the submissions and
evidence in this matter, and the considerations in s.387 I am required to have regard to,
I am satisfied it is not possible to find the Applicant’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or
unreasonable. I am satisfied in those circumstances it is appropriate to now dismiss the
matter in accordance with s.587(1)(c) on the basis that the application has “no
reasonable prospects of success”. The application is accordingly dismissed.”
Appeal Grounds and Submissions
[8] The grounds of Mr Townsley’s appeal against the Decision under s.604 of the Act
included that the Decision was “manifestly unjust”, that the full case should be heard
including cross examination of the Department’s witnesses, that there were significant errors
of fact in the decision, and other matters. He claimed that the decision raised issues of public
interest such that permission to appeal should be granted.
[9] Mr Townsley submitted in his first written submission that the decision was “wrong in
law”3, that the decision engaged in “reductionism”, reducing a lengthy issue to one or two
“assumed essentials”4, that Mr Townsley was misled and misrepresented in various respects,
and that proper procedure was not followed5, that the decision was an “affront to rights” given
the medical certificate and other matters6, that “due process” was not followed7, that there was
error and repetition in cross-examination of Mr Townsley8, that Mr Townsley committed “no
crime”9, and that the Department engaged in inappropriate conduct in various respects10. He
alleged that there were a large number of “significant errors of fact” in the decision11. He
attached a range of documents in his appeal book which included what he described as
ignored audio recordings about his teaching, the schools agreement, complaint outcomes June
27 2011, VCAA audit fraudulent document, admission the Principal condones falsifying
documents, Principal’s Merit Protection Board submission, the lawful direction letter and
emails, the 3rd complaint outcome letter, the 15 June 2012 “preliminary view letter”, the
termination letter, the investigation report, the respondent’s letters by Ms Petrony, the s.587
submission by the respondent, extracts of evidence concerning alleged intimidation and
repetition by Mr Townsley, and other matters.
[10] In a second written submission Mr Townsley submitted that he had a right to cross-
examine the Department’s witnesses, that the decision under appeal was contrary to the public
interest, that s.587 could not be used to stifle the opposition’s chance to cross examine, that
his five days sick leave in September 2011 should be taken into account and that the Principal
had not acted correctly, and dealt with other matters.
3 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 5-12
4 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 13-17
5 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 22-41
6 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 42-53
7 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 54-65
8 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 66-69
9 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 70-79
10 Appeal Submission, paragraphs 80-90
11 Appeal Submission, ‘Significant errors of fact’, paragraphs 1-98
[2013] FWCFB 5834
5
[11] In a third written submission Mr Townsley submitted that the first, second and third
complaints process conducted by the Principal was in error12, the performance procedure was
in error13, the directions issued by the Principal to Mr Townsley were in error14, the medical
certificate was ignored, the Commissioner supported the Principal’s directions and erred15,
and other matters.
[12] The Department submitted that the public interest test required for the grant of
permission to appeal under s.400(1) of the Act is a substantial one, not simply satisfied by the
identification of error or a preference for a different result. The decision at first instance did
not manifest an injustice, Mr Townsley was permitted to call his evidence and advocate his
case. His representative had the opportunity to re-examine Mr Townsley. He was assisted by
a lawyer for the first three days of the hearing. Mr Townsley was given an opportunity to
resist the s.587 application, an adjournment was granted, and he was given fair warning of the
matters to be advanced. Mr Townsley did not “dispute the underlying factual substratum on
the issue of each of the lawful and reasonable directions”. Mr Townsley’s submission that the
directions were not lawful and not reasonable was wrong both in fact and law. The
Commission should not grant permission to appeal. There was no error identified by Mr
Townsley. It put a number of other submissions in relation to each of the grounds of
termination relied on by the Department. The Department submitted that Commissioner
Gregory took into account the medical certificate, and other matters. In relation to the
conduct of the Commissioner, the Department submitted that he gave Mr Townsley every
opportunity to present his factual and legal case, and his conduct was ‘exemplary’.
[13] In a second submission the Department dealt with a number of other matters. It said
that Mr Townsley had been afforded natural justice, and that there is no “explicit statutory
right to cross-examine”.
[14] In a third submission the Department submitted that Mr Townsley had breached the
Commission’s direction that its third submission be a reply submission only, and had put new
submissions as to the merits of his application, and referred to new material not before
Commissioner Gregory. It said that these new submissions were inimical to the due
administration of justice and should not be permitted on appeal.
The Act
[15] Section 587(1) “Dismissing Applications” of the Act provides:
“(1) Without limiting when the FWC may dismiss an application, the FWC may dismiss
an application if:
(a) the application is not made in accordance with this Act; or
(b) the application is frivolous or vexatious; or
(c) the application has no reasonable prospects of success.”
[16] Section 587(2) is not relevant in the context of this matter. Section 587(3) provides:
12 Appeal Submission, 6 September 2013, paragraphs 177-202; paragraphs 216-223
13 Appeal Submission, 6 September 2013, paragraphs 203-215
14 Appeal Submission, 6 September 2013, paragraphs 222-235; paragraphs 244, 260-287
15 Appeal Submission, 6 September 2013, paragraphs 288-307
[2013] FWCFB 5834
6
“The FWC may dismiss an application:
(a) on its own initiative; or
(b) on application.”
Decision
[17] The first issue raised on appeal relates to the procedure followed by the Commissioner
in determining the matter. In Micheletto v. Korowa Anglican Girls’ School16 a Full Bench of
the Commission said:
“The Right to a Hearing
[14] It is implicit in the statutory provisions which we have referred to that once an
applicant has elected to have his or her application determined by arbitration he or she
acquires a right to have the case heard. There is a corresponding duty in the
Commission to hear the applicant's case. The nature of the applicant's right is, in the
time-honoured phrase, a right to their day in court. The right to a hearing is not
unqualified. Circumstances may render it just that something less than a full hearing is
appropriate. For example, the Act specifically provides for summary dismissal of an
application if there is clearly no jurisdiction (s.170CEA) or if the applicant fails to
prosecute its case (s.170CIB). There may be other circumstances in which an
application might be dismissed without a full hearing and without infringing the rules
of procedural fairness. It is necessary to explore in some detail what those
circumstances might be.
No Case Submissions
[15] In civil proceedings an application might be struck out at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case in response to a submission on behalf of the defendant that there is no
case for the defendant to answer, a no-case submission. Except in a narrow class of
cases the defendant would be required to elect between making a no-case submission
and calling evidence. Accordingly, if the no-case submission were to fail the defendant
would not be permitted to call evidence. Whether the respondent is put to its election
is a matter in the discretion of the judge.
[16] There is no reason why a no-case submission should not be permitted in s.170CE
proceedings, subject to the same limitations. As just indicated, in civil proceedings a
no-case submission is normally made at the end of the plaintiff's case. At that stage the
issues in the case and the evidentiary questions which may require resolution have
been exposed through examination in chief and cross-examination. For that reason in
our view in the arbitration of claims made under s.170CE(1)(a) a no-case submission
should generally only be permitted at the end of the applicant's case, unless the case is
one in which the conclusion can be reached at the outset that the respondent has no
case to answer.
16 [2003] AIRC 1391, Giudice J, President, Hamilton DP, Deegan C, 11 November 2003
http://www.fwc.gov.au/wrasections/s170CE.html
http://www.fwc.gov.au/wrasections/s170CE.html
[2013] FWCFB 5834
7
[17] In civil litigation there are circumstances in which a no-case submission may be
made at the outset of proceedings and before the plaintiff's evidence commences. The
court has a discretion to dismiss an application before any evidence is heard on the
basis of the pleadings and other material filed by the plaintiff. In General Steel
Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) and Others (General Steel),
Barwick CJ accepted that "the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be
sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is
satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the
parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion."”
[18] These conclusions are consistent with those of Full Bench decisions in Govender17 and
Ghalloub18. Those authorities made it clear that under the previous Workplace Relations Act
1996 it was open to the Commission to make the required findings of fact and the ultimate
decision in relation to an unfair dismissal application pursuant to a “no case to answer”
submission made by the respondent at the conclusion of an applicant’s case and without
hearing any evidence from the respondent.
[19] The power to undertake that course under the Act is now confirmed by s.587(1)(c),
which expressly empowers the Commission to dismiss an application that has no reasonable
prospects of success. Thus there is no doubt that the Commissioner had the power to dispose
of Mr Townsley’s application in the way that he did once he had formed the view that the
application had no reasonable prospects of success. Alternatively, he could simply have made
the findings he was required to make in relation to each of the matters set out in s.387 on the
basis of the material before him. For the reasons explained in Micheletto, it was open to the
Commissioner to take either approach without having heard the Department’s evidentiary
case.
[20] Mr Townsley objects to the procedure followed by the Commissioner. He submits
that he was denied the right to cross-examine the Department’s witnesses and thereby advance
his case. This submission is, with respect, misconceived. The Department did not call any
witnesses, nor was it obliged to do so. In that circumstance no issue of Mr Townsley’s right
to cross-examine could arise because there were no witnesses for him to cross-examine.
[21] The Commissioner allowed Mr Townsley to put the full evidentiary and merit case
that he wished to put. He had his “day in court”, and was afforded natural justice. When his
case concluded, the Department submitted that the application should be dismissed on the
basis of the evidence before the Commission. On the basis of that evidence, the
Commissioner was able to and did make findings about each of the matters set out in s.387,
and gave them due weight as he was required to do: ALH Group Pty Ltd trading as the Royal
Exchange Hotel v Mulhall19, Edwards v Giudice20. He dismissed the application for an unfair
dismissal remedy. No appellable error occurred in the Commissioner taking this course.
[22] For completeness, we note that in his decision the Commissioner made reference to a
number of documents appended to the statements of evidence which the Department filed in
connection with the matter but did not tender. We do not consider that in doing this the
17 [2003] AIRC 1145, 12 September 2003
18 [2005] AIRC 238, 21 March 2005
19 [2002] AIRC 329
20 [1999] FCA 1836
http://www.fwc.gov.au/fullbench/PR919205.htm
[2013] FWCFB 5834
8
Commissioner impermissibly entered into the evidentiary case which the Department
foreshadowed by filing the statements but never ran. The documents referred to in the
decision consisted of communications between the Department (in its various manifestations)
and Mr Townsley. There was no issue that the documents had been sent and received. Mr
Townsley was cross-examined about these documents, and his evidence in that connection
was relied upon by the Department. It is evident from the Decision that the Commissioner
had regard to the documents only as evidence of the fact of the communications between the
Department and Mr Townsley, and not as to the truth of their contents. Having regard to the
way in which the proceedings went forward, it was open to the Commissioner under s.590(1)
to inform himself by reference to these documents even though they were never formally put
into evidence.
[23] We further note that in allowing the Department to put what was effectively a no-case
submission after the close of Mr Townsley’s case, the Commissioner did not appear to have
required the Department to elect not to call any evidence. Indeed, the Commissioner appears
to have taken the view that if the Department’s no-case submission was unsuccessful, “the
original application simply proceeds from where we left off”.21 As the Full Bench stated in
Micheletto, the usual rule in civil proceedings is that a party desiring to have a matter
determined on the basis of a no-case submission must elect not to call any evidence. The
rationale for this approach was stated in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v
Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd22 as follows:
“The general rule of practice is that a decision will not be given on a no case submission
unless the moving party elects to give no evidence: Rasomen, at 223; Compaq
Computer, at 6-7 (and cases cited there). There are good reasons for the rule, in
particular the difficulty that if a judge rules in favour of a no case submission and the
judgment in favour of the moving party is overturned on appeal, it would usually be
necessary to order a new trial: Compaq Computer, at 7. A further problem is that a no
case submission may require the judge to consider the evidence twice during the trial,
namely, in connection with the submission and, if the submission fails, at the
conclusion of all the evidence. This problem may be particularly acute if the no case
submission requires an evaluation of the credit of witnesses.”
[24] In our view this rationale is fully applicable to unfair dismissal proceedings. The just
and convenient disposition of an unfair dismissal application would usually require a
respondent to elect not to call evidence if it wishes the application to be determined on the
basis of a submission made at the close of the applicant’s case that the application has no
reasonable prospects of success. However, the fact that the Department was not put to the
election did not have any effect upon the outcome here, given that the Commissioner
dismissed Mr Townsley’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy. It is not necessary for us
to deal with this issue further given the conclusions we have reached as to the disposition of
this appeal.
[25] Mr Townsley also challenges the Commissioner’s conclusion that there was a valid
reason for Mr Townsley’s dismissal, as well as a number of other findings made by the
Commissioner. In relation to s.387(a), the Commissioner found that Mr Townsley breached
three reasonable and lawful directions issued to him by the Principal and that this constituted
21 Transcript 12 March 2013 PN40
22 [2000] FCA 17; 169 ALR 344
[2013] FWCFB 5834
9
a valid reason for his dismissal. The fact of the directions and Mr Townsley’s breach thereof
was in effect conceded by Townsley in the hearing before the Commissioner. The main
complaint of Mr Townsley on appeal is that the breach of directions did not justify
termination of employment, for various reasons, including that the directions were not
reasonable23. These and other submissions are in substance an attempt to have us determine
afresh the merits of the matters which were required to be determined by the Commissioner.
It is not open to us to re-determine the matter unless an error in the decision has been
established of the type identified in House v The King24 and permission to appeal has been
granted. We do not consider that any such error has been established, nor do we consider that
the appeal raises any public interest issue which would permit us to grant permission to
appeal under s.400(1) of the Act.
[26] One submission that loomed large in Mr Townsley’s case on appeal was that the
Commissioner erred in finding that the second of the three directions which he breached was
lawful or reasonable because Mr Townsley was on sick leave at the time the direction was
issued and therefore could not reasonably be expected to comply with it. We do not consider
that any error has been demonstrated in this respect. The first direction was issued by way of a
letter dated 14 September 201125. In that letter, the Principal reminded Mr Townsley that he
had not provided assessment records or lesson plans as he had been previously asked to do,
and directed him to provide her with specified assessment results, and all lesson plans for the
week commencing 19 September 2011, by 4.00pm on 15 September 2011.
[27] There was no factual issue that this direction was not complied with by Mr Townsley.
No assessment results or lesson plans were provided to the Principal. Solicitors representing
Mr Townsley wrote to the Principal advising her that the requested documents could be
“made available” at the solicitors’ office, but the Principal (in our view justifiably) informed
the solicitors that Mr Townsley was required to produce the documents to her, that if he failed
to do so he may be committing an act of misconduct, and that she would not be attending the
solicitors’ office to view any documents.
[28] Not having received anything, the second direction was issued by the Principal in a
letter dated 19 September 2011. It noted that Mr Townsley had not complied with the first
direction, and directed him to provide four categories of documents by 4.00 pm on 21
September 2011, the fourth of which were lesson plans for that week (i.e. the week
commencing 19 September 2011) and the week beginning 10 October 2011. At the very least,
that aspect of the direction requiring the production of lessons plans for that week did not
involve any requirement for Mr Townsley to perform work, since those lesson plans clearly
should already have been prepared and should already have been produced pursuant to the 14
September 2011 direction. The evidence does not suggest that Mr Townsley’s medical
condition was such as to prevent him from simply producing documents already in existence,
since his evidence was that he did produce the first three categories of documents required by
the second direction. Therefore, at least to the extent that Mr Townsley failed to produce the
lessons plans for the week beginning 19 September 2011 in response to the second direction,
he failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction, and Mr Townsley’s challenge to
the Commissioner’s finding to that effect must fail. It is not necessary in the circumstances for
23 Eg. Appeal Submission, 6 September 2013, paragraph 233-234; ‘Significant Errors of Fact’, paragraphs 14, 24, 28, 29, 32,
51, 52, 63
24 (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505
25 It is set out in paragraph [15] of the Decision.
[2013] FWCFB 5834
10
us to go further and examine whether that aspect of the second direction requiring the
production of the lesson plans for the week beginning 10 October 2011 was also lawful and
reasonable. We simply note that the evidence did not make it clear whether those lesson plans
should already have been prepared by that time or not, and we further note that in any event
there was no suggestion by Mr Townsley in his evidence that he produced those lesson plans
at any time, even after the end of his period of sick leave.
[29] No error of fact or law has been established, let alone a significant error of fact26. The
public interest test in s.400(1) is not satisfied by advancing a case for the preference for a
different result: Barwon Health - Geelong Hospital v Colson27. In GlaxoSmithKline Australia
Pty Ltd v Makin a Full Bench of the Tribunal identified some of the considerations that may
attract the public interest:
“... the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issue of importance and
general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that
guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance
manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive or that the legal principles
applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with
similar matters...” 28
[30] The procedure followed in this matter to determine the outcome does not raise any
new issue of legal principle. There is no public interest in granting permission to appeal. We
refuse permission to appeal.
VICE PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr A Townsley on his own behalf with Mr J Townsley
Mr N Harrington of counsel for the respondent
Hearing details:
2013.
Melbourne:
15 August.
Final written submissions:
2013
9 August
15 August
26 s.400(2)
27 [2013] FWCFB 4515
28 (2010) 197 IR 266 at paragraph 27
WORK COMMISSION -- AUSTRALIA THE SEAL OF FA
[2013] FWCFB 5834
11
5 September
10 September
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Price code C, PR540385
